Economic Sanctions: A Valuable Weapon?

The Conflict

Economic sanctions are a tool in international relations used in order to attempt to force one country to comply with another's wishes. The United States is by far the largest implementer of economic sanctions in the world. While some see sanctions as a low-cost method for accomplishing foreign policy goals, the toll in human suffering is often extreme, due to shortages in food, medicine, and other basic supplies. It is also argued that sanctions damage international relations and exact a high price on the sender in terms of lost jobs and trade opportunities.

Political

• Economic sanctions are sometimes imposed to achieve goals, such as democratization, or to condemn practices, such as human rights abuses and terrorism.

Economic

• Sanctions are ostensibly an economic issue, although ramifications are often humanitarian as well. The idea is to punish countries for reprehensible behavior by restricting trade with them, thus forcing them to change their policy, but economic sanctions may often have a greater effect on a country's general population than on its leaders.

Afghanistan under the Taliban, Angola, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cuba, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, India, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, and Yugoslavia are just a few of the countries that have been subjected to economic sanctions over the past few decades. At times carried out with group support (multilateral)—as in the cases of South Africa and the Taliban—or initiated by one country with little international backing (unilateral)—as in the case of Cuba by the United States—sanctions are a diplomatic tool used in lieu of force to indicate displeasure in a country's behavior and to encourage change. Sanctions can be initiated for a number of reasons, including discouraging armed conflict, hindering drug trafficking, and preventing weapons proliferation. They may be applied to the target country via arms embargoes, a withdrawal of diplomatic relations, reducing or cutting off foreign aid, limiting or ending trade, or various other means.

While the aim of sanctions is to apply pressure on a country's leadership to bring about a desired result, the problem exists that such pressures could, and often do, backfire. If sanctions limit the number of supplies coming into a country, that country's government can better control the distribution of goods. The general population of a country targeted by sanctions is rarely untouched by the measures. As scarcity of supplies increases and conditions in a country worsen, the people are likely to consider those who are applying the sanctions as the source of their problems, rather than see their government as responsible. This is the situation that has developed in Iraq. Subjected to sanctions at the end of the Persian Gulf War (1991), the conditions of the Iraqi people have worsened over more than a decade. As a result public opinion has turned more negative towardsthe United States, themainproponentofthe sanctions, than it has against Iraq's authoritarian leader Saddam Hussein.

As in the instance of Iraq, sanctions often have a negative impact on a population of the targeted country, though this is not their intent, while the true purpose of the restrictions just as often is left unfulfilled. After more than 40 years of sanctions against the island nation of Cuba, the United States has failed to achieve its goal of ousting Fidel Castro and his communist regime from power in that country. Meanwhile, the Cuban people experience shortages in supplies and look for assistance from other sources while the United States denies itself what could be a lucrative trading relationship with its southern neighbor. In Iraq, more than 10 years of sanctions has seen the erosion of the population's health. The Iraqi health care system has experienced a breakdown, as available medicine stocks are not nearly enough to cover the people in need. According to a 1997 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey carried out by the Iraqi government and UNICEF, 32 percent of children under age five were malnourished, indicating a jump of 72 percent since the time of the Gulf War in 1991.

When sanctions are not well defined, fail to receive broad support, and possess no clear goal, their use inflicts hardship and suffering on people. When applied with a consensus of agreement, with a clearly defined purpose and course of action, sanctions can achieve their goal. One case in point is South Africa. After South Africa implemented the stratified racial system called apartheid in the 1950s, under which it was ruled by a white minority while its predominantly black population lived in oppression and poverty, many countries, including the European Community and the United States, used sanctions to discourage the policy's continuation. Over the course of more than 10 years, the sanctions remained in place. South Africa revoked the legal framework surrounding apartheid in 1991, and gradual forms were instituted until free all-race elections were held in 1994. In this instance, sanctions were a success. In instances where such a high level of international support is absent, however, sanctions can be far less effective, and the people suffer. Given their increasingly frequent use on the world stage, how valuable a weapon are economic sanctions?

Historical Background

Economic sanctions are a way of attempting to force one country (the target) to comply with the wishes of another country or organization (the sender). According to the Heritage Foundation's "User's Guide to Economic Sanctions" (O'Quinn, June 1997), these measures can include:

limiting exports to the target country; limiting imports from the target country; restricting investments in the target country; prohibiting private financial transactions between a sender country's citizens and the target country's citizens or government; and restricting the ability of a sender country's government programs …to assist trade and investment with the target country.

There are a number of reasons why a country or organization may choose to enact economic sanctions. According to the Heritage Foundation these can be divided into three main categories: "national security objectives; other foreign policy objectives; and international trade and investment dispute resolution."

National security is the issue when one country invades another. To express its disapproval, a sender country (or organization such as the UN) may impose sanctions. This was the case when the United Nations agreed to sanctions in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, as well as when the former Yugoslavia sent troops into breakaway republics. Stopping weapons proliferation also falls under the category of national security. Agreements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group attempt to restrict the export of military technology and equipment. The aforementioned agreements are all multilateral sanctions in which the United States participates. The United States also occasionally imposes controls on the export of military technology to countries that, while not direct threats, may be perceived as potential aggressors.

Evidence linking a nation's government to terrorist activity is another reason for imposing sanctions. It is on this basis that the United States forbids all investment in Iran and has severe restrictions on trade with that country. The United States also limits trade with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria under the same justification.

