Orthopraxy: Asia

The term orthopraxy means "right practice," and stands as a contrast term for orthodoxy "right belief." It is often said of Asian traditions generally that—in contrast to most Western traditions—right practice is of more importance that right belief, and to a certain extent this is true. For instance, Confucianism is primarily concerned with the rituals and practices that constitute a properly ordered society, while Buddhism is ultimately concerned with the practices that bring about enlightenment. This emphasis should not be overstated, however, as particular beliefs often undergird the practices of Asian traditions (as in Confucian beliefs about the nature of cosmic order) and the practices themselves sometimes vary so widely as to call into question the very notion of right practice (as in Buddhism). As the following accounts will indicate, orthopraxy plays an important role in Asian traditions, but the definition of this role is always strewn with the challenges of diversity, consistency, and regulation within each of these traditions.

Hinduism

Orthopraxy is difficult to define for Hinduism, not because there is no mention of what constitutes right action, but rather because there is such diversity within Hinduism that it becomes difficult—if not impossible—to say anything definitive about the tradition as a whole. For any practice that might be considered "right practice" within Hinduism, there are usually a few traditions for which it is either irrelevant or even "wrong practice" (heteropraxy ). Yet whatever diversity there is pertaining to practice, there is still more diversity pertaining to belief. For example, some Hindus believe in one god, others believe in many gods, and still others believe in no gods at all; yet, within Hinduism, none of these beliefs necessarily renders a person unorthodox. Indeed, Hindus have at times demonstrated a remarkable pluralism with respect to belief (although variations in belief have often been seen as inferior alternatives), but have tended to identify themselves and their tradition with the rites and practices that underlie Hindu society.

Perhaps the most consistent trait of Hindus is that some relation to the Vedic texts plays an important role in their religious and cultural lives. Hindus tend to distinguish between two broad groups: the astika (those who accept the authority of the Vedas) and nastika (those who do not accept the authority of the Vedas). It should be noted that such acceptance says nothing about what beliefs a person or group holds, but rather whether they are participating in the preservation and enrichment of Hindu society as inaugurated in the Vedas. Thus, "orthoprax" Hindus are considered astika, while Buddhists, Jainas, and Carvakas (those who reject the tradition stemming out of the Vedas) are considered nastika. The Vedic tradition is ultimately a belief in the dharma revealed by the Vedas—the cosmic order of reality that, when embodied in the structure of Hindu society, leads to social and cosmic harmony.

The most basic exemplification of the dharma is proper observation of caste distinctions (although there are additional distinctions made according to age, social position, etc.). Within Hindu thought, caste distinctions are not artificial constructs, but natural designations: one is born into a particular caste because of karmic residue from past lives. Moreover, society functions well only when these distinctions are respected, because each caste was created with particular capacities that correspond to particular needs within society. Traditionally, Brahmans —typically seen as the highest caste—are priests and scholars, kshatriyas are warriors and rulers, vaishyas are merchants and artisans, and shudras are farmers and laborers (the so-called untouchables typically fall outside of the caste system, and are seen as even lower than the shudras ). Right practice for a Hindu is thus a matter of living according to one's caste and performing the duties and obligations of that caste (that is, living according to the dharma); however, because those duties and obligations are often different for each caste, what constitutes right practice for any Hindu is typically dependent on their caste (as well as a number of other related social considerations). Needless to say, caste intermarriage and attempts at social mobility have traditionally been censured within Hinduism.

Just as there are exceptions to the aforementioned adherence to the tradition stemming out of the Vedas, so there are other, less central practices that are widespread among Hindus (for example, reverence for the cow, refraining from harming other creatures, etc.). Furthermore, there are a number of dharmashastras (texts of religious laws) and other post-Vedic literature that further specify right action with respect to rituals, caste relations, and personal discipline (e.g., the Manava Dharmashastra or Manusmrti, Laws of Manu ). What all of these manifold specifications of practice have in common, however, is that they all exemplify the attempt to act in accordance with the dharma for one's position in life and to do so while accruing as little negative karma as possible. Thus, while the Vedas may not be in the forefront of every Hindu's understanding of "right action," they ultimately inform the traditions that make such action properly Hindu.

With the Brahman class at the head of the Hindu caste system, one would expect authority to reside with them for interpreting orthopraxy with respect to the dharma. Historically, Brahman scholars have in fact seen themselves as the protectors of the dharma and have argued in the courts of their rulers (typically kshatriya ) for the preservation and enforcement of a social structure based on the Vedic rules and ritual practices. However, because there has traditionally been no prevailing institutional authority for Hinduism, such preservation and enforcement has typically been possible only at the level of broad social pressure. Moreover, any authority the Brahmans have for interpreting the dharma has been at least matched by the authority afforded to extraordinary devotees and saints of any caste for reinterpreting it. Perhaps the most prominent recent example of this is found in Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), who proposed a radical shift in the structure of Hindu society by renaming—and thus repositioning—the so-called untouchables (those who reside in India but fall outside of the caste system); he renamed them harijan, or "God's people," and gave them equal status among other Hindus in temples. As Gandhi's case illustrates, the authority for reinterpreting the dharma does not necessarily reside with social position (Gandhi was a member of the vaishya caste), but rather with the moral authority—usually understood in terms of devotion and service—to speak on behalf of the dharma.

