CHINA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

since the late 1980s, china's middle east policy primarily revolves around its desire to maximize its economic interests without becoming entangled in political controversies.

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, China has had a roller-coaster relationship with the region. Periodic domestic upheavals and its long exclusion from the United Nations (UN) resulted in China oscillating from isolation and disengagement to active involvement with groups and movements hostile to Middle Eastern regimes. Even though the Bandung Conference (1955) opened the doors to the Middle East, Chinese diplomatic progress was slow and painful. Conservative Middle Eastern regimes that were apprehensive of atheist communist ideology were further threatened by China's identification with revolutionary regimes such as Egypt and Iraq and its support of radical movements. Likewise, some Middle Eastern countries maintained diplomatic relations with the breakaway Taiwanese republic, and this in turn raised concerns in Beijing.

China's admission to the UN in 1971 resulted in a nuanced foreign policy, and confident of its international recognition and acceptance, China toned down its criticism of the conservative monarchies and began adopting a friendlier posture with all the major countries. The emergence of pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 brought about significant shifts in China's Middle East policy.

As part of its four modernization processes, China commercialized its arms supplies and looked to the Middle East as a prime customer. The prolonged Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s and the U.S.–U.S.S.R. arms embargo upon the warring nations proved advantageous to China. As Iran and Iraq looked to Beijing for arms supplies, Chinese weapons were in action on both sides of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Military modernization also compelled China to look to Israel as a possible ally, and military ties were established between the two long before the establishment of political relations.

In the 1980s China actively promoted proliferation of nonconventional weapons and helped countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria to acquire missile capabilities. The Saudi apprehension over the intensification of missile attacks during the Iran–Iraq War enabled China to conclude a multibillion-dollar deal for the supply of CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Riyadh, with whom China had not yet established normal relations.

Israel occupies an important position in China's Middle East policy. Even though the Jewish state was the first Middle Eastern country to recognize the People's Republic of China (in January 1950), it was the last country in the region to be recognized by China (in January 1992). Initial Israeli reluctance, owing to perceived pressure from the United States, was followed by Chinese recognition of the political value of and ideological affinity to the Palestinian cause. The Suez Crisis of 1956 alienated China further. Political rivalry with Moscow and ideological competition with Washington influenced China to become the staunchest supporter of the Palestinian cause, and in January 1965 it became the first non-Arab power to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Besides political support, Beijing also provided military support and training to various Palestinian groups.

The 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait tested China's diplomatic skills and threatened its delicate relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia. Unwilling to join the U.S.-led coalition and unprepared to abandon Iraq, its political ally and economic market, during the critical UN Security Council vote authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Resolution 678) China abstained. This tacit support endorsed the liberation of Kuwait without unduly damaging the Sino-Iraqi relations.

The resolution of the Kuwait crisis, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the United States as the preeminent global power, posed new challenges to China. Eager to participate in the Madrid peace process, in January 1992 China recognized and established diplomatic ties with Israel. Greater Chinese emphasis on economic relations is strengthened by increasing Chinese dependence upon Middle East for its hydrocarbon requirements. As China's economic growth continues, its energy needs shape its Middle East policy, especially towards countries such as Iraq and Iran, which were identified by U.S. president George W. Bush as part of an "Axis of Evil." During the Iraq war of 2003, China vehemently demanded Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 but opposed the use of force to secure Iraqi compliance. However, when the war broke out, China's Middle East policy reflected the traditional policy of seeking to maximize its economic interests without becoming entangled in political controversies.

see also bandung conference (1955); iran–iraq war (1980–1988); war in iraq (2003).

Bibliography

Bin-Huwaidin, Mohamed. China's Relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949–1999. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

Calabrese, John. China's Changing Relations with the Middle East. New York: Frances Pinter, 1991.

Gladney, Dru C. "Sino-Middle Eastern Perspective and Relations since the Gulf War: Views from Below." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1994): 677–691.

Harris, Lillian Craig. China Considers the Middle East. London: I. B. Tauris, 1992.

Kumaraswamy, P. R., ed. China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence. New Delhi: Sage, 1999.

Shichor, Yitzhak. The Middle East in Chinese Foreign Policy, 1949–1977. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Kazuo Takahaski

Updated by P. R. Kumaraswamy