Sanctions can also be imposed for a variety of foreign policy objectives, including encouraging democratization in the target nation. For example, the military government of Burma (also known as Myanmar) denied that it had been defeated in a May 1990 election, and it kept opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for six years. On May 20, 1997, in response to the government's continued refusal to follow democratic practices, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) announced that the United States would not engage in any new investments in the country. Going a step further, some U.S. states such as Massachusetts initiated sanctions of their own against Burma to further restrict relations with that country. These sanctions, however, were overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Human rights violations pose another foreign policy objective that may prompt the use of sanctions. Ironically, it can be argued that sanctions themselves have caused large-scale violations of human rights. Especially in countries such as Iraq and Cuba, sanctions have caused extreme suffering and have denied many people such basic necessities as food, safe water, and emergency medical treatment. Other motivations for the application of sanctions include drug trafficking—applied by the United States against Colombia in 1996—and environmental protection—initiated by the United States against China for its Three Gorges Dam project in 1996, which threatens a wide expanse of land and requires the relocation of millions.

When it comes to international trade and investment dispute resolution, economic sanctions are usually limited. Their use depends upon the degree of the infraction committed by the target country. Such disputes are more commonly resolved through mediation by the World Trade Organization (WTO), coalitions such as the European Union (EU), accords such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or other bilateral agreements.

Unilateral vs. Multilateral Sanctions

Unilateral sanctions involve a single country restricting its business with another country, whereas multilateral sanctions involve several countries agreeing to cut off financial interaction with the target country. Many multilateral sanctions are imposed through actions of the United Nations Security Council. The United States is virtually the only country in the world that imposes unilateral sanctions, certainly the only one that does so with any regularity.

During the Cold War, between 1945 and 1989, the United States primarily imposed sanctions against communist countries to prevent them from developing and gaining access to weapons technology. Sanctions were also employed as a response to military aggression or the threat of such aggression. Such sanctions during the 1980s proved largely ineffective and, in fact, were at times even counterproductive. The grain embargo and pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union are prime examples. In 1980, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States condemned the action by refusing to sell grain to the Soviet Union. In response, countries such as Brazil and Argentina dramatically increased their production in order to fill the void in the market. In 1981 then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-89) revoked the embargo, declaring that it was not achieving its goals. The pipeline sanctions, attempting to cut off the Soviet oil supply, were equally unsuccessful and were also aborted.

In the mid-1990s, during the Clinton administration, economic sanctions reemerged as a popular weapon in the U.S. arsenal in battles ranging from terrorism to drug trafficking. According to a 1997 study by the National Association of Manufacturers, between 1993 and 1996, the United States imposed new economic sanctions on more than 30 countries. Many of these sanctions were unilateral, meaning they did not have broad international support. The organization estimates that sanctions denied American companies 2.3 billion potential customers—42 percent of the world's population—constituting $790 billion in export markets, or 19 percent of the world's total market.

Unilateral sanctions are increasingly ineffective in a more globalized economy. When the United States, for example, decides it will not trade with a country, there are many more nations ready to step in and take its place. Even in the case of the multilateral UN sanctions against Iraq, illegal trade across the border with Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Iran poses a threat to the ability of the sanctions to isolate the target country and achieve their purpose. Due to a lack of compliance by many other countries, the effectiveness of sanctions suffers.

The United States has instituted several acts in the 1990s in an effort to combat this problem. The Helms-Burton Act and the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act threaten punitive action against companies from countries that do not restrict business in Cuba, Iran, and Libya. These acts, however, run the risk of angering third-country corporations, who in turn can retaliate against U.S. companies by refusing to do business with them. In the instance of unilateral sanctions, such laws by the United States are seen as an attempt to coerce international compliance with U.S. goals. Many countries have responded to U.S. actions like the Helms-Burton Act by passing so-called "blocking statutes." These laws, already enacted by Canada and the European Union, compel these countries not to follow the U.S. legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act or the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act. They place the same restrictions on U.S. subsidiary companies located in Canada or EU nations, thus putting these corporations in the awkward position of being bound to two conflicting sets of requirements.

The Iran/Libya Act, passed on August 5, 1996, threatened punitive action against any U.S. or foreign company that invested over $40 million in either Iran or Libya, especially in the hydrocarbon sector. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act, was signed in March 1996. The expressed intention of the act was to encourage Cuba's democratization. As it targeted primarily European and Canadian investors in Cuba, however, the act raised questions as to the scope of U.S. jurisdiction and to what extent one country can enforce its policies beyond its national borders. For example, does the United States have the right to tell a Canadian airline that it cannot service Cuba? Canada does not think so. The law goes so far as to state that products consisting of more than 20 percent of U.S.-made components can not be sold to Cuba by any company and those with between 10 to 20 percent require a license to be sold. The fact that the United States felt the need to pass the Libya/Iran Act and the Helms-Burton Act is an indication of the flaws inherent in unilateral sanctions. Without the cooperation of other nations, sanctions have limited potential to injure the economy of the target country. Indeed, unilateral sanctions can at times violate international law. On October 19, 2000, several speakers in the UN General Assembly condemned unilateral sanctions on this basis and on the basis that they were an infringement on the principles of State equality and presented barriers to free movement and international commerce.

Pros of Economic Sanctions

When one country engages in action that others feel is reprehensible, the disapproving nations often assume a moral obligation to react. While war is the most extreme and unequivocal expression of such disapproval, for many reasons it is usually not the most appropriate. War is costly for everyone involved, both financially and in terms of human repercussions. Economic sanctions are often seen as a more humane method of getting one country to comply with the wishes of another without resorting to violence. In theory the repercussions are primarily at the upper level, and the primary injuries are sustained by the government and large corporations rather than by the people of the targeted country.

