Pensions and Pensioners

PENSIONS AND PENSIONERS. Between 1775 and 1906 state and federal governments awarded pensions to about 55,000 Revolutionary War veterans and 23,000 of their widows at a cost of nearly $70 million, an amount greater than was spent winning independence. These entitlements resulted from the adoption of colonial precedents, a fundamental change in the political culture and status of veterans, and a new social policy that departed from the Founders' principles.

THE REVOLUTION: INVALID AND HALF-PAY PENSIONS

At the beginning of the Revolution, states continued practices inherited from English and colonial militia laws by providing pensions for injured soldiers. The amount of the invalid pension was rated to the degree of the soldier's disability, which was measured by the capacity of the veteran to work rather than by the type of injury. Invalid pensions were dispersed by local officials and would increase or decrease with changes in the veteran's ability to be self-supporting. Benefits varied according to local law and custom. States also provided pensions for widows and orphans of soldiers who died in service. This aid more closely resembled poor relief than an entitlement. Generally, recipients had to be destitute before being eligible for assistance. Support ended when the widow remarried. As in prior wars, pensions for invalids and widows were intended to assist the recruitment and retention of soldiers, although they were not part of the formal agreements for enlistment. Revolutionary governments continued to distinguish between wages obligated by contract and benefits granted in cases of disability or death. Wages were enforceable under law. Pensions, on the other hand, were discretionary and thus could be changed or withdrawn.

Federal pension laws began when the struggle for independence required Americans to form a national army instead of relying on local militias and state troops. In 1776 the Continental Congress passed the first national pension law, which applied only to invalids who served in Washington's army. The law provided half-pay for life for any soldier or officer who lost a limb in battle or who was disabled so as to be unable to work. The law also granted partial benefits to men who were disabled but still capable of some labor. Adopting the British practice of an invalid corps, these invalid men could be called on to do light military duty. Although the law was federal, administration and payment were left to the states. In 1778 the law providing for Continental soldiers expanded to cover any soldier who fought in the militia. In 1785 Congress tried to standardize benefits by recommending that states grant half-pay to totally disabled officers, $5.00 a month to noncommissioned officers and soldiers who were unable to work, and partial benefits to all invalids rated by the degree of their disability. Whereas the 1776 law treated all invalids equally, the 1785 resolutions marked a significant change in the principle of invalid benefits by distinguishing between officers and men.

In 1790, after adoption of the Constitution, the federal government assumed payment of invalid pensions from the states. In 1792 the federal government took over the administration of the invalid pension program for veterans of the Continental Army. By 1800 the program enrolled about 1,500 men and cost less than $100,000 a year. In 1806 Congress consolidated all invalid programs by extending benefits to all Revolutionary War soldiers. Furthermore, Congress provided benefits to any veteran who had become disabled after the war owing to causes directly related to their service. Under this law the War Department required court-certified medical proof of the disability and evidence linking it to military service. In 1808 the federal government assumed all payments for invalid pensions, thereby ending remaining state programs. In 1816 benefits were increased to privates and officers below the rank of captain. Even so, the program remained small, with 2,200 recipients at an annual cost of about $200,000.

Departing from English practices, revolutionary leaders opposed lifetime service pensions to officers because they were antithetical to republican ideals. These leaders believed such pensions subverted civic virtue by creating a privileged class of "placemen and pensioners." In 1776 Washington rejected half-pay pensions for officers, but in 1777 he advocated them to slow the resignation of officers. He argued that the officers must be tied to service by self-interest as well as devotion to liberty. Thus arose a contentious issue that was not resolved until 1828. Its history is a reflection of the conflict between revolutionary ideals and expedient measures needed to sustain the army.