In the end, orthopraxy is crucial to the understanding of Hinduism not because Hinduism entails no particular beliefs or because it makes no claims for orthodoxy; different traditions do espouse particular beliefs, and many will not hesitate to claim orthodoxy for those beliefs. Rather, orthopraxy is important for Hinduism because the commonality of practices among Hindus far exceeds the commonality of beliefs. Indeed, it is not merely religious scholars but also Hindus themselves who define Hindu identity in terms of practices more than beliefs. This emphasis on practice rather than belief runs counter to the typical Western model of religions, but it is an emphasis that proves characteristic not only of Hinduism but also of Asian religious and social traditions generally.

Buddhism

Strictly speaking, Buddhism is not interested in right action, as action itself is tied up in the ignorance and desire that Buddhism is intended to overcome. At least with respect to its ultimate aims, Buddhism is primarily interested in realizing the emptiness (shunyata ) of action (as well as all other things, especially the self), and thus achieving enlightenment (nirvana). As Buddhists find themselves faced with a world that demands decisions in the midst of this quest for enlightenment, however, they have found it useful and appropriate to comment on what would constitute right practice in such a context. The most prominent example of this is found in the Eightfold Path for achieving enlightenment, as laid out in Gautama Buddha's (c. 563–c. 483 b.c.e.) first sermon. This path consists of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration (Samyutta-nikaya, 420). From this account, at least two things become clear: The first is that Buddhism is not entirely antinomian—it is quite possible to follow the wrong path; the second is that, while right beliefs play an important role in Buddhist practice, greater emphasis is placed on right practice. At least at the origins of Buddhism, enlightenment was possible only when one's practices were consistent with the Eightfold Path.

Following the death of Gautama Buddha, however, Buddhism ceased to have any centralized religious authority and thus found it difficult to maintain any consistency with respect to its interpretation of the Buddha's message. It is notable that the early Buddhists held councils to determine right belief and practice, but—as evidenced by the various accounts of different schools—they proved less than effective at achieving any substantive degree of consistency. Rather, as Buddhism was interpreted by different persons in increasingly different contexts (in Tibet, China, and Japan), this diversity only compounded. Indeed, such diversity of practice is often considered a virtue: according to the doctrine of upaya-kaushalya (skillful means), the Buddhist message is not seen as something static but rather something to be altered in such a way as to be effectively communicated to its intended audience. Thus, at least in theory, the diversity of forms that Buddhist practices can take is potentially limitless. These differences should not be overstated, because there is still an underlying consistency to Buddhism that affirms prevalence of illusion and the need for enlightenment; however, the practices that are pursued as a means to that end vary remarkably among the various schools of Buddhism.

Aside from the Eightfold Path, Buddhist orthopraxy is also exemplified in rituals and monastic orders. Rituals of one form or another are practiced by all Buddhists—monks and nuns, as well as laypersons—and pertain to actions whose merit can be applied toward achieving nirvana or a better position in the next reincarnation. This includes not only engaging in virtuous behavior and avoiding vicious behavior, but also participating in ceremonies, acts of devotion, and other symbolic acts. Significantly, whereas ritual is seen as secondary to meditation in most Buddhist traditions, it is given equal status and prominence in Tibetan Buddhism for the attainment of enlightenment. Monastic orders, in turn, offer a more disciplined approach, including an increased enforcement of orthopraxy in order to assist in aligning one's actions with the path to enlightenment (as the path is understood by that particular monastery). These practices differ from monastery to monastery, but they generally follow from the doctrinal commitments of each monastery. Like their monastic practices, Buddhist practices in general also vary markedly from context to context; what holds true in Buddhism across the board, however, is that these practices—whatever they are—are always designed to bring local Buddhists ever closer to nirvana.

Chinese Religion

From its very beginnings, Chinese society has placed a particular emphasis on the right performance of rituals. In the Shang dynasty (c. 1554–1045/1040 b.c.e.), this had to do primarily with performing rituals to appease the High God (Shangdi), one's ancestors, and other spiritual powers. It should be noted that the larger part of ritual activity was applied to the veneration of ancestors, as it was generally felt that their approval was easier to attain than the more powerful but less reliable Shangdi. In all of this, the king bore a particular responsibility in performing the right rituals, since the success or failure of the state was seen to be a direct result of such performance. Indeed, proper performance of these rituals was seen to influence everything from harvests and weather patterns to illnesses and military campaigns. It should be noted, however, that this performance of ritual also served to legitimize the king's position, as it afforded him a special position as a mediator between spiritual forces and the welfare of the state.

