MOBILIZATION, FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

The origins of the French and Indian War lay in conflicting British and French claims, particularly in the Ohio Valley and Nova Scotia. The war began in the Ohio Valley in 1754 but soon spread to the rest of North

America and eventually became a global war, known in Europe as the Seven Years' War.

causes and course of the war

The early years of the war went badly for the British. In 1755, a British army was routed at the Battle of the Monongahela and in the following year the British surrendered the important fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario. Meanwhile, Indian raiders devastated the colonial frontier. In 1757, the French captured Fort William Henry and there were fears of a French invasion of New York. By 1758, the British had committed over 20,000 troops to North America. This turned the tide of war. An amphibious force captured the strategic French fortress of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island, and in the Ohio Valley another army seized Fort Duquesne. In 1759, the British won their greatest victory when an army under Major General James Wolfe captured Quebec, and in the following year the remaining French forces in Canada surrendered.

mobilizing colonial resources

The war mobilized colonial resources in various ways, the most basic of which was the recruitment of colonists into the armed forces. Most British regiments were under strength when they were shipped to North America and once in America recruited thousands of colonists. To make recruitment easier, the British created the Royal American regiment, where foreigners, forbidden from holding high rank in other units, could hold command. Even more men served in the provincial forces. During the French and Indian War, nearly all colonies created their own military forces, which undertook operations independent of the British army or served alongside regular units or under the ultimate command of regular officers. Unlike soldiers in the regular army, who enlisted essentially for life, men enlisted in the provincial forces for short terms, often only for that year's campaign. At the height of the war, about 20,000 troops were serving in provincial regiments: over 10,000 from New England; nearly 3,000 each from Virginia and Pennsylvania; about 2,000 from New York; and smaller numbers from North and South Carolina.

In addition to the regular army and provincial forces, nearly all men would have served at some time in the militia. Most colonies had their own militias, and they formed the backbone of local defense and in times of emergency defended provincial forts or served alongside regular and provincial units. Hundreds of women also served, working as cooks or washerwomen alongside the regular and provincial forces, as well as unofficially accompanying their husbands on campaign. Other civilians were also contracted to work for the army as laborers or craftsmen. These camp followers played a vital role in allowing the armies to function.

The mobilization of such substantial forces boosted the provincial economies during the war. Money flooded into the provinces as Britain provided funds to raise these forces, much of which was spent on wages and bounties to lure men into service. These varied from colony to colony and from year to year, but in some cases the bounty amounted to over one and a half years' pay for a typical laborer. The lure of bounties and wages attracted specific types of men into the provincial forces. In New England, the provincial forces were composed principally of the sons of farmers who were waiting for their inheritance and these forces were representative of the communities from which they were recruited. Further south, in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, the provincial forces attracted more immigrants, landless poor, and indentured servants, and recruits tended to represent the lower levels of society.

legacy: colonial society and revolution

The creation and supplying of these provincial forces provided an important precedent for the Revolutionary War. Whereas New England had previously raised provincial forces, most other colonies had not. In 1775, this experience would prove central in assuring the colonies that they could raise their own forces with which to oppose Great Britain. The French and Indian War also provided many colonists with important military experience. It was little wonder that at the start of the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress turned to the officer who had gained the greatest experience of command during the French and Indian War, George Washington, who had commanded the Virginia Regiment.

Mobilization also provided conflicting lessons for the British and their colonists. The British noted the successes of the regular army in the campaigns at Louisbourg and Quebec. To British officers, provincial troops seemed undisciplined and unruly, little more than a rabble, unable to fight or even defend themselves. In contrast, American colonists noted the ineptitude of British commanders such as Major General Edward Braddock and Major General James Abercromby, whose armies were routed by French and Canadian forces. British troops seemed reliant on large supply convoys and unable to march without a substantial baggage train. Both sides viewed the other as militarily weak, and these perceptions fed their willingness to resort to war in 1775. British officers also noted the failures of the colonial militia to fight effectively and concluded that the militia had limited military use. George Washington drew similar conclusions and developed a clear preference for regular troops over militia. These perceptions would shape the attitudes of British commanders and Washington during the Revolutionary War and largely account for the failure of the British to perceive the value of the American militia and Washington's belief that the preservation of the Continental army was central to the revolutionary cause.

Mobilization during the war also affected perceptions of colonial identity. The many colonists who had served alongside the British were shocked at what they saw as the immorality of British troops, their failure to observe the Sabbath, profanity, and frequent gambling, and the arrogance of their officers. To these Americans, the only reason for British military discipline was fear. This contrasted to the provincial forces, where officers were often elected and commanded their men as much through influence and cajoling as through coercion and fear. This seemed to underline the different natures of the British and colonial societies and was central in defining a sense of colonial identity in the years before the Revolution.

Mobilization during the French and Indian War affected colonial societies in many different ways. However, perhaps its most lasting legacy was the manner in which it prepared the colonies, both militarily and psychologically, for the coming Revolutionary War.

bibliography

Anderson, Fred. A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

Higginbotham, Don. George Washington and the American Military Tradition. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985.

Nash, Gary B. The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Selesky, Harold E. War and Society in Colonial Connecticut. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.

Shy, John. Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Titus, James. The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

Ward, Matthew C. Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.

Matthew C. Ward

See also:Fort William Henry Massacre, Cultural Legacy; French and Indian War, Legacy of; Stamp Act Congress; Washington, George.