Another argument for sanctions, in the case of Iraq for example, is that it allows the sender to direct where that country's income is going. According to Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Gwen Ifill, interview, May 3, 2000), "if the sanctions weren't in place, the situation would be worse in Iraq because Saddam [Hussein] would spend money on arms and on arms industry… And if there weren't UN controls which force [Hussein] to spend money on humanitarian goods, I think he would be using that money for nefarious purposes instead."

When combined with other factors, sanctions can be a powerful incentive in encouraging governments to change their policies. One case in point is South Africa. The European Community (currently known as the European Union) imposed sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s due to its policy of apartheid. Also at this time, in 1986, the U.S. Congress imposed strict trade limitations with South Africa, overriding President Ronald Reagan's veto. The South African economy, which had grown rapidly from the end of World War II (1939-45) through the 1970s, suffered under the sanctions, which resulted in a lack of investment capital. Diplomatic pressure from outside and civil unrest and violence within the country, led to the election in 1989 of the reformist presidential candidate F.W. de Klerk. Changes in South Africa's apartheid policy were enacted gradually. In 1989 de Klerk did away with the Separate Amenities Act. The following year he repealed a ban on 33 opposition groups that had spoken out against apartheid, including the African National Congress (ANC). Also in 1990 ANC leader Nelson Mandela was freed after 27 years in prison. In January 1991 black students were allowed for the first time to enter all-white public schools. That year saw the repeal of other apartheid laws as well, and on July 10, 1991, U.S. President George Bush (1989-93) lifted most U.S. sanctions against South Africa. On October 8, 1993, the UN rescinded most of the remaining sanctions against the country.

Sanctions tend to be most successful when they are multilateral and have a clear, specific, and limited aim. The sanctions against South Africa had a specific goal—the end of apartheid—and were successful in meeting that goal. In contrast, sanctions against the Middle Eastern country of Iraq have met with much less success, though restrictions have been in place for more than 10 years. Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy contends that one of the reasons why the Iraq sanctions have lasted so long and with such debatable efficacy is because there is no consensus in the international community that Hussein needs to be removed from office, which was the goal of the United States at the time the sanctions were put into place. With the international community split on the purpose of the sanctions, their effect and the extent to which they are upheld suffers.

Cons of Economic Sanctions

In the United States economic sanctions are often seen as a low-cost way of compelling other countries to conform to international law or will on an issue, or even to the U.S. leadership's view of how things should be, such as in the case of Cuba, which has been subjected to decades of sanctions from the United States due to the Cuban government's adherence to communism. As one of the most powerful nations, the United States can wield heavy influence on smaller nations and their policies. The negative impact of economic sanctions are not as immediately evident as those of war, but they can be just as devastating and long lasting, for both the target and the sender.

Despite claims to the contrary on the part of senders, the population at large of a target country often suffers greatly under sanctions. Trade barriers mean that goods essential for survival—food, medical supplies—can not reach the country. While the elite can almost always find access to these goods, it is the poor who are hit hardest. Sanctions often make it difficult or impossible for even humanitarian aid to reach the people of a target country. For this reason, numerous humanitarian groups have expressed their opposition to sanctions in many cases. The supply shortages also create a flourishing black market, in which those with money can still obtain the desired products. This situation encourages illegal activity and exaggerates the gap between the wealthiest and poorest in the target country.

Sanctions exact a price from the sender as well as from the target. When imposing sanctions a nation must be willing to sacrifice its market in that country, which can at times mean considerable loss of revenue and jobs at home. This impact is often felt immediately, but there are also long-term implications. When a country gets a reputation for imposing economic sanctions liberally, as the United States has in the past decade, it makes other nations reluctant to do business with that country. If a nation feels that there is a real prospect of being cut off, it will be less willing to make an investment in developing economic relations with that supplier and will instead seek out what it perceives as more stable options. For these reasons the National Association of Manufacturers, an American business organization, opposes sanctions. According to a 1995 study conducted by the group, sanctions have lost the United States US$6 billion annually in export sales, and put 120,000 American jobs at risk.

Another disadvantage of economic sanctions is their increasing ineffectiveness in a global economy. Even in the case of multilateral sanctions, during which several nations band together to isolate the target country, there are often other suppliers ready to step in. In this sense the sender can end up not only hurting its own economic prospects, but also giving business to those countries with a conflicting agenda who choose not to comply with the sanctions.

Sanctions without Success

In addition to putting the sanctioned country's general population at risk, sanctions also run the possibility of accomplishing the opposite of their intended goal. One case in point is Libya. In 1982 the Reagan administration declared the Libyan government under Muammar Qaddafi to be associated with terrorist activities and imposed an embargo on oil from Libya, forbade the sale of technical equipment to the country, and banned American travel there. In 1985 Reagan extended the sanctions when Libya was implicated in terrorist attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna. The U.S. president issued a declaration stating that Libya was endangering the national security and foreign policy of the United States. He cut off all political and economic relations and mandated that any Americans in Libya leave the country. Animosity between the two countries escalated. The U.S. Navy held maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, which Libya considered its territory. The two countries had a run-in in these waters, after which Reagan ordered a bombing of Libyan missile sites, declaring that it was Qaddafi's intention to target U.S. diplomats worldwide.

In April 1986, after a suspected Libyan terrorist bombing in West Berlin, the United States attacked Qaddafi's compound, Libya's naval academy, and air bases in Tripoli and Banghazi. Fifteen people were killed, including Qaddafi's infant daughter, and 60 were wounded. It can be argued that in this case, economic sanctions did not avert violence, but rather were one step in escalating tensions that eventually led to events in which a number of people died. Neither the sanctions nor the military maneuvers in the country weakened Qaddafi's government; in fact, they appeared to cement his support base both within his country and in other Arab nations and confirmed perceptions of the United States as an imperialist aggressor.

