Chapter Four
Winning Global Support to Fight Terror

Occasionally news headlines trumpet the capture of a high-profile terrorist, such as the arrest in Pakistan in March 2003 of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, the al-Qaeda leader said to be the mastermind of the events of September 11. Despite the significance of such arrests, the news stories are often strikingly undramatic. Observers often describe an unassuming resident of a quiet neighborhood being arrested while he slept, or ate, or visited friends. There were no bombs, just an uneventful stakeout followed by a quick raid. The arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad followed this pattern. At 2:30 a.m. a house was raided, based on a tip from neighbors hoping for a reward who had noticed a stranger in their neighborhood. Unknown to them, this stranger was the third highest ranking member of al-Qaeda. Acting on this tip, Pakistani police moved in, and quickly and without bloodshed arrested Mohammad and a companion.

What appeared on the surface to be simple and ordinary was in fact the result of delicate and complex cooperation between the governments of Pakistan and the United States. Such diplomacy is required in the war on terror. President Bush said as much, in his first major address to Congress and the American public after September 11:"We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world."²⁹ What this has meant in practice is that behind every terrorist arrest in a foreign country is a story of collaboration with foreign officials, ranging from heads of government to local police chiefs.

These negotiations are designed to help the United States capture wanted terrorists while respecting the sovereignty of other nations. As the richest and most powerful nation in the world, what the United States offers in return for cooperation is whatever financial, political, military, or other support is most needed by the government of the foreign country involved. However, concerns often arise in the international community about how the United States uses its extraordinary power, and the enormous pressure it can exert on weaker nations. Mixed reactions to U.S. requests for cooperation have resulted in a great deal of international tension as the war on terror progresses.

Using Economic Clout

Some nations such as Great Britain work effectively with the United States because they generally agree with American objectives and share American values. Others cooperate because they need the wealth the United States can offer. The United States provides billions of dollars in foreign aid each year. Offers of more aid are a key way the United States persuades reluctant nations to support its goals. In addition to direct monetary assistance, future economic development is often offered in the form of promises to help build highways, airports, dams, factories, and other costly infrastructure that strengthens countries by enabling them to become more competitive and more self-sufficient. Other economic incentives include granting what is known as favored nation trading status, which allows for certain tariff reductions that benefit the foreign country.

A prominent example of how economic pressure can result in cooperation by otherwise reluctant or unfriendly nations occurred in Pakistan. Before the September 11 attacks, Pakistan was one of only three countries in the world (along with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) recognizing the

Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Pakistan had not traditionally been considered an ally of the United States. In fact, it had been subject to American economic sanctions as a result of its acquisition and testing of nuclear weapons as part of its ongoing conflict with neighboring India, a longstanding U.S. ally.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, however, Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, was faced with a difficult choice. The Bush administration made it clear that it expected Pakistan's cooperation in tracking down Taliban and al-Qaeda members who had crossed the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Musharraf was concerned that a refusal might result in stronger U.S. support for India in the struggle over the resource-rich Kashmir province on the India-Pakistan border. He also worried that a refusal would make Pakistan look like a supporter of terror in the eyes of the world. On the other hand, Musharraf was well aware of Pakistan's strong and vocal core of radical Muslims, who openly threatened a backlash against Musharraf if he cooperated with the United States in hunting down fellow Muslims.

Musharraf was willing to risk this backlash because what the United States offered was too significant to turn down. Pakistan was staggering economically under a $35 billion loan debt from other countries and international agencies. Its

domestic debt was equally devastating. The Bush administration offered an aid package worth over a billion dollars and agreed to forgive an additional billion dollars in debt, and to reduce trade barriers and other economic sanctions against Pakistan so it could make money on its exports.

Similar aid packages have been offered to other countries, not always with equal success. For example, Turkey refused to allow the United States to station sixty-two thousand troops on Turkish soil, which foiled U.S. plans to launch an invasion of Iraq from the north. The United States had offered Turkey an aid package including $6 billion in grants for Turkish cooperation, but the Turks strongly opposed the U.S. action in Iraq and could not reach an agreement.

Threatening the Uncooperative

In some cases, especially among smaller, developing countries, threats of boycotts, trade embargoes, reducing direct aid, and other sanctions are used to convince a country to go along with American requests. Countries may be more likely to bow to economic pressure, however, simply because the alternative might be submitting to military force.

