Science and Religion, Methodologies

A primary concern of contemporary scholarship on science and religion is the question of precisely how the two areas should be related. Historically, there has been a wide range of such theories. While the situation is in many ways similar today, the growth of a specific field of religion and science has provided some increased sophistication. Modern methodologies of science and religion generally seek to do two things. First, any methodology of science and religion almost inevitably has to give an account of the nature of both science and religion. That is, it must give an account of the realities that science and religion each describe, as well as how knowledge in each field is acquired. Second, any methodology must then account for how the truths in the respective fields can be related to one another. Most current methodologies of science and religion attempt both these tasks to varying degrees. In much of the current literature on science and religion methodology, the sciences in question are usually the physical and biological sciences, while the aspects of religion of most concern are the theological and metaphysical claims that undergird religious life and practice.

Independence models

For much of the twentieth century, many (if not most) philosophers and theologians conceived of religion and science as two completely separate disciplines that were each legitimate in their own right but which explained or described completely different realms of experience. Of these, the earliest was the theological movement of neo-orthodoxy, championed in particular by Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968), but widely represented in both Europe and the United States. Neo-orthodox theologians emphasized revelation as the primary means of knowing God, and they emphasized the separateness of this revelation from all other spheres of knowledge. This emphasis on the uniqueness of theology with respect to the sciences tended to also be supported by existentialist theologians such as Paul Tillich (1886–1965) and Rudolf Bultmann (1813–1855).

Independence models of religion and science received a further boost from the mid twentieth-century development of linguistic philosophy, deriving primarily from the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who argued that human discourse and knowledge could best be understood as separate and incommensurable language games that each possess a unique vocabulary and logic. In some versions of this, science could be said to be about facts, religion about values. Both areas of practice and experience are equally legitimate, but cover completely separate spheres of life. In some later writings, this mode of independence received metaphorical support from the idea of complementarity derived from the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics championed by Niels Bohr (1885–1962). Just as modern physics was forced to alternatively describe subatomic particles as either waves or particles, but not both simultaneously, so too could religion and science be understood as giving complementary but distinct accounts of reality. Once again, both religion and science are legitimate areas of inquiry and practice, but are pursued and understood separately.

Forms of these independence models remain championed today. Neo-orthodoxy's emphasis on the separate character of religion strongly influenced British theologian Thomas Torrance and, more recently, Alistair McGrath. Paleontologist and science writer Stephen Jay Gould (1941–2002) also attempted to revive the linguistic philosophy version of independence. Despite this, these are now minority views for a number of reasons. Independence views presume that a clear distinction can be made between the provinces of science and religion, with an implication either that religion does not rely on facts about the world or that the facts of religion and the facts of science are completely different. Historically, however, this has not been the case, and most modern theologians believe that there are at least important border areas where science and religion overlap. Moreover, the more general theological and philosophical frameworks (particularly neo-orthodoxy and linguistic philosophy) are no longer seen to be nearly as persuasive as they once were, with the result that their more specific claims about the relationship of science and religion are found wanting.

Critical realism as a default view

Among current views of the relationship of religion and science, the most prominent has been that of critical realism. This prominence is due in no small part to its advocacy by three of the most important contributors to the field of science and religion: Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne, all three originally practicing scientists who later wrote on issues of religion and science. On the critical realist view, both religion and science describe the world as it is, and so there is some correspondence between the statements of religion and science and the real world that such statements describe. Critical realism differs from a naïve realism, however, in its recognition of the role of the possibility of error, bias, and partiality in all descriptions.

The most elaborate defense of critical realism within the field of science and religion has been given by Ian Barbour. Drawing on the philosophy of science of Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) and others, Barbour argues that both science and religion have elements of subjectivity in their models of the world. While theories are based on evidence, they consistently overdetermine it. Consequently, theory choice is never simply a matter of verification or falsification, but includes criteria of coherence, scope, and even beauty. The way that a theory speaks of the world may thus be rather indirect, depending on data but not determined by it.

For critical realists, science and religion both provide partial views of the world that may overlap on a range of issues. Arthur Peacocke has argued that theology can be placed along a hierarchy of knowledge, with physics providing the most basic facts at the lowest level and theology providing the most general at the highest level. Because there can be significant overlap between science and religion on particular issues such as cosmic origins and human nature, critical realism is committed to providing theological perspectives that are capable of harmonizing with modern science.

While critical realism has been highly influential within the field of science and religion, it has also been the subject of significant criticism. The issue of how exactly scientific and especially religious models can be said to correspond to reality has been especially problematic. The more one acknowledges the critical element in any theory or model, the less realist it seems to be, a problem that is well recognized more broadly in the philosophy of science. Despite much early work in promoting critical realism, its advocates have yet to provide a sophisticated response to its critics, and for this reason its appeal has languished some since the 1990s.

