Naftali, Timothy

views updated

Naftali, Timothy

PERSONAL:

Son of James D. and Marjorie Naftali. Education: Attended Yale University and Johns Hopkins University; Harvard University, Ph.D.

CAREER:

Historian. University of Hawaii, professor. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, research scholar; Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, visiting scholar; Yale University, New Haven, CT, visiting assistant professor of history and Olin Fellow, 1997-98; University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, Miller Center; National Archives and Records Administration, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, director-designate and director of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, 2006—.

WRITINGS:

(With Alexander Fursenko) One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964, Norton (New York, NY), 1997.

(Editor, with Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May) The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, Volumes 1-3, The Great Crises, Norton (New York, NY), 2001.

Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, Basic Books (New York, NY), 2005.

(With Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, and Robert Wolfe) US Intelligence and the Nazis, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 2005.

(With Aleksandr Fursenko) Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, Norton (New York, NY), 2006.

SIDELIGHTS:

Timothy Naftali is a professor and historian. Some thirty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, the end of the Cold War and the release of previously secret archival material by both the United States and the former Soviet Union allowed scholars to probe more deeply than before into that milestone of narrowly averted nuclear holocaust. Two scholars who benefited from the newly opened information, and who have benefited the public in turn through their research, are Naftali and Alexander Fursenko, coauthors of 1997's One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964. Naftali is also a former student of Ernest R. May, coeditor of the bestselling book The Kennedy Tapes. Wall Street Journal reviewer Richard J. Tofel, assessing both books in one article, observed that One Hell of a Gamble seemed to be "the perfect companion to The Kennedy Tapes." Where May's The Kennedy Tapes present readers with previously secret tape recordings made in the Oval Office, One Hell of a Gamble offers previously secret Soviet archives.

As the dates in their book's subtitle imply, Naftali and Fursenko analyzed the background and the consequences of the missile crisis as well as the famous thirteen days of the crisis itself. One Hell of a Gamble shows how Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had been gradually pushed into the Soviet orbit by both Soviet and U.S. moves and by the communist beliefs of his brother Raul. It also outlines the history of U.S. attempts to topple the Castro regime and of Soviet maneuvers to strengthen its own foothold in the Caribbean, not only against American interests but against potential Chinese aggression as well.

As far as the October, 1962, crisis itself, the book's authors present, as Robert Sam Anson put it in the St. Petersburg Times, numerous "shockers" about events behind the scenes, thus "producing one of those rare achievements: a book that takes our understanding of great events and stands it on its head." Among the micro-level shockers is the revelation that the Soviets were inadvertently warned about an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba—which had not in fact been decided upon—when a Russian émigré bartender overheard two American reporters talking about their plans to cover such an invasion. Other revelations had to do with an unsettling willingness on both sides, at least during the speculative portions of secret conferences, to consider the possibility of nuclear attacks.

On the broader level, Anson felt, the two authors had chipped away at the prevailing image of President John F. Kennedy as the cool-headed hero of the crisis, showing instead that, Kennedy "chose the world-saving course … only because he had no other." The Russian and Cuban leaders, Anson declared, seemed no more statesmanlike in this chronicle, which was "chock-a-block with such lunacies, many freshly discovered and all grippingly portrayed."

Warren Bass, in an online review for Slate, called One Hell of a Gamble "important," "impressive," and "one of the best of a flood of new books about the Cold War," and remarked that, in contrast to the thrills provided by spy fiction, this nonfiction diplomatic thriller, "while it will leave readers' knuckles white, is no fun at all to read, because the events it describes are so frightening." For Paul Roazen on the Boston Book Review Web site, One Hell of a Gamble is "diplomatic history at its best." Roazen commented: "Fursenko and Naftali have successfully recreated the high drama of the key few days back in October 1962…. Their reliance on Soviet sources means that One Hell of a Gamble has something to teach even the most conscientious students of foreign policy."

