Chapter One
The End of the INS

The porous state of the nation's borders should not have been much of a surprise to anyone—least of all to the agency responsible for them, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or INS. At the time of the September 11 attacks, it was one of the fastest-growing agencies in Washington, D.C., yet with an outdated computer system and huge backlog of paperwork, noted Eric Schmitt of the New York Times, "the most fouled up."⁴

Part of the problem for the INS was the enormity of its assignment. First, it was in charge of monitoring the 500 million people—approximately 330 million of them noncitizens—who enter the United States each year. Before they can be allowed into the country, they must produce a valid passport along with a visa or other documentation, which gives the INS information to determine how long they can remain in the United States.

The second of the agency's jobs was to provide assistance to immigrants. New residents would need information on citizenship classes, finding jobs, getting health care, and enrolling their children in schools. "There's a lot of confusing bureaucratic red tape for a native-born American who wants to get a loan or something," said Jim, who teaches English to immigrants. "But just think—if it's confusing for us, imagine what it's like for someone who is just learning English, just getting used to this country. The INS is the organization that tries to step in and give immigrants a hand."⁵

Second-guessing

As more information about the attacks came to light, it was clear that the INS had not performed either of its responsibilities very well. Two of the nineteen hijackers had already been identified by international intelligence agencies as terrorists, and their names had been put on border "watch lists." They should never have been allowed into the country, yet they entered and exited border crossings several times over a two-year period. Several other hijackers had entered the United States using stolen or forged passports, which had not been spotted by INS agents. And five of the nineteen men should have been deported by the INS well before September 11, 2001, because their visas had all expired.

James Ziglar, head of the INS, acknowledged that his agency had indeed made mistakes. However, he explained, those mistakes could be traced back to budget shortfalls over the past several years. The agency lacked an adequate number of border inspectors and the INS had neither enough agents nor enough technological support to do the jobs it was expected to do.

Ziglar felt confident that if the INS were given more funds, there would be improvements made—both in maintaining a higher level of border security and in keeping track of the millions of immigrants entering the United States. Although they hoped he was right, some government officials worried that the agency's problems might be too difficult to fix.

"Why Didn't Anyone Speak Up?"

One of the early priorities in the war on terrorism was locating possible cells of terrorists already in the United States. However, if the public believed that the INS would be of any help in tracking down these cells, they soon learned otherwise. INS officials explained that they had no way of checking which immigrants had overstayed their visas, since the agency only recorded the names of people arriving in the country, not leaving. They estimated that there were as many as 3 million foreign visitors, still in the United States, whose visas had expired. Again, the agency blamed budget restrictions and a lack of manpower: The INS had only seventeen hundred agents to locate them. And, explained INS officials, those agents had plenty of other duties—such as locating noncitizen criminals and investigating employers who exploit illegal immigrants. There simply were not enough agents to do all that was asked of them.

The government's admission that the nation's borders were not secure, combined with the fear that there were more terrorists already inside the country, frightened and angered many Americans. Gilda, a graduate student in business affairs at the University of Minnesota, complained that she had the feeling that no one had been taking responsibility for what was a very important job. She said,

It's like nobody is accountable for their work…. How is the system supposed to work, and why haven't we been told about these problems until now, when it's too late? If people had been thinking about how important their jobs were, and they knew that they had no idea where immigrants are at any one moment, why didn't anyone speak up? Did it take thousands of people getting murdered on 9/11 for anyone to care?"⁶

Cracking Down

The events of September 11 served as a wake-up call in many areas of government security, especially the INS. Immediately after it was clear that the nation was under attack, the government ordered the INS to tighten the borders, putting all inspectors on the highest state of alert. Air borders were essentially closed after President Bush ordered all planes en route to the United States diverted and all domestic flights canceled. Seaports remained open, as did entry points at the Canadian and Mexican borders.

Under the protocol for the high state of alert, border agents (INS as well as Customs officers, who inspected cargo crossing the border) were told to search people, their cars, and their luggage thoroughly—no matter how long each search took. Not surprisingly, the lines at border points were long and the waits at the entry points reached unheard-of lengths. Some travelers at the U.S.-Mexican border waited as long as twenty-one hours to get across.