Alternative methodologies from the philosophy of science

Despite the perceived shortcomings of the critical realist movement, it has been highly influential in its view that science and religion (and, more specifically, theology) can be said to employ similar methods of exploring reality, thus providing a basis for dialogue and engagement between the two areas of experience. Reasons for this view stem not only from critical realism, but also from more general developments in the philosophy of science, from which critical realism also drew. Consequently, there has been widespread support for employment of insights from the philosophy of science for explaining the nature and relationship of religion and science, even though significant disagreement remains as to whose philosophy of science should be employed and to what extent. While critical realists such as Ian Barbour were influenced by the work of Thomas Kuhn, German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg utilized the earlier philosophy of science of Karl Popper (1902–1994), arguing that theological claims should be capable of being falsifiable, just as Popper argued that scientific claims should be. A number of theologians and philosophers of religion, including Philip Hefner, Nancey Murphy, and Philip Clayton, have preferred to build on the thought of Hungarian philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (1922–1974). Influenced by both Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos argued that science should be understood in terms of competing research programs, each with an unfalsifiable core, which nevertheless must prove to be progressive over time.

Notable in these approaches is an abandonment of a strong commitment to a metaphysical realism for explaining the nature of both science and religion. Murphy has been the most vocal in rejecting realism as an explanatory category, and has argued, following philosopher W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000), that foundationalism, the view that knowledge claims can be deductively built one on another, must be abandoned. Rather, human beings build webs of belief that are complexly interconnected, but with only a weak sense (if that) of some beliefs being more primary than others. Nevertheless, there remain clear criteria for preferring some beliefs and theories over others.

Philosophy of science and post-modernism

The abandonment of both foundationalism and realism are important elements of the broad set of movements characterized as postmodern. A general feature of post-modern movements have been an increased skepticism towards certainty of knowledge, especially with regard to the sciences, combined with a deep awareness of hidden ideologies in apparently objective knowledge claims that influence power relations of race, class, and sex. Feminist philosophers of science such as Sandra Harding and Evelyn Fox Keller have noted how sexual bias can pervade scientific theory and practice. Advocates of the strong program of sociology of science such as Steve Fuller have argued that science, in essence, has no objective basis and is simply one discourse among others. Taken to extremes, such views are debilitating to a science and religion dialogue, as they destroy any possible ground of knowledge. There are, however, profound insights to be derived from these postmodern approaches, and these have been, to varying degrees, employed by some science and religion scholars. Theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen has attempted to carefully incorporate a postmodern, postfoundationalist critique while still maintaining the legitimacy of both science and religion as intellectual endeavors. Distinctly feminist perspectives have had a harder time entering into the mainstream of religion and science scholarship, although a number of elements of feminist thought (e.g., an abandonment of dualism, rejection of foundationalism, and an acknowledgement of ideological bias) are now widely acknowledged.

An alternative approach to a number of characteristically postmodern perspectives has been provided by process theology, which received initial inspiration from the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947). Rather than drawing on the philosophy of science, process theology is based on a broader metaphysical perspective that encompasses both science and religion. Theologian David Ray Griffin has argued at length for a new understanding of naturalism that is based on process theology and does not exclude God. Because of its metaphysical commitment, process theology does not share the skepticism of other forms of postmodernism, and claims some confidence about providing a robust understanding of the world and, consequently, of religion and science.

Prospects

The 1980s and 1990s saw a particularly rich discussion of religion and science methodological issues. Despite this, there remains a considerable array of opinions about the proper relationship of religion and science, both within the field of religion and science proper as well as outside of it. It should be expected that the philosophy of science will continue to play an important role in methodological research, particularly since most of the philosophy of science research currently cited in the field of religion and science dates before 1980. Among perspectives from philosophy of science that may play an increasing role are characterizations of the practice of science as a process of inference to the best explanation (employed by some) and characterizations based on information and probability theory.

A number of methodological perspectives remain under-represented in the field of religion and science. Most notable of these may be the philosophical movement of pragmatism, founded by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and William James (1842–1910) and now widely represented in the United States and abroad. Likewise, more radical forms of postmodernism need to be engaged at a more serious level than has been the case to date. A further complicating factor is the growing engagement of a number of the world religious traditions, whose different presuppositions will likely alter perceptions of how religion and science should, in the end, be related.

See also Science and Religion; Science and Religion, History of Field; Science and Religion in Public Communication; Science and Religion, Models and Relations; Science and Religion, Periodical Literature; Science and Religion, Research in

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gregory r. peterson