A reviewer for Publishers Weekly, mentioning that the authors "emphasize the ignorance and uncertainty that haunted all three countries," assessed One Hell of a Gamble this way: "If the writing is a little academic, the authors do illuminate and confirm past suppositions." Library Journal contributor Edward Goedeken praised the book, calling One Hell of a Gamble "a breathtaking view of the inner workings of the Soviet Politburo," and continued: "Seldom have scholars plumbed the depths of Soviet-American relations as deeply or effectively." For Goedeken, the previous standard for research on the Cuban Missile Crisis had been Essence of Decision (1971), by Graham Allison; raved the reviewer: "[Allison's] work has now been vastly improved upon by the investigations of Fursenko … and Naftali."

In Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, Naftali turns his attention to the United States' ongoing war against terrorism, a battle that began in the 1940s and has continued into the modern, post-9/11 world. One of Naftali's primary points is that overall, much of the actions taken by the nation in the early part of the twenty-first century bear a striking resemblance to those actions taken decades ago. In the early 1960s, following a number of hijackings to Cuba, then-chief of the Federal Aviation Administration Najeeb Halaby suggested that flights would be safer with the inclusion of federal marshals, however the fear of accidental shootings or fire fights in mid air ended the discussion. This is only one example of actions taken long before September 11, 2001, in an effort to prevent terrorism from endangering US citizens. Writing for the New York Times Book Review, Eric Lichtblau observed that the book's "real punch … comes in Naftali's descriptions of the advances, retreats and inertia of presidential administrations and counterterrorism officials since World War II. And in an understated style, he points out the haunting similarities between the events surrounding 9/11 and the attacks and policy debates from previous generations." According to Foreign Affairs contributor Martha Crenshaw, the book "shows how a more complicated Pattern—with some government officials stressing the dangers of terrorism and others then minimizing or ignoring them—has hampered Washington's ability to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy."

Naftali is one of several writers of the book US Intelligence and the Nazis, an anthology that addresses various topics of World War II, and how much the United States knew regarding the activities of the Germans, particularly regarding the use of concentration camps and postwar use of war criminals to gather further intelligence. Jurgen Matthaus, in a review for American Jewish History, noted that "if U.S. intelligence did perceive the true scope and unprecedented character of German crimes during the Second World War, few lessons were drawn from it at the time or later," going on to point out the events of later atrocities in world history where the United States failed to intervene. Rorin M. Platt, writing for Canadian Journal of History, commented that "the authors should have more critically examined presidential responsibility for the moral failure inherent in hiring war criminals."

Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, which Naftali cowrote with Aleksandr Fursenko, addresses the political strategies of former Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev over the course of his time in office. Naftali looks at the various crises that Khrushchev was forced to handle, and his policy of aggression in order to maintain peace, a strategy based in his belief that the survival of the Soviet block relied on his ability to maintain the upper hand in all situations. Khrushchev believed in a strong military and used the threat of nuclear retaliation to gain ground against his enemies and with his allies. A contributor for Kirkus Reviews called Khrushchev's Cold War "sobering—[even] scary—and necessary reading for historians of the modern era." Mark Atwood Lawrence, writing for the New York Times Book Review, commented: "Fursenko and Naftali shrewdly point out that any success Khrushchev may have had came at an enormous cost. His risk-taking not only put the world through hair-raising crises but also played straight into the hands of American hawks, who demanded a major arms buildup and denounced any politician who dared advocate a relaxation of tensions."

BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SOURCES:

PERIODICALS

American Jewish History, September 1, 2004, Jurgen Matthaus, review of US Intelligence and the Nazis, p. 361.

Canadian Journal of History, March 22, 2006, Rorin M. Platt, review of US Intelligence and the Nazis, p. 163.

Foreign Affairs, July-August, 2005, Martha Crenshaw, review of Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, p. 187.

Kirkus Reviews, August 15, 2006, review of Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, p. 819.

Library Journal, July 1, 1997, Edward Goedeken, review of One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964, p. 101.

New York Times Book Review, July 10, 2005, Eric Lichtblau, "It Didn't Start on 9/11" review of Blind Spot, p. 28; December 17, 2006, Mark Atwood Lawrence, review of Khrushchev's Cold War, p. 15.

Publishers Weekly, May 19, 1997, review of One Hell of a Gamble, p. 60.

St. Petersburg Times, September 22-28, 1997, Robert Sam Anson, review of One Hell of a Gamble.

Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1997, Richard J. Tofel, review of One Hell of a Gamble, p. A20.