AGRANAT COMMISSION, ON ARAB-ISRAEL WAR (1973)

Established in November 1973 to investigate the reasons for Israel's vulnerability to the surprise attack by Syrian and Egyptian forces on 6 October, the commission, chaired by Chief Justice Simon Agranat, inquired into the responsibility of the Cabinet and the failures of military intelligence. Despite Israel's ability to recoup militarily after the first few days of the war, the initial fighting had incurred heavy losses of manpower and matériel, and Israeli military intelligence was discredited for not having predicted the attack. In addition, the brief war shattered Israel's belief that it was militarily invulnerable and hence its conviction that territories could be held indefinitely. The commission blamed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for its flawed assessment of Egyptian military prowess and recommended the removal of the chief of staff, the chief of intelligence, and other high-ranking officers. To the disappointment of many Israelis and the press, the commission called for the dismissal of David Elazar, chief of General Staff, and four other officers, but stopped short of judging Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, relegating that responsibility to the Knesset via a no-confidence vote and to the public via general elections. The commission's report, issued in April 1974, did, however, lead to a major shake-up of the Labor government, the resignation of Prime Minister Meir, and a new cabinet led by Yitzhak Rabin in June 1974, and it was considered a factor in Labor's defeat in the 1977 Knesset election.

SEE ALSO Agranat, Simon;Arab-Israel War (1973).