The United States has by far the most powerful military in the world, and American leaders have proven their willingness to use military force when economic sanctions fail. This was the case in Iraq, after President Saddam Hussein repeatedly fell short of both UN and U.S. demands to disclose his inventory of weapons and dispose of weapons he was forbidden by the United Nations to have.

After declaring an end to diplomacy and negotiations, it took the United States only a few weeks to cross over from Kuwait, traverse Iraq, enter Baghdad, and topple Saddam's regime. Subsequently, key administration figures such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited the region, and in their speeches and meetings hinted at the possibility that the military would be used again if countries such as Syria and Iran did not take a stronger stand in rejecting terrorists and their methods. The Bush administration has clearly signaled its intention to keep the pressure on all countries it considers important to the war on terror, using both the carrot and the stick.

Cooperative Policing

In the case of Pakistan, even with the powerful package of incentives offered by the United States, Musharraf knew that his alliance with the United States would be hard to sell to his people, many of whom harbor strong anti-American sentiment. He agreed to cooperate by allowing only a very limited military presence in Pakistan. Though American forces have been permitted to chase suspected terrorists across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan if they are in "hot pursuit, " and to assist in covert operations, Pakistan expects U.S. forces to stay on the Afghan side of the border. Their role is to provide technical support and advice to Pakistani law enforcement and generally to go no further than that. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) is ultimately responsible for conducting intelligence gathering and stakeouts and making arrests. Typically, American operatives are present when arrests are made and during interrogations, but both countries take great pains to stress the Pakistani role. The important point is that the United States is not violating Pakistan's sovereign right to handle all aspects of law enforcement and military action in its own country.

Thus, cooperative policing has become one of the major components of the war on terror. The capture in early 2003 of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was a prime example, as was the arrest of Abu Zubadayah, a top al-Qaeda leader, in March 2002. Zubadayah escaped Afghanistan in September 2001 and went into hiding in Pakistan. His whereabouts came to light after two men disguised as Afghan women were caught at a border checkpoint by Pakistani police. Under interrogation, the men revealed knowledge of Zubadayah's presence in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Communication detection devices were then used to pinpoint his location, and Pakistani authorities called in the Faisalabad police to close in.

Police clipped electric wires and snuck into the target house around 3:00 a.m., where they surprised and subdued guards. Zubadayah and others ran to the roof and jumped to a neighboring rooftop, where more Pakistani police were waiting. In the melee that ensued, Zubadayah and a companion were shot and another accomplice was killed. Two dozen others were arrested in the house. Once the arrests were made, American operatives moved in to identify the suspects and search the hideout, where they found computer disks, notebooks, and

phone numbers—in all, about ten thousand pages of material. This evidence was sent back to the United States for analysis, while the suspects were taken to American bases for questioning. In that month alone in Pakistan, more than sixty al-Qaeda suspects were apprehended in similar cooperative policing efforts.

Equipment and Training

Because the details of covert operations generally remain secret even when a major arrest is made, it is impossible to know the full extent of the American role in covert activities in Pakistan and elsewhere. However, the extent of U.S. technical support, essential to the success of the effort, is more open and obvious. Pakistan's border security has been boosted by the provision of all-terrain vehicles, Apache helicopters, and radio communication equipment. Afghanistan has been similarly equipped, and the United States has spearheaded the training of Afghan and Pakistani police and army officers in use of this equipment and tactics in the war on terror. The ways in which U.S. training has enabled other countries to fight terrorism can be seen perhaps most clearly in the Philippines.

The Philippines were once an American protectorate, and a huge American military presence continued even after Philippine independence in 1948. Although small groups, primarily Filipino Muslims, have been consistently hostile to the

United States, for the most part relationships between the two countries have been cordial. In recent years, the Philippines have been troubled by several terrorist groups, most notably Abu Sayyaf ("Bearer of the Sword"), whose goal is similar to that of other groups in neighboring countries—to establish an independent fundamentalist Islamic state in Southeast Asia.

Speaking for the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that "if we have to go into 15 more countries, we ought to do it to fight terrorism."³⁰ The president of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, saw in this message an opportunity to get American assistance in fighting Abu Sayyaf. Though Filipino law forbids allowing foreigners to fight on Philippine soil, an exception provides for visiting forces joining in noncombat military exercises. Arroyo worked with the United States to create a joint military exercise designed to train Filipino soldiers to track down Abu Sayyaf members and other terrorists. In January 2002, 650 American soldiers,

including 160 Special Forces operatives, arrived in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines.