One Wisconsin man recalls how closely his car and trailer were inspected as his wife and he returned from a vacation in Mexico. Not only did agents do a visual scan, but they used mirrors to inspect the undercarriage of the car and trailer, and even used dogs to sniff underneath the frame. "The guy ahead of me was body-searched, but I managed to avoid that," he says. "I did have to unload all of our coolers and suitcases, though—and that took forever."⁷

Others had similar experiences, but say that they were struck by how cooperative people were, even though the intensity of the searches made them very time-consuming. Wayne, a retired airline worker who was crossing the border from Canada, says that he was more than happy to endure delays if it would help keep terrorists out. "These [border] agents were doing their jobs, and they were being real careful," he says. "When they finished asking me the questions and looking around at my car, I told them, 'Thank you.' The last thing you want is more terrorists coming in."⁸

Trying to Be Thorough

But while many people were glad for the thoroughness at the border crossings, there was a downside for the border agents themselves. The round-the-clock high alert meant longer hours for INS and Customs agents. At one crossing point on the Mexican border, a supervisor was worried about his agents working extended hours in the one-hundred-plus-degree temperatures. "They are absolutely getting weary," he said. "The body can only take so much physically. The guys are working sixteen-hour shifts in heat that'll knock you down."⁹

The long shifts took a toll on the agents, and by October 2001 it was evident that they needed help. Although President Bush had promised a much larger budget for border control—especially for hiring more agents—it would take time to hire and train them. In the meantime, the National Guard was deployed to areas on the Canadian and Mexican borders to provide temporary assistance.

Some officials were concerned that the presence of armed soldiers at the borders would be alarming to people entering the United States. However, some of the soldiers involved felt that the reaction to their presence was very positive. Perhaps, they reasoned, people felt more secure knowing that the nation was serious about keeping terrorists out of the country, and the sight of a soldier in uniform reinforced that feeling.

Enormous Mismanagement

But while the temporary assistance of the National Guard helped ease the staffing problems at the border, the underlying problems were not solved. Within several months, it became apparent that the agency itself was not able to handle the responsibilities with which it was charged.

One of the last straws, for public and governmental critics alike, occurred six months after the attacks. In what appeared almost cruelly ironic, the INS sent the Florida flight school, where two of the hijackers had learned to fly airplanes, copies of visas for the two men to extend their visit to the United States as student pilots. To Americans, still reeling from the attacks, the mix-up was seen as inexcusable. Not only had the INS allowed terrorists into the United States to begin with, but the bureaucracy was so muddled that months after the two men had committed suicidal terrorist acts, the agency granted them an extension on their stay.

In Washington, D.C., politicians called for an end to the INS. One member of the House Judiciary Committee called the issuing of visas to the dead terrorists just another example of the mismanagement of the INS. "We've all been dumfounded by these revelations," he said.¹⁰

Senator Edward Kennedy agreed, insisting that the mistake was far from a simple mix-up, but proof that the INS had had no idea of the whereabouts or activities of the two hijackers. Kennedy blamed the INS for not installing a computer system which was supposed to track the movements of foreign students. "We cannot continue to tolerate a flawed information gathering and tracking system," he said, "that allows potential terrorists to enter or remain in the United States."¹¹

Other Washington leaders were less critical of the agency. They believed that the INS was an easy target, and that Congress had to take some of the blame for the absence of an INS computer tracking network. After all, Congress had agreed to postpone the start of the new system when education groups complained that not only would tracking the movements of foreign students be invasive, but it would add a mountain of paperwork to colleges and universities. Many echoed earlier feelings—that the INS needed to be reformed, for it had too much responsibility. President Bush agreed, saying that Commissioner James Ziglar should be given a bit more time to fix the problems of the INS. "He's held accountable," said the president. "His responsibility is to reform the INS. Let's give him time to do so."¹²

A Variety of Complaints

The American public was just as divided in its assessment of the situation. Some agreed that the borders were too busy, but thought that perhaps the agents had not received training necessary to do the difficult job. "This is what people mean," grumbled one high school English teacher, "by government inefficiency."¹³

But while some criticized the INS for its lack of scrutiny of immigrants, others complained that the U.S. borders had become positively unfriendly since September 11—especially toward anyone of Middle Eastern descent. Especially indignant were U.S. citizens whose heritage was Middle Eastern; they often protested that they felt as though border agents were treating them with suspicion and, in some cases, with disdain. Some Americans were sympathetic to charges that immigrants were being treated with suspicion, but others insisted that the extra scrutiny of people who appeared to be Middle Eastern or Muslim was warranted. "I'm sorry people feel discriminated against," says one teacher, "but feelings are raw in the United States now. We have people who have sworn that we are the enemy, and they are Middle Eastern. How can we blame the border guards for being careful?"¹⁴

"It Worries Me"

Even though some critics charged that INS agents were being too careful, within six months of the terrorist attacks there

was evidence that the thoroughness shown by border inspectors after September 11 was disappearing. Stories circulated about travelers being waved through border checkpoints with only a cursory inspection—or no inspection at all.