In both Cuba and Iraq as well, sanctions appear to be in many respects self-defeating. While the goals of the sanctions have been to remove Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein, respectively, from power, it can be argued that the sanctions have instead cemented their leadership. In order to remove a ruler from power in a democratic fashion, which is the goal of the sanctions against these countries, public support is necessary. The intention is that the people of the target country will turn against the leader, at least in part to have the sanctions overturned. Rather, it is more often the case that the leader uses the sanctions to turn public sentiment against the sender. Shortages give the leader greater control over the population in the form of rationing, and provides a scapegoat for any of the government's own faults. This is evidenced in Cuba, where government propaganda continues to portray Castro as a righteous David battling the imperialist American Goliath.

Regarding Iraq, it may seem that Saddam Hussein in fact supports the sanctions against his country. In a March 2001 summit meeting of Arab nations in Amman, Jordan, a resolution calling for the repeal of the sanctions was opposed by only one country—Iraq. Iraq's issues with the resolution were minor. The agreement would have compelled the country to respect Kuwait's sovereignty, which it has already done; the Iraqi delegates claim that this point implies that Iraq is not trustworthy, and they refused the resolution.

Another risk of economic sanctions is that they can provoke the target country into an escalating contest with the sender. Iraq, for example, rather than backing down when sanctions were in place, issued further threats against Kuwait. "If sanctions aren't lifted," the Iraqi foreign minister threatened, "no Kuwaitis should sleep well at night."

Controversy over Iraq

The United States and other Western nations have long had a precarious relationship with Iraq, depending on the country for oil, yet often disapproving of Iraqi politics. One major bone of contention has been Iraqi antagonism toward the state of Israel. Another has been its treatment of the Kurds within Iraq, and the genocide perpetrated against them by the Iraqi government. Yet despite condemnation of these policies, it is also the case that U.S. money and support cemented Saddam Hussein's hold on power in the first place.

Iraq has long played an important role in the international economy because of its oil production. In 1931 the country signed an agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, an international conglomerate composed of several Dutch, English, French, and U.S. oil companies. The agreement gave these companies the exclusive right to develop the oil fields in the Mosul area of the country in exchange for annual royalties paid to the Iraqi government. These payments increased under new agreements in 1950 and 1951. In 1952 they again increased, giving Iraq 50 percent of the profits. Between 1972 and 1975 Iraq nationalized all oil companies operating in the country. In 1973, when an international oil shortage caused prices to rise sharply, Iraq's revenue also rose accordingly.

Between the 1950s and 1990 oil revenues brought significant increases in the standard of living for the majority of the Iraqi population, including advances in agricultural production and health care. The infant mortality rate fell from 120 per 1000 live births in 1960, to 45 per 1000 in the late 1980s. After sanctions were enacted against Iraq the rates skyrocketed to more than 100 by 1998.

Iraq's monarchy was overthrown in a 1958 revolution. Several leaders rose and fell in quick succession amid political turmoil. When Hasan al-Bakr resigned in 1979, Saddam Hussein took his place as president and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. That same year, an Islamic revolution arose in neighboring Iran. The Iranian dictator, the Ayatollah Khomeini, called for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. War broke out between the two countries on September 16, 1980, when Iraq invaded. The United States supported Hussein's forces throughout the indecisive eight-year war. The countries arrived at an inconclusive peace agreement on August 20, 1988.

Throughout the 1980s the United States and Britain kept Hussein's regime supplied with electronics, chemicals, and other goods, and provided an ample market for Iraqi exports. When the war ended Hussein attacked the Kurds, a minority in his own country who had sided with Iran during the fighting. The Iraqi army used chemical weapons and nerve gas against the Kurds, many of whom were forced to flee to Turkey and Iran. The United States and Britain not only continued their supplies to Iraq. The war against the Kurds entailed the destruction of agricultural areas, and the United States offered more subsidized food to Iraq, declaring that it would allow the country to better handle human rights issues.

When Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait on August 2, 1990, however, with the intention of obtaining the oil reserves there, the United States and other Western powers withdrew their support and cut off all aid to Iraq. The United Nations Security Council called for Iraq's withdrawal from the council on August 3, and on August 6 it imposed an international trade ban against the country. The United States and its NATO allies sent troops to Saudi Arabia in an operation called Desert Shield, to prevent a possible attack on that country and present a unified front against further Iraqi aggression.

Iraq failed to comply with a November 29 Security Council ultimatum to evacuate Kuwait by January 15, 1991, and on January 16 and 17, the United States led massive air attacks on Baghdad,

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the Iraqi capital. Operation Desert Storm (the air attacks) and Operation Desert Sabre (the land offensive) lasted until February 28, 1991, by which point the Iraqi resistance had entirely crumbled. U.S. President George Bush declared a ceasefire. Kuwait regained its briefly interrupted independence, and a UN commission was sent to supervise while Iraq destroyed its medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons research facilities. The sanctions remained in place as inspectors suspected non-compliance regarding Iraq's weapons destruction efforts, a required component of the ceasefire agreement.