In 1778 Congress approved a compromise measure that provided half-pay to officers for seven years and one year's pay, or $80, to noncommissioned officers and men who served until the end of the war. In 1780 officers, with Washington's support, succeeded in getting a reluctant Congress to award them half-pay pension for life if they served throughout the war. Officers viewed the pension as part of their wages and as compensation for their sacrifices. Opponents of the pensions, by contrast, viewed the measure as a stopgap to retain officers. But more important, they deplored what they saw as the creation of a privileged class sustained by public taxes. The pensions, in their view, were more suited to a corrupt monarchy than to a new republic, in which citizen-soldiers should return to the ranks of civilian life without preferment. The newly formed Society of Cincinnati, whose membership was limited to officers and their male heirs, added a taint of aristocracy to the disparity between lifetime pensions for officers and the one-time payment of $80 to the rank and file who also served until the end of the war. The uproar of insurrection in 1783 coming from officers encamped in Newburgh, New York, further discredited the claim for half-pay. In early 1783, with the end of the war in sight, Congress reneged on its promise to award half-pay pensions for life. The country was bankrupt and could not pay them. Nevertheless, Congress compromised by awarding officers certificates worth five years' full pay and bearing 6 percent interest until redeemed. All others still received one year's pay. Upon leaving the army in 1783 most officers, desperate for cash, sold their commutation certificates at a fraction of their value. A bitter seed had been planted among these veterans.

In 1790, under Hamilton's plan of assuming debts incurred during the Revolution, the federal government redeemed the certificates at face value, a windfall for speculators and the few officers who held them. Rather than concluding the matter, these payments led to nearly forty years of lobbying and petitions by officers to secure half-pay pensions. Officers claimed that they had been cheated twice—once by their government, which had reneged on its promise in 1783, and again by speculators, who exploited men who had given years of service to their country. In 1809, 1810, and 1819, and from 1825 to 1827, officers submitted claims to Congress stating that they had a legal right to the pensions. Congress rejected these claims on the grounds that its obligations toward these veterans had been met with the 1783 commutation certificates.

The half-pay controversy ended in 1828, when Congress granted full-pay pensions for life to any soldier—not only officers—who had served until the end of the war. This solution upheld the objection made in 1783 that half-pay pensions for officers only was a practice associated with aristocratic societies. The law also sustained the principle that pensions were a gratuity, not a property right protected by contract as the officers claimed. This resolution of the half-pay controversy was less a testimony to the persistence of officers, however, than it was to a fundamental change in American political culture, social policy, and the status of veterans in American society. The passage of the Revolutionary War Pension Act in 1818 codified this shift and established a new precedent for veterans' benefits that eventually benefited those nagging officers.

VETERANS AS ICONS

Following the war and through the first decade of the nineteenth century, Fourth of July celebrants reserved their accolades for the war's leaders while still paying paid tribute to the "Spartan mothers" and the citizen-soldiers represented by militia. The contributions of the Continental Army, on the other hand, were diminished because of lingering anti-army sentiment. In light of the Newburgh conspiracy and demands for half-pay pensions, many viewed professional troops as vice-ridden and their officers as presumptuous and self-serving.

Between 1804 and 1816 the cultural status of rank-and-file veterans of the Continental Army was transformed. To a new generation, veterans emerged as icons of the spirit of '76, a combination of militant patriotism and self-sacrifice for revolutionary ideals. They were idealized as models of American character whose example would unite the nation and inspire future generations to achieve even greater patriotic deeds. The generation that came of age following the Revolution sought to memorialize veterans and show their gratitude toward them, especially as their numbers declined. Thinking of how future generations would view them, younger Americans were aware that neglecting the soldiers of the Revolution would dishonor the nation.

The esteemed status that veterans came to enjoy was partly a product of early nineteenth-century revisionist histories of the Revolution, which focused on the valor of the Continental Army. These histories recounted how the army overcame privations made vivid by images of bloody feet and hunger at Valley Forge. They portrayed the army as composed of citizen-soldiers, unlike England's army of social dregs and misfits, and as an exception to the rule that professional soldiers were a threat to liberty. The Newburgh conspiracy was recast from near treason to an expression of anguish by soldiers who had endured years of suffering as a result of the public's hostility toward them and its failure to pay and provide for them. The troops' restraint and loyalty under these conditions were celebrated as evidence of their virtue, whereas during the Revolution their demands for pensions were viewed as confirmation of their corruption. By removing the stain of treason and highlighting the courage of Continental veterans, revisionist histories provided younger Americans a view of the Revolution that accentuated the role of ordinary soldiers in securing Independence and as models of the spirit of '76.

