Philosophy, Moral: Ancient

Ancient Greek moral theories are concerned in the first instance with the good life for human beings, or, in a word, happiness—what it is and how we might attain it—and with the role of the virtues of character—for example, temperance, courage, and especially justice—in achieving it. Serious critical inquiry into these questions began in Athens in the fifth century b.c.e. with Socrates (469–399), peaked twice in the theories of Plato (427?–347) and Aristotle (384–322), and came to rest in the Hellenistic period (323–30) with the calmer and more austere theories of the Epicureans and Stoics.

Socrates

Our picture of Socrates derives mainly from several short, inconclusive dialogues by his disciple Plato. In these, Socrates, believing that "the unexamined life is not worth living," typically challenges the conventional beliefs of his fellows, both ordinary people and more sophisticated thinkers, with questions about how human life should be lived. When his inter-locutors prove unable to defend their opinions on such questions, Socrates offers his own, radical, positive agenda in their place. We are happy, he thought, when our souls are in the best condition—when, as he believed, we have the virtues of character, especially justice. Since we all want to be happy, we will inevitably do what is virtuous if we know what it is. Hence happiness is achieved by removing ignorance and vice from our souls and replacing them with knowledge and virtue. Socrates' moral seriousness and courage, in discussion and in life, won favor not only with posterity but also with many of his contemporaries—but not all of them: in 399 he was tried and convicted on a charge of impiety, and put to death.

Plato

Socratic ethics insists that we will do what makes us happy if we know what that is. Often enough, however, when we (think we) know what will make us happy, we would rather do something else instead, and sometimes we do that something else. Also, Socratic ethics does not say enough about the soul to establish that justice and the other virtues bring the soul into its best condition or that we are happy when our souls are in their best condition.

In response to these concerns, Plato in the Republic (360 b.c.e.) distinguishes between the "rational," "emotional," and "appetitive" parts of the soul.

Each part is defined by desires: reason, by desires for what is best for us; emotion, by desires for honor, achievement, power, domination of others, and so on; and appetite, by desires for various kinds of physical pleasure. Plato also associates each part of the soul with goals: reason he associates with seeking after knowledge or understanding and emotion, and appetite with the various forms of emotional and physical gratification. Given these distinctions, Plato goes on to argue that our souls will be in better condition to the extent that our lives are structured and our practical activities are motivated by goals associated with reason, not goals associated with emotion and appetite.

Plato's metaphysics provides us with his account of the proper objects of understanding. According to his "theory of forms," the world that we are familiar with and the items populating it are merely "shadows" or "reflections" of a separate world of eternal and unchanging "forms," or "ideas," such as Number, Man, and Justice. By "sharing in" or "participating in" these most fundamental realities, ordinary objects are what they are and have the features they do. The desire to attain understanding of these entities should dominate our lives. Apprehending and appreciating formal reality, Plato thinks, makes us happy and makes our lives worth living.

It also makes us moral. Formal reality, Plato thinks, is so appealing—so riveting—as to cause us to lose interest altogether in emotional and physical forms of gratification. In consequence we will behave decently toward our fellows. Justice is thus the natural expression in the field of human relationships of a properly lived human life.

Aristotle

Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (350 b.c.e.), like Plato in the Republic, makes knowledge or understanding central to his conception of what is good for us as human beings. He also sees the virtues as expressing knowledge or understanding in action and in a life. But the kind of knowledge he takes to be involved in the virtues and how exactly he sees the virtues give expression to them are very different from what Plato thought.

Happiness for Aristotle consists primarily in the contemplation of the eternal truths of mathematics, physics, and theology. But practical wisdom, which is deployed in living a life well, is a separate intellectual virtue for Aristotle, and the virtues of character are closely connected with it. In the case of justice, Plato thinks that I will not take what is yours because, given my compelling interest in intellectual activities, I am no longer interested in what is yours. Arguably, this is not to take you and your rights as a person seriously. Aristotle's account of justice is a useful corrective. To be just requires not that I am uninterested in what is yours, but that I am disinterested or impartial; I see what is yours as yours and what is mine as mine.

I can achieve this perspective in matters of justice, Aristotle thinks, if I assume the perspective of a judge who sees us as free and equal citizens, each with his own interests and entitlements, and decides matters between us accordingly. And if I achieve this perspective, I will behave justly toward you. Thus being just requires that I understand what it is to be a citizen on a par with other citizens and to act from that perspective. So too with the other virtues: each involves correctly understanding the area of human reality appropriate to it and embodying that understanding in our actions and passions.

Hellenistic Theories

The most important ethical theories of the Hellenistic period are Epicureanism and Stoicism. According to the Epicureans, we are happy to the extent that we achieve a state of mind called "peace of mind" or "lack of disturbance." Disturbance is pain, and its absence is pleasure. To achieve peace of mind, we need to recognize that any fear of death or of the gods is baseless and that wronging others or pursuing physical pleasures beyond what is necessary will produce more pain than pleasure in the end. Thus knowledge as well as virtues such as justice and temperance do have value for the Epicureans, but they are valued only as means to peace of mind, not for themselves as they are for Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

The Stoics identified happiness with a state of mind called "absence of passion" or "spiritual peace." We can achieve this by coming to understand and identify with the impartial moral order of the universe and living "according to nature." This means living in ways that express our nature as rational beings. Crucial to such a life are the virtues, since they are all forms of knowledge; for example, justice is knowledge of what we owe to other people. Such knowledge is of a piece and is all or nothing; if we attain it, we will become calm and indifferent to such ills as poverty, pain, and even enslavement and death. Thus, although the Stoics' conception of happiness resembles that of the Epicureans, their view of virtue and its relation to happiness is closer to the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

See also Philosophy, Moral: Medieval and Renaissance ; Philosophy, Moral: Modern ; Virtue Ethics .

bibliography

Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. A two-volume revision of the Oxford Translation that includes all of Aristotle's works mentioned earlier, as well as a number of works attributed to Aristotle but of doubtful authenticity; various fragments, including parts of two poems; and Aristotle's will.

Bekker, Immanuel, ed. Aristotelis Opera. 5 vols. Berlin: G. Reimerum, 1831–1870. The complete Greek text of Aristotle's writings but for the Constitution of Athens.

Burnet, John, ed. Platonis Opera. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1900–1907. A complete Greek text of Plato's writings.

Cooper, J., ed. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis and Cambridge, U.K.: Hackett, 1997. A one-volume translation by various hands of all of Plato's writings, including works attributed to Plato that he may not have written.

Hamilton, Edith, and Huntington Cairns, eds. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Translated by Lane Cooper and others. New York: Pantheon, 1961.

Inwood, Brad, and L. P. Gerson, trans. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998. A one-volume selection of materials.

Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Greek and Latin texts of the principal sources for Hellenistic philosophy, with notes, translations, and commentary.

McKeon, Richard, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941. A one-volume abridgment of the Oxford Translation.

Ross, W. D., and J. A. Smith, eds. The Works of Aristotle Translated into English. Oxford: Clarendon, 1910–1952. The standard English version of Aristotle's writings, referred to as the "Oxford Translation."

Charles M. Young