In April 1995 the sanctions were eased slightly with the introduction of the oil-for-food program. This gave Iraq permission to export $2 billion in oil every six months; of this revenue, $1.3 billion was to be spent on food and medicine, $600,000 would go into a compensation fund to pay for war damages, and $80,000 would go to pay UN expenses. While the oil-for-food program may have averted a truly disastrous famine it has been inadequate in alleviating the day-to-day situation in Iraq. The UN estimated that Iraq needs $2.1 billion in food and medicine every six months just to keep the already poor conditions from sinking lower. Revenue from the oil-for-food program is also unevenly distributed; much more of it goes to the northern region of the country than to the south; the north also receives significantly greater aid from international donors, even though the region comprises only 9 percent of the country's land area and 13 percent of the population. It does, however, contain 48 percent of Iraq's arable land. The north has historically been better off than the south, and this imbalance is perpetuated and compounded by the distribution of funds from the oil-for-food program.

Bureaucratic red tape has also prevented the oil-for-food program from being as successful as it could be. Whole shipments of humanitarian goods are often held up if the list includes one or two items to which someone on the UN sanctions committee objects. For example, pencils have been forbidden as part of aid packages. The reasoning is that the carbon in them could be used to coat airplanes to make them invisible to radar. As a result, millions of Iraqi children go without even the most basic in food, health, and educational materials.

As conditions in Iraq continue to deteriorate and worldwide oil production fluctuates, effecting supply to many nations, France and several other countries have begun to call for an end to the sanctions against Iraq. Pointing to the sanctions' lack of clear direction and their obvious negative impact on the general population, nations who once supported the economic sanctions are now divided over the matter.

The Case of Cuba

Like Iraq, Cuba has also been the subject of sanctions with a questionable purpose. Cuba has a long history of economic dependence on other countries. Under the dominion of Spain, the island's commerce was restricted largely to produce goods primarily for sale to the colonial power. In the nineteenth century, however, Spain opened Cuba's markets and U.S. investors came in large numbers, buying land and sugar refineries, as well as putting money into the transportation, tobacco, and banking industries. The United States began to eclipse Spain as the dominating force in the Cuban economy; a 1902 agreement guaranteed that a certain amount of sugar annually would be sold to the United States. While this system proved beneficial for Cuba's economy in some respects, providing a sense of stability and a guaranteed income, it also perpetuated a system in which the Cuban work-force remained underpaid and capital was consistently drained from the island.

It was partially in response to this economic inequality that Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista's government was toppled in 1959. The revolution that put Fidel Castro in control promised to address the issue of this imbalance both within Cuba and in relation to the United States. This made the United States uneasy, particularly because the Cold War was in full swing, and the United States greatly feared what it perceived as the incursion of communism into the Western Hemisphere, only 90 miles from U.S. soil. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61) severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1960, and passed a partial trade embargo prohibiting the import of Cuban products.

By isolating the country economically the United States believed that Castro would eventually be forced to modify his policies or would be replaced. Instead, Castro, with a groundswell of popular support, undertook a program of increased nationalization. Among the businesses brought under government control were $8 billion in U.S. assets. Rather than capitulate with U.S. demands on how Cuba should govern itself, the island nation appealed to the Soviet Union for support. The Soviet Union, grateful for both the ideological and economic alliance, offered its assistance.

With the Soviet Union/Cuba alliance, Cold War tensions were heightened. The United States, already sensitive to having a communist nation so close to its shores, was further alarmed at Cuba's closer ties with the Soviet Union and with the incoming Soviet assistance. In a plan engineered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the United States prepared to invade Cuba and assassinate Castro, believing that this action would eliminate the communist threat. The infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 resulted in a terrifyingly close brush with nuclear destruction, but it had no effect on Castro's hold on power. The invasion, largely launched by CIA-trained Cuban expatriates, did not receive full U.S. support, and it failed in its endeavor. Little more than a year later, the Cold War reached its height with a standoff over Soviet missiles in Cuba. In October 1962 the Cuban missile crisis was resolved when the Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba and the United States agreed not to invade the island.

While Soviet missiles were no longer supplied to the island, Soviet support to Cuba continued. The Cuban economy managed to do well despite sanctions imposed by the United States in 1960. In many ways the economic relationship that Cuba had with the United States before communism was replicated in its relationship with the Soviet Union in the early years of Castro's regime. Cuba exported sugar and several other raw materials to the Soviet bloc in exchange for technology and manufactured goods.

When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, Cuba's $3 to $4 billion a year in aid dried up; the country also lost the market for over 80 percent of its exports. The country's gross domestic product fell 35 percent between 1983 and 1993, with the steepest decline between 1990 and 1993. In the early 1990s, to make up for this sudden loss, Cuba increasingly opened its economy to foreign investors and at the same time instituted strict rationing of basic necessities for the majority of the population.

In 1991 the Cuban government eliminated all references to Marxism from the constitution. In 1993 Castro allowed the use of the U.S. dollar in monetary transactions. At the same time, the United States began to allow Cuban Americans to send more money back to relatives in Cuba. Together these policies have brought significant sums of the currency into circulation in Cuba. In 1994 the Cuban economy began to recover from its losses of the previous decade, and in 1995, the government made explicit its goal to bring in more foreign currency. Foreign investment has grown steadily in the sectors of biomedical products and tourism.

The explicit goal of the United States in permitting more dollars to be transferred to Cuba was to encourage capitalism within the country in the hopes that it would translate into internal political opposition. While no such opposition materialized as of 2001, there has been a noticeable shift toward capitalist policies within Castro's government, although often in such a way that the primary beneficiaries are not the Cuban people, but investors from other countries.

Despite Castro's continued insistence on his adherence to socialist principles, Cuba is taking an increasingly active role in global capitalism. The government prides itself on the freedom of operation it allows foreign corporations, which is one indication of a country moving away from a socialist system. Money from Spain, the Netherlands, and other European countries has built luxury hotels, bars, restaurants, and other facilities to service tourists. The income from the tourist industry is currently $1 billion a year.