One Minnesota dentist of Middle Eastern descent returned to the United States from a fishing trip in Canada. Prepared for a lengthy interview and search at the border—in part because of his Pakistani name—he was astonished when U.S. agents simply waved him through the border. While the speedy crossing saved him time, he says, he was left with an uneasy feeling. "It worries me," he says. "It sounds odd, perhaps, but I don't mind the searches. I'm a citizen of the United States, and am as worried about terrorism as anyone else. I want them to be vigilant, to stop people that look like they might be from the part of the world that is currently on our 'bad guy' list."¹⁵

Government investigators, working undercover, found similar problems with border security late in 2002. Reporting to a Senate panel, one team of investigators said that they had experienced no difficulty entering the country using fictitious names together with fake documents, including invalid driver's licenses and counterfeit birth certificates. They had entered the United States from both Mexico and Canada, and told the panel that officials never once questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents they provided. What made the results of the investigation that much worse was that the documents were such poorly made forgeries. "Bouncers at college," noted Iowa senator Charles Grassley, "could spot the kind of fake IDs that were used by investigators."¹⁶

A New Department

The Senate investigation showed that the borders were as porous as they had been before September 11, and few leaders were

willing to defend the status quo. Finally convinced that the INS was broken beyond repair, the administration proposed a new bureaucracy to Congress. All agencies that had had a presence at the border would be combined into one new agency called Customs and Border Protection, or CBP.

Officials announced that the new bureau would streamline border crossings. In the past, Customs inspectors were in charge of making sure that baggage or cargo was not dangerous. INS agents were supposed to make sure everyone crossing the border showed proper documentation. Still another agency, the Agricultural Plant Health and Inspection Service, watched for any illegal plants or food items being brought across the border. Under the new system, there would be fewer people asking questions about luggage, cargo, and passengers.

The bureau would have thirty thousand full-time employees—seventeen thousand inspectors and at least ten thousand agents patrolling the borders, watching for illegal crossings as well as securing the borders from possible terrorist activities, illegal weapons, or anything else that might compromise U.S. security. The CBP would be under the control of the new Department of Homeland Security, formed by President Bush shortly after September 11.

To handle the enforcement and investigation of immigration issues, another new agency, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was created and was scheduled to begin its duties in March 2003. This agency would be made up of at least fourteen thousand employees, including fiftyfive hundred criminal investigators and four thousand immigration and deportation agents. Agency officials were aware that keeping accurate records of the whereabouts of foreign visitors in the United States could very well prevent another terrorist attack.

Finally, to handle the old INS's immigration duties, another new agency called the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services would focus on providing services for immigrants, such as processing work authorizations and

applications for U.S. citizenship, handling the administration of visas, and providing support for new residents and citizens. It, too, would be part of the Department of Homeland Security.

Officials of the new agencies insisted that the reorganization would enable them to do their various jobs more efficiently. However, officials conceded that fighting terrorism was definitely the priority behind the shuffling of the bureaucracy.

An Impossible Task?

But while the reorganization of the nation's border guards might have been a step in the right direction, many agents say that it will take more than that to secure the nation's borders. Some scoff that it can never be done. For example, agents along the Mexican border say they have been trying for years to stem the flow of illegal drugs and the smuggling of humans into the United States. They say there are simply too many crossing points to patrol.

Short of building a wall from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf of Mexico, border agents say, there is no way to guarantee that a terrorist or a dangerous weapon cannot get past the border. With hundreds of thousands of vehicles and more than a million people crossing into the United States each day, searching every car and truck would mean impossible delays—and the odds of finding a poison or weapon that could be used by terrorists would still be slim.

There is no doubt that stopping illegal entry is extremely difficult, with thousands of miles of coastline, millions of people crossing the borders daily, and the enormous volume of cargo moving into the United States each day. However, the alternative—not catching the enemies at the border, before they can attack the United States again—is something that is too terrible to imagine. "We are taking on the protection of our borders … at a time of a real national threat to our security," says Border and Transportation Security undersecretary Asa Hutchinson, "but we are up to the task."¹⁷