Political conflict over defense policies during Thomas Jefferson's administration and military failures in the War of 1812 also elevated the status of Revolutionary War veterans. Republicans and Federalists used veterans as political symbols in their rhetorical clashes over foreign and defense policies. They celebrated veterans to portray themselves as defenders of the Revolution and protectors of American security. Republicans also used veterans to reinforce their image as the party of the people, as they had in 1808 by honoring the thousands of revolutionary soldiers who died on English prison ships in New York City.

The war with England (1812–1815) tested the nation's patriotism and military. Instead of a renewal of the spirit of '76, however, Americans experienced defeat, failure to fill ranks, and deep sectional divisions. Americans looked for lessons from the Revolution to explain their failures and for guidance to build a stronger and more united nation. Nationalists, informed by revisionist histories of the Revolution, made military valor a central theme in uniting the country and defining the character of Americans. Revolutionary War veterans became the symbols of renewed nationalism. Comparing America to ancient Greece and Rome, nationalists called for the preservation of battlefields and encampments such as Valley Forge, for monuments to fallen heroes including a national military cemetery, and for artists and writers to memorialize Revolutionary War veterans.

Sentimentalism and nostalgia reinforced nationalism. Orators and writers invoked the image of suffering soldiers in an effort to shape the public's attitude toward veterans. Romantic stories of their suffering while in service to the nation and in their old age conveyed the soldiers' heroism and sacrifice, establishing them as models of American character. At the same time, this emphasis on veterans' suffering highlighted the nation's ingratitude toward the soldiers who had won independence. Society's failure to aid these aged veterans tarnished America's reputation and set a poor example for future generations.

Veterans contributed to view that they deserved and needed assistance. Old soldiers applying for disability pensions, rather than making medical claims, portrayed themselves as becoming infirm and poor as a result of hardships while in service. They distinguished themselves from paupers, who had brought on their own miseries as a result of vice, by casting their poverty and infirmities as the price paid for the nation's independence. Rather than evidence of shame and personal failure, their infirmities and poverty became symbols of courage and devotion to the revolutionary spirit.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR PENSION ACT OF 1818

In December 1817 President James Monroe called on the nation to honor and assist the nation's Revolutionary War veterans by awarding life-time pensions to all men who had served in the war and who needed assistance. With the federal treasury overflowing, he urged Congress to act quickly for the few thousand thought to be still alive. Monroe viewed the pensions as a debt of gratitude to these veterans and as a means to unite the nation by renewing its revolutionary heritage. Considering that in 1816 Congress had given itself a substantial raise and increased benefits to disabled veterans, withholding pensions for Revolutionary War veterans would appear crass and heartless.

The public and House of Representatives responded enthusiastically to Monroe's request. The House passed a bill that provided pensions to all veterans of the Revolution in the amount of $8 for men and $20 for officers, the same rates paid under the 1816 Invalid Pension Act to totally disabled men and captains. Although the bill restricted eligibility to men "who were in reduced circumstances," the wording was intentionally vague so as not to exclude any veteran except for a few wealthy individuals. The Senate, however, fought over veterans' pensions.

The original draft of the Senate version of the bill restricted the pension to Continental soldiers who served for three years or the duration of the war. This version resembled the claim for half-pay pensions submitted by officers and set off a bitter conflict in the Senate. Opponents argued that service pensions were unconstitutional because granting them exceeded Congress's enumerated powers; that such pensions were antithetical to the principles of the Revolution because they singled out a class of men for preferment; and that restricting benefits to Continental soldiers distorted the true history of the Revolutionary War by ignoring the contributions of militia and the sacrifices of civilians. Opponents and supporters alike attacked the indigence qualification as demeaning and inconsistent with the nation's wish to honor veterans. After the bill survived a vote to kill it, senators from the New England and middle Atlantic states united to expand eligibility to Continental soldiers who served at least nine months. In the House, even supporters of the original comprehensive bill voted to pass the Senate's restricted version. As one congressmen remarked, half a loaf was better than none. With signing of the law in March 1818 the precedent was established to extend benefits to all other veterans.