Yet at the same time, capitalist activity among the Cuban population itself is actively discouraged; the government restricts the entrepreneurial activity of its citizens to a limited scope. This means that the majority of the money generated by the tourist boom goes to either foreign investors or to the Cuban government. Those who are prospering have relatives abroad who send money back, or are benefiting from the illegal activity that tourism has spawned, including prostitution and other crimes. Meanwhile, unemployment remains at 25 percent.

Despite the continued persistence of U.S. sanctions, Cuba endures. The U.S. hope that the Cuban people will overthrow their leader has not been realized. The unilateral sanctions have been ignored by many countries and, in fact, serve as good propaganda for Castro's anti-American speeches. While the sanctions remain in place the United States loses out on what could be lucrative trade with Cuba and risks angering allies who do wish to trade with Cuba, but who risk doing so at the displeasure of Cuba's much larger and influential neighbor to the north.

Recent History and the Future

Toward the end of the Clinton administration in the United States it appeared that the sanctions against Iraq, which have faced increasing opposition in the UN, were nearing their end. The sanctions have come up against resistance from Russia, Spain, and France; Great Britain and the United States remain the sole hard-line supporters of the sanctions. Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State under the George W. Bush administration (2000-), however, is in favor of revamped "smart" sanctions, which would be intended to ease the situation of ordinary Iraqis, but have a harder effect on Hussein's government.

The new plan would loosen restrictions on trade and would allow commercial flights to and from Iraq to resume. At the same time, Iraq's income from oil exports would continue to be directed through the UN, and increased control would be exerted to cut off sources of income outside the purview of the UN, such as oil smuggling. The intention of these measures is to bring more money into the country in the hopes of alleviating poverty, food shortages, and medical crisis, while at the same time limiting the control Hussein has over the Iraqi economy. Under the sanctions repression has increased and the Iraqi economy has become more centralized. Travel, freedom of speech, and the dissemination of information remain restricted, and anyone wanting to conduct trade abroad must petition the government in Baghdad for permission.

Despite opposition and the prospect of revised policies, many still see sanctions as the only possible recourse. In an interview by Ray Suarez for PBS Online News Hour (April 25, 2001), U.S. Representative Tony Hall asserted that sanctions can and should be "sharpened," though he noted that humanitarian assistance is needed. "We've got to have …a better sanctions committee," he told Suarez. "We've got to …allow emergency equipment and emergency goods for humanitarian purposes to go in immediately. We need serums for cholera and diseases. We need more international workers… as far as the sanctions on weapons of mass destruction, those in my opinion should not be lifted."

At the same time, the George W. Bush administration has vowed to take a more active role in attempting to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Bush administration has indicated its intent to provide financial and material backing to the opposition in Iraq, with the intention of building a strong enough base to bring down Hussein's government. The country's opposition groups, however, have historically suffered from a lack of organization and effectiveness. Political and religious divisiveness and the lack of strong leadership are a perennial problem. The possibility of a strong and broadly supported opposition movement arising in Iraq under the existing conditions is slim, even with U.S. support.

While opposition against continued sanctions in Iraq has grown, so, too, has opposition to the U.S. policy. On November 9, 1999, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration supporting the end of the embargo on Cuba. While this was the ninth time the UN had voiced disapproval of the embargo, this vote was the most strongly in favor of abandoning the sanctions. Only two countries, Israel and the United States, dissented; eight countries abstained from voting.

While reluctant to abandon its sanctions against Cuba the United States has made moves to ease the restrictions. In March 1997, after an appeal from Pope John Paul II, President Bill Clinton relaxed some travel and shipping restrictions to the island, restored direct humanitarian charter flights, and allowed Cuban Americans to send remittances of up to $1,200 a year back to relatives in Cuba. Additionally, in October 2000 the United States passed a law that allowed U.S. farmers to sell food to Cuba. It was a small concession, however, as the policy stipulated that Cuba must use U.S. dollars to purchase the food, and forbade American banks from helping to finance any transactions. The Cuban government scorned the policy as insignificant and stated that it would not buy goods from the United States.

It remains to be seen whether continuing trends toward free trade, both globally and specifically within the Americas, will have an affect on the sanctions against Cuba. In an April 2001 summit meeting in Quebec, Canada, President George W. Bush reaffirmed his commitment to free trade among the nations of the Americas. Cuba was not invited to attend the summit, which included representatives from 33 countries. The Bush administration stated that, despite the recent loosening of restrictions, the embargo against Cuba would remain firmly in place. It is estimated that the sanctions are costing the United States an estimated $1 billion in potential sales annually.

There are bills in the U.S. Congress that would amend the embargo to allow food and medicine to be sent to Cuba, as well as ease travel restrictions. These bills have a strong support base, and, while not momentous, if passed, they would certainly be a step toward normalized relations with Cuba, and would allow Cubans access to some much-needed goods.

A Valuable Weapon?

The human cost of sanctions continues to be documented, in Cuba, Iraq, and other nations. But there also exists a human benefit, as exemplified by South Africa. After free elections were held for the first time in 1994, the country began to heal the wounds of apartheid through the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It has since held another round of free elections and experienced a peaceful transfer of power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. Much remains to be done in South Africa to redress wounds gouged out of decades of social, economic, educational, and political division, but the first steps have been taken. Restrictions have been lifted and international assistance is once again flowing into South Africa. Had the international community not expressed its disapproval of apartheid and applied sanctions to discourage the policy's continuation, South Africans might still be living without many of the freedoms available to them today.