In the Zhou dynasty (1045/1040–256 b.c.e.), this relationship became more formalized, largely in the attempt to legitimize the Zhou overthrow of the Shang. As recorded in the Shujing (Classic of documents), Shang rulers had once been virtuous and mindful of their ancestral obligations; toward the end of the dynasty, however, they became cruel and negligent. As a result, Heaven allowed the Zhou to rise up and overthrow the Shang, and thus to become the rightful rulers of China. As this account illustrates, the Zhou began to see the highest spiritual power as the impersonal Heaven (tian ) rather than as the personal God, Shangdi; likewise, they saw the survival of the state as dependent on observance of a moral principle—the Mandate of Heaven (tianming ) —rather than the allegiance of spiritual powers. Of course, this does not do away with the veneration of ancestors—a hallmark of Chinese practice—but begins to reinterpret it in terms of ritual responsibility rather than appeasement.

By the time of Confucius (Kong fuzi; 551–479 b.c.e.), the Zhou was in serious decline, such that there was military upheaval, social unrest, and general devastation throughout the empire. Confucius's message, as found in the Analects, was that this devastation was the result of the fact that the order of Earth no longer reflected the order of Heaven and the order of Heaven could only be exemplified by reviving the classic virtues (most significantly, ren, or humaneness). These virtues, in turn, could only be realized by a revival of the rituals (li ) that guide human relations. Confucianism brought ritual propriety to the fore by taking a term that had indicated guidelines for deference among the nobility and imbuing it with ethical implications for all people. In short, for Confucius, right practice is not a matter of mere politeness but is rather the very heart of a stable and prosperous society.

Consider this doctrine as utilized some centuries later by Zhu Xi's (1130–1200) to (somewhat one-sidedly) compare Confucians and Buddhists on the question of ritual propriety.

[A student] asked how to tell the difference between Confucianism and Buddhism. The teacher said: just take the teaching 'what heaven has endowed is called the nature.' The Buddhists simply do not understand this and dogmatically say that the nature is empty consciousness. What we Confucians talk about is solid principles, and from our point of view they are wrong.…

Take the human mind-and-heart, for example. In it there must be the five moral relations between parent and child, ruler and minister, elder and younger, husband and wife, and friends. When the Buddhists are consistent in action, they show no affection in these relationships, whereas when we Confucians are consistent in action, there is affection between parent and child, rightness between ruler and minister, order between elder and younger, attention to their separate functions between husband and wife, and trust between friends." Zhuzi quanshu (The Complete Works of Zhu Xi ) 60:14a. Translated by Wm. Theodore de Bary. In de Bary, p. 713.

A good example of ritual propriety is found in the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean ), one of the central texts of the Confucian tradition. Among other things, it emphasizes acting in accordance with one's position: effectively, a person of lower position acts with deference without resentment, while a person of higher position acts with graciousness without disdain. Such ritual propriety applies on a diminishing scale as family relations become more distant and official positions less distinguished. Most importantly, the Zhongyong gives expression to the five relations taken to be the most important foci of right relation: "The five are those governing the relationship between ruler and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and younger brothers, and those in the intercourse between friends. These five are universal paths in the world" (The Doctrine of the Mean, quoted in Chan, p. 105). It should be noted that, while Confucianism is often associated with patriarchy, not all of the relations listed above are hierarchical. Thus, while many of its relations have historically been patriarchal, there is reason to believe that there is room in Confucian orthopraxy for more equitable relations.

While Confucianism is rightly seen as the dominant tradition informing social practices, it was only one of many approaches introduced during this tumultuous period; Mozi (fifth century b.c.e.), for example, argued for the eradication of all ritual (in that all people were equal before Heaven), while the so-called legalists argued for the strict enforcement of certain practices within the context of a system based on punishment and reward. Perhaps the most persistent counterpoint to the Confucian emphasis on ritual, however, was the Daoist tradition. Where the Confucians praised structured interactions, the Daoists prized spontaneity. To Daoists, the social constructs of the Confucians were unnatural at best, if not outright destructive. The opposition of these two schools of thought, however, should not be overstated, as each balanced the other and even borrowed from the other in its own development. Stated simply, even Daoists had their rituals, though they were less centralized than those of their Confucian counterparts (see, for example, Daoist liturgies, ordination rites).

Historically, however, it is the Confucians who have enjoyed the most government sponsorship, and have thus had the greatest influence on the nature and breadth of ritual practice in China. Consistent with the Confucian account, therefore, right practice was not enforced on any official level (as evidenced by its Daoist and Buddhist detractors), but it was upheld on an unofficial basis as a standard of social morality and decorum. Indeed, the prominence that ritual propriety still enjoys in Chinese society can be attributed in large part to the longstanding influence of the Confucian tradition on its history. Although the Confucian tradition is no longer officially sanctioned by the government in the early twenty-first century, the importance of ritual propriety continues to be very evident in Chinese social practices, and arguably will remain so for many generations to come.

See also Buddhism ; Confucianism ; Daoism ; Hinduism .

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Robert Smid