The purpose of these exercises was primarily to train Filipino soldiers to use new technologies that would help them combat terrorism in their own country. The American military training was judged a success, especially because the leader of Abu Sayyaf was killed during the joint operation, in a dramatic skirmish that took place on a small boat off the coast of the Philippines. The new skills the Philippine army had acquired were a major factor in their ability to carry out this mission. In January 2003 a new group of U.S. soldiers and advisers arrived to take part in another round of training including advanced night flying skills. It appears that the Philippines might serve as an example of how the United States can work with other countries to fight terror in ways which respect their leadership and national sovereignty.

Some question the long-term advisability of this broad technical support, however. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan has a long history of alliance with the United States, and indeed it is uncertain whether the friendship will outlast the current president of either country. If Muslim extremists are able to gain more power in Pakistan or Afghanistan, all the equipment and training offered by the United States could potentially be used against it. International relations in this part of the world are complex and go beyond the war on terror. For example, there is concern that U.S. help in strengthening the Pakistani armed forces may lead to escalating tension between Pakistan and India, its long-standing enemy. Alliances built on such whims threaten important partnerships in the region, such as that between the United States and India, and must be undertaken with great care and sensitivity.

With or Without Global Support?

America's relations and sometimes fragile alliances with many other countries around the world were unquestionably harmed by the stance taken by the United States against Iraq. To many nations, Iraq was not a threat to the region or the world because its army and its weapons had been greatly reduced in a long war against Iran as well as the first Gulf War in 1991. Instead of going to war, many nations favored giving UN weapons inspectors more time to comb Iraq, arguing that this was the safest and most humanitarian way to determine what Iraq did and did not have in its arsenal.

How to Reduce Terrorism?

The position of the United States and its sole significant ally, Great Britain, was that Saddam Hussein had to be removed from power so that a serious and imminent threat could be removed from the world. Although the Bush administration claimed there was a strong possibility that Saddam would supply al-Qaeda with weapons, links between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime have not been documented. The war on terror is very different from other wars, and its goals are rather imprecise. As a result, many Americans supported the war simply to see a ruthless dictator stripped of power, and because invading and conquering was a familiar and easily understandable way to confront an enemy. Whether it was actually fought over terrorism and whether it has actually reduced terrorism remains to be seen.

How to reduce terrorism is indeed a major worldwide concern that many nations feel the Bush administration has not adequately addressed. When Bush announced the war on terror shortly after September 11, he categorized the nations of the world as either supporters of the United States or supporters of terrorists. At the time, concerns about his possible oversimplification of the problem took a backseat to the legitimate need to bring al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups under control. Since 2001, however, defining a country as "friend" or "enemy" on the basis of one issue—terrorism—has been called into question. A case in point is Pakistan, whose new status as an ally is troubling to many who see more threat than friendship brewing there. Saudi Arabia has been considered an American ally for decades, but most of the September 11 hijackers came from that country and the invasion of Iraq prompted reexamination of that alliance despite Saudi support in other areas. Countries such as France and Germany, who led the opposition to the war in Iraq, have long-standing good relationships with the United States but have been alienated by the Bush administration's policies and actions. Few, however, would seriously consider France and Germany enemies of the United States.

As the war on terror took center stage in American foreign policy, and the Bush administration began to focus on a war with Iraq, many countries perceived America as a bully whose actions were undermining long-standing, hard-won, and valuable international bonds that preserved peace. The Bush administration, on the other hand, believed that the United Nations and other world bodies lacked the initiative and will to go beyond endless and ultimately fruitless diplomatic negotiation and that only force would make real headway in the war on terror.

Whatever merit there may be in these differing positions, it is clear that relationships between the United States and most nations around the world, including some of its staunchest allies, have been significantly affected by Bush's decision to go to war in Iraq without UN support. Some fear that efforts to defeat al-Qaeda and other terrorists will dissolve as resources and media attention are focused on Iraq. Others contend that the war in Iraq is likely to create a new generation of people with a grudge against the United States and thus undermine the chances for winning the war on terror. It remains to be seen what steps must be taken to ensure the kind of global support the United States needs to wage the war on terror.