Bhopal, India

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Bhopal, India

On December 3, 1984, one of the world's worst industrial accidents occurred in Bhopal, India. Along with Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, Bhopal stands as an example of the dangers of industrial development without proper attention to environmental health and safety.

A large industrial and urban center in the state of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal was the location of a plant owned by the American chemical corporation, Union Carbide, Inc. and its Indian subsidiary, Union Carbide India, Ltd. The plant manufactured pesticides, primarily the pesticide carbaryl (marketed under the name Sevin), which is one of the most widely used carbamate class pesticides in the United States and throughout the world. Among the intermediate chemical compounds used together to manufacture Sevin is methyl isocyanate (MIC)—a lethal substance that is reactive, toxic, volatile, and flammable. It was the uncontrolled release of MIC from a storage tank in the Bhopal facility that caused the death of 5,000 people, seriously injured another 20,000 and affected an estimated 200,000 people. The actual number of casualties remains unknown; many believe the numbers cited above to be serious underestimates.

MIC (CH3-N=C=O) is highly volatile and has a boiling point of 89°F (39.1°C). In the presence of trace amounts of impurities such as water or metals, MIC reacts to generate heat, and if the heat is not removed, the chemical begins to boil violently. If relief valves, cooling systems and other safety devices fail to operate in a closed storage tank, the pressure and heat generated may be sufficient to cause a release of MIC into the atmosphere . Because the vapor is twice as heavy as air, the vapors if released remain close to the ground where they can do the most damage, drifting along prevailing wind patterns. As set by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), the standards for exposure to MIC are set at 0.02 ppm over an eight-hour period. The immediate effects of exposure, inhalation and ingestion of MIC at high concentrations (above 2 ppm) are burning and tearing of the eyes, coughing, vomiting, blindness, massive trauma of the gastrointestinal tract, clogging of the lungs and suffocation of bronchial tubes. When not immediately fatal, the long-term health consequences include permanent blindness, permanently impaired lung functioning, corneal ulcers, skin damage, and potential birth defects .

Many explanations for the disaster have been advanced, but the most widely accepted theory is that trace amounts of water entered the MIC storage tank and initiated the hydrolysis reaction, which was followed by MIC's spontaneous reactions. The plant was not well designed for safety, and maintenance was especially poor. Four key safety factors should have contained the reaction, but it was later discovered that they were all inoperative at the time of the accident. The refrigerator that should have slowed the reaction by cooling the chemical was shut off, and, as heat and pressure built up in the tank, the relief valve blew. A vent gas scrubber designed to neutralize escaping gas with caustic soda failed to work. Also, the flare tower that would have burned the gas to harmless by-products was under repair. Yet even if all these features had been operational, subsequent investigations found them to be poorly designed and insufficient for the capacity of the plant. Once the runaway reaction started, it was virtually impossible to contain.

The poisonous cloud of MIC released from the plant was carried by the prevailing winds to the south and east of the city—an area populated by highly congested communities of poorer people, many of whom worked as laborers at the Union Carbide plant and other nearby industrial facilities. Released at night, the silent cloud went undetected by residents who remained asleep in their homes, thus possibly ensuring a maximal degree of exposure. Many hundreds died in their sleep, others choked to death on the streets as they ran out in hopes of escaping the lethal cloud. Thousands more died in the following days and weeks. The Indian government and numerous volunteer agencies organized a massive relief effort in the immediate aftermath of the disaster consisting of emergency medical treatment, hospital facilities, and supplies of food and water. Medical treatment was often ineffective, for doctors had an incomplete knowledge of the toxicity of MIC and the appropriate course of action.

In the weeks following the accident, the financial, legal and political consequences of the disaster unfolded. In the United States Union Carbide's stock dipped 25% in the week immediately following the event. Union Carbide India Ltd. (UCIL) came forward and accepted moral responsibility for the accident, arranging some interim financial compensation for victims and their families. However its parent company, Union Carbide Inc., which owned 50.9% of UCIL, refused to accept any legal responsibility for their subsidiary. The Indian government and hundreds of lawyers on both sides pondered issues of liability and the question of a settlement. While Union Carbide hoped for out-of-court settlements or lawsuits in the Indian courts, the Indian government ultimately decided to pursue class action suits on behalf of the victims in the United States courts in the hope of larger settlements. The United States courts refused to hear the case, and it was transferred to the Indian court system. Warren Anderson, then chairman of Union Carbide, refused to appear in Indian court. The case is still under litigation and the interim compensation set aside has reached only a fraction of the victims.

The disaster in Bhopal has had far-reaching political consequences in the United States. A number of Congressional hearings were called and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and OSHA initiated inspections and investigations. A Union Carbide plant in McLean, Virginia, that uses processes and products similar to those in Bhopal was repeatedly inspected by officials. While no glaring deficiencies in operation or maintenance were found, it was noted that several small leaks and spills had occurred at the plant in previous years that had gone unreported. These added weight to growing national concern about workers' right-to-know provisions and emergency response capabilities. In the years following the Bhopal accident, both state and federal environmental regulations were expanded to include mandatory preparedness to handle spills and releases on land, water, or air. These regulations include measures for emergency response such as communication and coordination with local health and law enforcement facilities, as well as community leaders and others. In addition, employers are now required to inform any workers in contact with hazardous materials of the nature and types of hazards to which they are exposed; they are also required to train them in emergency health and safety measures.

The disaster at Bhopal raises a number of critical issues and highlights the wide gulf between developed and developing countries in regard to design and maintenance standards for health and safety. Management decisions allowed the Bhopal plant to operate in an unsafe manner and for a shanty-town to develop around its perimeter without appropriate emergency planning. The Indian government, like many other developing nations in need of foreign investment, appeared to sacrifice worker safety in order to attract and keep Union Carbide and other industries within its borders. While a number of environmental and occupational health and safety standards existed in India before the accident, their inspection and enforcement was cursory or non-existent. Often understaffed, the responsible Indian regulatory agencies were rife with corruption as well. The Bhopal disaster also raised questions concerning the moral and legal responsibilities of American companies abroad, and the willingness of those corporations to apply stringent United States safety and environmental standards to their operations in the Third World despite the relatively free hand given them by local governments.

Although worldwide shock at the Bhopal accident has largely faded, the suffering of many victims continues. While many national and international safeguards on the manufacture and handling of hazardous chemicals have been instituted, few expect that lasting improvements will occur in developing countries without a gradual recognition of the economic and political values of stringent health and safety standards.

[Usha Vadagiri ]