Miranda Rules

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MIRANDA RULES

in miranda v. arizona (1966) the Supreme Court held that a person subject to custodial police interrogation must be warned that any statement he makes can be used against him, that he has a right to remain silent, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney and that one will be appointed for him if he is indigent. A defendant may waive these rights. Awaiver must be voluntary and intelligent. In the absence of a fully effective alternative, these warnings must be given and a valid waiver taken as the constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of any product of custodial police interrogation.

theMiranda opinion left unresolved numerous issues. For example: When is a person in custody? What constitutes interrogation? What are the standards for measuring the validity of a purported waiver of the Miranda rights? May voluntary statements that are inadmissible for failure to comply with Miranda be introduced to impeach the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony? How is the burden of proving voluntariness and compliance with the Miranda requirements allocated?

Post-Miranda cases have lessened considerably the constraints the decision had imposed upon law enforcement officials. For example, the police are required to give a suspect the Miranda warnings only if the suspect is in custody at the time of interrogation. In orozco v. texas (1969) the Court held that a person is in custody any time that he is not free to leave whether in his own home, a hospital, a police car, or the stationhouse. estelle v. smith (1981) held that when an indicted defendant, who has not put his mental state in issue, is compelled to undergo a court-ordered psychiatric examination, he is in custody and is entitled to the Miranda warnings prior to the evaluation by a mental health professional. However, most courts have held that a suspect is not in custody when in an open, natural environment. Examples include stop and frisk situations, traffic arrests, accident investigations, or searches at international borders.

The second prerequisite to requiring the Miranda warnings is that the suspect be the subject of interrogation. The Miranda opinion defined interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers." In rhode island v. innes (1980), the Court elaborated, stating that "interrogation" meant "express questioning or its functional equivalent" including "any words or actions on the part of the police … reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." By contrast, a statement freely and voluntarily made without any interrogation is admissible as a "threshold confession" or "spontaneous statement." If, for example, a person walks into a police station and states that he has killed someone, the police are not required to stop the person wishing to speak and give that person the warnings.

If both custody and interrogation are present, the police must give the warnings or take a valid waiver before proceeding. The police may not presume that a suspect knows of the Miranda rights. The form of the warnings may vary, however, so long as the words used give a clear, understandable warning of all the rights, taking into account the circumstances and the characteristics of the suspect.

in oregon v. elstad (1985) the Supreme Court held that an invalid confession obtained without the suspect being informed of his Miranda rights would not invalidate a later confession made after the suspect was informed of his rights, so long as the confession was obtained without coercion. However, in new york v. quarles (1984) the Court established a "public safety" exception, stating that if reasonable concern for public safety is present, a police officer need not recite the Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect in custody.

The accused, after receiving the warnings, may voluntarily waive any of his Miranda rights. The government must demonstrate voluntariness under all the circumstances. A signed waiver form is strong, but not conclusive, evidence of voluntariness. An effective waiver need not be written, however, and it may be implied from the accused's conduct.

Once the suspect terminates the interrogation or requests counsel, he may not be reinterviewed without being provided access to the requested attorney even if the suspect is given a second set of Miranda warnings. In edwards v. arizona (1981) the Court held that once an accused requests counsel, questioning must cease until counsel is present or until the accused "initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police." inSmith v. Illinois (1984), the Court followed this precedent by holding that, once the accused has requested an attorney, no further questions or responses may be used to cast doubt on the request.

By contrast, in Fare v. Michael C. (1979) the Court held that a juvenile's request for a probation officer during questioning does not have the same constitutional effect as a request for a lawyer. The Court based its distinction on the fact that a lawyer's principal responsibility is to defend his client, while a probation officer has a duty to report and prosecute misconduct by a juvenile. In addition, probation officers are not necessarily qualified to provide legal assistance. Consequently, a juvenile's request for his probation officer is not a per se invocation of the Mirandaright to counsel.

The issue of voluntariness arises in nonwaiver contexts as well. The Court has held that voluntary confessions obtained in violation of the Miranda rules, though not admissible in the State's case-in-chief as evidence of guilt, may be admitted to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility. In the leading case, harris v. new york (1971), the defendant denied in court that he had sold heroin to an undercover agent. During cross-examination, Harris was asked whether he had made certain statements following his arrest that were inconsistent with his in-court testimony. Even though the prosecution conceded that the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's ruling that the statements could be considered by the jury in evaluating the defendant's credibility.

When the defendant's statements are truly involuntary, they may not be admitted into evidence for any purpose. Mincey v. Arizona (1978) is illustrative, holding that the defendant's statements were inadmissible because they were obtained while the defendant was hospitalized and barely able to speak.

Whether the issue arises in the waiver or in the impeachment context, the burden of proving voluntariness under all the circumstances rests on the government. Miranda described it as a "heavy burden," a term which a number of courts have interpreted as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court, however, stopped this trend by holding, in Lego v. Twomey (1972), that proof by a preponderance of the evidence will suffice in federal court, though the states may impose a higher burden in state proceedings.

Charles H. Whitebread
(1986)