An alternative to the type of sanctions most commonly employed, such as those used on South Africa, which tend to target imports of supplies that are often needed by the target country's population, is the use of what is being called "smart sanctions." Smart sanctions aim to be more focused and more effective, with a lower humanitarian cost. They seek to punish those who have control over the target country's actions—the government and political elites—rather than the general public. To do this, smart sanctions will target the financial assets of a country and its leadership and establish mandatory measures early on to maintain a clear focus for the sanctions. By focusing on financial measures smart sanctions have a better chance of reaching the people in charge rather than inflicting humanitarian costs to the general population through the prohibition of much needed supplies through trade. Exemptions to some smart sanction measures could be made if they are considered to incur humanitarian costs.

In instances where sanctions might not be appropriate, where the costs to the population exceed the achievements of the restrictions, there are alternatives to consider. It is possible for a sender country to impose non-economic sanctions. Rather than impacting the target country's economy, these sanctions attempt to undercut the nation's legitimacy, prestige, or international reputation. These measures could include refusing to hold ministerial and summit meetings with the target country; restricting diplomatic relations with the country; denying the country admission to international organizations; denying foreign aid; pressuring other countries to deny the target nation foreign aid; and a variety of other actions. This type of sanction is primarily symbolic; but while there is less at stake for the target country, there is also little chance of non-economic sanctions harming the sender, and few if any humanitarian concerns.

Another option that may lessen the risk of humanitarian costs is the practice of conditional engagement. Conditional engagement combines the narrow use of sanctions with political and economic exchanges with a country. These interactions are made conditional on the basis of specific behavioral changes on behalf of the target country. For instance, conditional engagement could be used by the United States to encourage India and Pakistan to resolve their nuclear standoff, which at times has led to high tension in the region. Through offering incentives to these countries and tying their behavior to them, the United States could perhaps achieve its goal of maintaining a nuclear déte'nte, without resorting to the full use of economic sanctions.

The effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool of persuasion may or may not work. Much depends on the scope of the sanctions, their purpose, and the level of support behind them. What is clear is that economic sanctions alone are not the only non-violent means available to try to influence countries into compliance with international laws, agreements, and will. As a weapon of diplomacy and engagement, it is a tool that must be exercised carefully. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in an address to the International Rescue Committee (November 15, 2000) that "Sanctions must and will remain an important instrument for compelling compliance with the will of the international community… The challenge is to achieve con sensus about the precise and specific aims of the sanctions, and then provide the necessary means and will for them to succeed."

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—Eleanor Stanford

Chronology

1960 U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower severs economic relations with Cuba and imposes trade restrictions.

1980 The United States enforces a grain embargo and oil pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union; both are declared failures and called off the following year.

1986 The United States and the European Community impose sanctions against South Africa in protest of apartheid.

August 6, 1990 After Iraq invades Kuwait, the United Nations (UN) imposes sanctions against Iraq.

January 16, 1990 to February 28, 1991 The Persian Gulf War occurs. U.S. and NATO forces take action to eject Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from Kuwait after Hussein refuses to evacuate.

1992 The UN imposes sanctions against Libya, demanding the extradition of bombing suspects in the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 attack.

August 8, 1993 Most sanctions against South Africa are lifted in response to ongoing reforms in that country.

1995 An oil-for-food program is enacted by the UN in an effort to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people due to continued sanctions against their country.

March 1996 The Helms-Burton Act is passed by theU.S. Congress, allowing the United States to punish other countries who do business with Cuba in violation of the U.S. unilateral sanctions against that country.

May 30, 1996 The United States imposes trade restrictions against China in concern over environmental ramifications of the Three Gorges Dam project.

August 5, 1996 The U.S. Congress passes the Iran/Libya Act, which punishes non-U.S. companies that invest more than $40 million in petroleum resources in those countries.

November 27, 1996 The UN General Assembly calls for the repeal of extraterritorial laws and sanctions against companies of third states who violate unilateral sanctions.

March 1997 U.S. President Bill Clinton eases travel restrictions to Cuba.

1999 The UN lifts sanctions against Libya when its leader, Muammar Qaddafi, agrees to release the Pan Am bombing suspects for trial.

October 19, 2000 Speakers in the UN General Assembly condemn the use of unilateral economic sanctions.

November 9, 2000 The UN General Assembly calls for the United States to end its long-standing embargo against Cuba. This is the ninth such request from the Assembly in nine years.

November 15, 2000 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan speaks to the International Rescue Committee about the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions.

December 19, 2000 The United Nations SecurityCouncil imposes new sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

April 2001 The UN considers sanctions againstUganda, Burundi, and Rwanda for their looting of natural resources from their mutual neighbor, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

May 2001 Sanctions are issued by the UN against Liberia.

Sanctions and the United Nations

Article 41, Chapter VII, of the United Nations Charter allows the organization's Security Council to "apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." In other words, the Security Council is authorized to impose sanctions on countries. In the organization's history it has called upon its Member States to take such action 15 times, including against the countries of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Kosovo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.

Though the United Nations may issue multilateral sanctions against a country, the action does not mean that all Member States are in agreement. In December 2000 Pakistan criticized plans to tighten economic sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The sanctions were targeted specifically at the Taliban and exempted opponent groups in the north. Pakistan asserted that sanctions should be applied to Afghanistan as a whole rather than piecemeal to different opposition groups in the country. Additionally, for the ninth time in as many years the UN General Assembly called for the United States to end its unilateral sanctions against Cuba. The sanctions, in place since 1960, restrict economic, commercial, and financial transactions between the two countries.

