Gordon, Michael R. 1951-

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Gordon, Michael R. 1951-

PERSONAL: Born 1951, in New York, NY. Education: Columbia Journalism School, B.A.; Columbia University, M.A.

ADDRESSES: Home— Washington, DC. Office— New York Times, 229 W. 43rd St., New York, NY 10036.

CAREER: During early career, worked for the United Nations and as a Washington, DC, reporter for the National Journal; New York Times, New York, NY, staff member, 1985—, currently chief military correspondent.

WRITINGS

(With Bernard E. Trainor) The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Little, Brown (Boston, MA), 1995.

(With Bernard E. Trainor) Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, Pantheon Books (New York, NY), 2006.

SIDELIGHTS: Michael R. Gordon is a war correspondent who has covered conflicts in many of the world’s hot spots, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the Middle East. After graduating from the Columbia School of Journalism, he worked for the United Nations, mostly covering issues in Namibia for three years. He then became a reporter for the National Journal in Washington, DC. During the early 1980s, he covered the Pentagon, before being hired by the New York Times in 1985. Military issues and foreign policy became his specialty. Teaming up with retired army general Bernard E. Trainor, Gordon has written two books about American wars in the Middle East:The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, and Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.

The Generals’ War is about the first Gulf War—also known by the operation names of Desert Shield and Desert Storm—and the decisions made by Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf during the George H.W. Bush presidency. The American invasion of Kuwait to oust invading Iraqi forces was like a German blitzkrieg. Yet despite the quick success of liberating the small, oil-rich country, the ultimate end of the conflict is seen by many as a failure because of President Bush’s decision not to relentlessly pursue and destroy Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. Hence, Saddam remained comfortably in power in Iraq, and eventually became the target of a second, disastrous war for the Americans. Gordon and Trainor attempt to answer the big question as to why the Americans did not destroy the Republican Guard in what Eugene Sullivan called a “fascinating and sustained analysis” in his Booklist review. Washington Monthly contributor David Evans praised the “thoroughly researched” book, which makes use of declassified government documents and numerous interviews with military personnel and political bureaucrats. While the authors conclude that the military’s performance in the war was exemplary, they largely lay the blame on General Schwarzkopf for not being forcefully insistent on finishing the job. For this reason and other reasons, the American forces stalled at the end of the conflict, and allowed the Iraqis to safely flee. Gordon and Trainor also point out that the air attacks, though heavy, still left the Iraqis with the ability to respond with Scud missiles; also, there was a notable lack of communication and coordination between the various branches of the service and the commanders in charge of the operation. While Evans regretted that the authors do not “satisfactorily” explain why the air attacks did not completely succeed, the critic appreciated the many other “juicy details” of what went awry.

A Publishers Weekly contributor concluded that The Generals’ War is a “meticulous reconstruction of American leadership in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.”

Cobra II depicts a much different military under much different leadership. Under President George W. Bush, son of the previous Bush, and his Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, there was a fundamental shift in the concept of what the U.S. military should be. Rumsfeld felt that the military under previous administrations was cumbersome, outdated, and geared more toward the problems of the Cold War era than toward the twenty-first-century dilemmas of conflicts in the Middle East and terrorism. Rumsfeld and President Bush believed that smaller forces, using high-tech weaponry and support, could succeed much more quickly and efficiently in military operations. This idea was put to the test when President Bush unilaterally decided to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. In Cobra II Gordon and Trainor explore what led to this fateful decision and the numerous mistakes in policy and decision-making that caused the Americans to become bogged down for years in a quagmire of endless violence and civil unrest. The authors discuss how Bush, and especially Rumsfeld, developed such tunnel vision that they refused to adapt their strategy when they met with unexpected resistance after successfully toppling the Iraqi regime. They grossly underestimated the number of American forces that would be required, and they did not expect to create a civilian insurgency against which the American military had little experience in overcoming. “Gordon and Trainor lucidly lay out the story of how perception and personality played decisive roles in planning for the war and the subsequent occupation from the moment the administration cast a baleful eye on Iraq,” reported Gregory Fontenot in the Military Review. While Fontenot complained that the authors sometimes do not provide supporting documentation for their arguments, the critic concluded that they “argue effectively that the planning effort was flawed by poor communication and a top-down approach that brooked almost no contrary points of view.” An Economist contributor was disappointed that the authors barely touch on the extended occupation of Iraq, focusing instead on what led up to it, but asserted that the book “will be hard to improve upon.” Also commenting on the “riveting... descriptions of the war” and “stupendous research,” Jacob Heilbrunn concluded in his New York Times Book Review assessment that “Cobra II is everything that the Bush administration’s plan for the war was not. It is meticulously organized, shuns bluff and bombast for lapidary statements, and is largely impervious to attack.”