The 1818 Pension Act awarded $240 a year to officers and $96 to rank and file who served at least nine months in the Continental Army and who were "in reduced circumstance and need of assistance from their country." The implementation of the law was a cause for public celebration, especially during Fourth of July parades when veterans mustered to submit their applications for pensions before courts. Rather than the few thousand pensioners expected to apply, by December 1818 the War Department received nearly 25,000 applications, over-whelming the pension office. The cost had increased from an estimated $300,000 to $2,000,000, with a further increase predicted to reach $5,000,000. In addition, the pension program was rocked by scandal involving fraud and corruption. In 1820 Congress amended the law by suspending all recipients and requiring them to reapply with proof of their poverty in the form of an inventory of all of their possessions except for clothing and bedding. The number of recipients was reduced by a few thousand and the scandal subsided. Although the pension office established a means test, it applied it liberally by awarding pensions to veterans who deeded their property to kin or caregivers in return for housing and support. Legally, these veterans were poor but not destitute. Through successful administration, the pension program became entrenched, and veterans regained their image as worthy recipients. In 1823 Congress extended benefits to Continental veterans who had disposed of their property to pass the means test. With this amendment nearly every veteran who met the service qualification was eligible for the pension.

America's first entitlement program eventually benefited just over 20,000 veterans and some 47,000 of their dependents. By enacting service pensions the Monroe administration departed fundamentally from the principles that had guided the Founders. The act established the precedent for the use of entitlement programs not only for veterans but for others groups to address a wide variety of social issues.

PENSION ACTS OF 1832 AND 1836

The expansion of benefits to Continental Army veterans established a pattern that was repeated in the Pension Acts of 1832 and 1836. Facing a budget surplus, in 1829 President Andrew Jackson proposed that service pensions be awarded to veterans of the Revolution not yet covered under existing law. Echoing the arguments for and against the precedent-setting act in 1818, Congress debated the extension of benefits. The pension proposal also became part of the sectional conflict in the Senate over the tariff, with opponents alleging that the purpose of the bill was to support the continuation of high tariffs that produced income for the federal government. Veterans' affairs continued to be enmeshed with larger political issues. Nevertheless, Congress approved a bill granting full pay for life to any veteran who had completed a total of two years of service, whether in the Continental Army, militia, or state regiments. As with prior laws, officers were to receive up to $20 a month. The bill also granted partial pensions rated by the months of service to any soldier who served a total of six to twenty-four months at any time during the war. Unlike the 1818 and especially the 1820 laws, the 1832 law did not require an oath of poverty or a means test. In essence, the 1832 law implemented the intent of the first bill introduced to Congress in 1818 that proposed service pensions to all veterans.

Once again, Congress had grossly underestimated the number of recipients and the cost of the program. Instead of the projected 9,000 to 10,000 recipients and $450,000 in cost, nearly 28,000 veterans received the pension at an annual cost of $1.8 million. Fraud and corruption marred the program, leading some to observe that there would be more pensioners than there were soldiers in the Revolution. Congress responded by making the Pension Office a separate branch of the War Department. In 1834 Commissioner James L. Edwards, who had headed the branch since 1818, reported that about 43,000 veterans were then on the pension rolls under the various acts of Congress and that $2,325,000 had been paid that year, a figure that represented about 20 percent of the federal expenditures that year.

CONCLUSION

The pension laws greatly benefited veterans and their families. Unlike poor relief, which varied by need and could end with improved circumstances, the pensions provided a stable, guaranteed annual income. Pensions were welcomed locally because men who received them would not become paupers in need of other forms of public assistance. On the social level, pensioners reliant on their children for support regained at least some of their independence, to the mutual benefit of both generations. Veterans used their pensions to support their dependents and in some cases to reunite families divided by poverty. Besides the financial and family benefits, service pensions elevated veterans' status by honoring them as patriots who deserved the nation's gratitude. Subsequent veterans' benefits were built on this cultural and political heritage.

With even more federal revenue to spend, in 1836 Congress awarded pensions for widows of any soldier who would have been eligible for a pension under the Pension Act of 1832. The law restricted eligibility to wives who became widows when their husbands died while serving in the Revolution. In subsequent years, eligibility expanded to include nearly every veteran's widow. In 1906, 130 years after declaring independence, the pension program for Revolutionary War soldiers ended with the final payment to a veteran's widow.

SEE ALSO Cincinnati, Society of the; Congress; Continental Army, Social History; Continental Congress.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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