In an attempt to expand the effectiveness of its sanctions against Cuba, the U.S. Congress in March 1996 enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which sought to punish third countries and companies who did business with Cuba, in violation of U.S. sanctions. In other words, the United States wanted to punish countries that did not comply with its unilateral sanctions against Cuba, even though those countries were not party to supporting the sanctions in the first place. In August 1996 the United States followed-up on the Helms-Burton Act with the Iran/Libya Act, which, in an attempt to make sanctions more effective against those countries, punished non-American owned companies for investing more than US$40 million in petroleum resources in Libya or Iran. These measures generated anger in many nations, which saw the U.S. laws as an effort to control their practices. On November 27, 1996, the UN General Assembly called for a repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws and sanctions such as the Helms-Burton and Iran/Libya Acts. It encouraged Member States not to comply with such laws because they ran contrary to the UN Charter, impeded the liberalization of world trade, and hurt the economies of developing nations. Despite the Assembly's appeal, the Helms-Burton and Iran/Libya Acts remain in place in the United States, though foreign compliance with the U.S. laws may vary.

While the United Nations can issue sanctions and reprove countries for acting outside of its Charter, as in the case of the United States with the Helms-Burton and Iran/Libya Acts, it can not enforce such measures. The success or failure of sanctions issued by the United Nations is dependent on the cooperation of its Member States. Additionally, the United Nations has no control over the laws passed by its members. The U.S. measures, while against the UN Charter, are valid in the United States. Their continuation or their repeal depends on the U.S. Congress, which is not obliged to bow to the requests of the United Nations if it does not so choose. It is actions like these, and the difficulty of obtaining true multilateral agreement, that make effective sanctions difficult to achieve.

The Humanitarian Cost

The UN representative of Burundi reported in October 1996 that since economic sanctions had been applied to his country, food production had fallen by 30 percent and industrial growth decreased 10 percent. The people were at risk of famine and an economic crisis was spreading to Burundi's neighbors. The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, stated about Iraq in 1997 that, after six years, "The consequences of [the sanctions] are causing a near breakdown of the health care system, which is reeling under the pressure of being deprived of medicine, other basic supplies and spare parts." ("Iraqi Health System Close to Collapse," February 27, 1997) In February 1997 Iraq received only 30 percent of the medical supplies it needed to meet the needs of its people. The circumstances experienced by Burundi and Iraq are not unique. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in an address to the International Rescue Committee on November 15, 2000, that "Too often, innocent civilians have become victims not only of the abuses of their own government, but also of the measures taken against it by the international community."

When sanctions are applied to a country it is often the people who suffer. As they are most often applied, sanctions limit the goods and services going in and out of a country. The country or organization issuing the sanctions, as the source responsible for the limited supplies, often becomes the recipient of backlash. Instead of putting pressure on a government to change its behavior, sanctions may actually create more popular support for the government, which can step into the role of provider for the now limited resources. The leadership can also use the sanctions to raise nationalist feelings against those who would interfere with the country's sovereignty by trying to impose their will on the country through coercive means.

In the case of Iraq, more than 10 years after sanctions were applied, malnourished children are a common sight, their condition evident by their distended bellies. Twenty-five to 30 percent of children between the ages of one and six are chronically malnourished. The United Nations estimated in 1997, that over one million Iraqi children did not have enough to eat. Malnutrition was not a problem in the country before 1991, when Iraq was pushed back from its takeover of neighboring Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War. Since the war and the economic embargo that followed, meager rations and high prices have meant that the average family spends 80 percent of its income on food.

Health is not the only area of life in Iraq affected by the sanctions. Education, infrastructure, and other elements of society have deteriorated significantly since sanctions were imposed in 1990. A 1997 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey completed by the Iraqi government and UNICEF found that 96 percent of people in urban areas had access to a water supply. Only half the people in rural areas had this access. Additionally, people in rural areas had an immunization rate 10 to 15 percent below those in urban areas. Primary school enrollment for children between the ages of six and eleven years was reported at 73 percent, meaning that over a quarter of Iraqi children are missing out on an education. Virtually every aspect of public life has been touched by sanctions.

To offset the humanitarian impacts in Iraq, the United Nations implemented the oil for food program. Established in 1997, the oil for food program allows Iraq to trade an agreed upon level of oil for necessary supplies such as food. Under this program the first shipment of oil left Iraq in December 1996, and the first food shipments arrived in March 1997. As of 2001 a committee of the UN Security Council has approved contracts valuing US$18.5 billion. More than $13 billion in supplies and equipment have been delivered to Iraq since the program began. These measures, while helpful in alleviating some of the strain placed on Iraqi society due to the sanctions, can not be arranged for every nation that is subject to sanctions. In addition, such programs do not alleviate the cause of hardship, thus, the problem persists until that cause—the sanctions—is removed.

There will always be a cost in imposing sanctions on a country. No action meant to coerce change can bring about that change without a measure of harm. That is, after all, the intent—to make a situation so undesirable for the target country, whether through diplomatic ostracism, trade restrictions, or other means, that it will adjust its behavior accordingly in order to improve its circumstances. Often, however, economic sanctions harm those who are innocent of the infractions for which their country is being punished, while the political elite remains relatively unscathed and may even benefit from the sanctions. Special programs, such as the oil for food program for Iraq, and specific, realistic goals can help lessen the humanitarian costs that befall the people of a country under sanction. The welfare of the general population should be the responsibility not only of the target country, but of the sanctioning body as well.