Nigeria and Shari'a: Religion and Politics in a West African Nation

The Conflict

The Nigerian state, or province, of Zamfara declared in 1999 that it was repudiating Nigeria's constitution and adopting Islamic law, shari'a. Observers feared that Nigeria would dissolve into civil war. Violence broke out and many people fled their homes.

Political

• The Muslim population of Zamfara was enthusiastic about adopting shari'a to deal with crime that the state seemed unable to stop.
• The central government rejected Zamfara's right to establish a separate legal system and civil rights groups challenged the constitutionality of the system.

Religious

• Nigeria is comprised of roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims.
• Christians object to being forced to abide by Islamic law.

Economic

• In the 1980s the price of oil plummeted, causing economic dislocation, violence, and land disputes.

Beginning in the fall of 1999 American newspapers such as the New York Times and wire services such as the Associated Press and Reuters began to publish stories regarding the announcement by Nigeria's northern Zamfara State that it would implement shari'a. Shari'a is the Islamic code of law that for centuries has provided a complete guide to life for Muslims. Because Nigeria's population is roughly divided between Muslims and Christians, many sources feared that the move to establish shari'a would further divide the country or lead to violence and possibly civil war. For several months both sides argued the constitutionality of the issue. During this period, several other northern states declared that they, too, would seek to implement shari'a. In February 2000 wide-scale rioting between Muslims and Christians in the northern city of Kaduna led to hundreds of deaths, particularly of Christians. In the Christian-majority regions of the south Christian mobs took vengeance on the region's Muslim minority. Relatively silent up to that time, the Nigerian Federal Government, under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo, suspended shari'a in the northern states and convened conferences of governors and religious leaders to reach a compromise. On May 1, 2000, leaders from around Nigeria, including the northern states, agreed to "shelve" shari'a and return to the use of the Nigerian penal code. For the time being, at least, peace and tolerance won over religious conflict and bigotry in Nigeria.

Historical Background

Located on the coast of West Africa, Nigeria is a very large country—it is roughly the size of the states of California, Nevada, and Utah combined, or almost twice the size of Spain. With a population of over one hundred million, it is the most populous country in all of Africa. There are over 250 languages spoken in Nigeria, a fact that highlights the country's incredible cultural diversity. Often referred to as "tribes" in the press—a term disliked by many scholars of Africa because it encourages images of Africans which are more based in myth than reality, these ethnic groups draw upon a variety of cultural and linguistic traditions. The largest groups include the Hausa in the north, the Ibo in the southeast, and the Yoruba in the southwest. Furthermore, Nigeria's north is predominantly Muslim, while other parts of the country, particularly the southeast, are predominantly Christian. In the southwest and the Middle Belt, as the central states are known, the population is almost evenly distributed between Muslims and Christians. Prior to the invasion and conquest of the region by the British in the early 1900s there was no political unit known as "Nigeria." In 1914 Britain combined its protectorates of northern and southern Nigeria into a single colony, which it ruled until 1960, forcing the various Nigeria ethnic groups to come together as a single political and economic unit. When the British left Nigeria they handed power over to a hastily organized, yet democratically elected government. The British had organized the new country into three semi-independent regions—the north, the west, and the east. The northern region, home to more than fifty percent of the new country's population, handily dominated the first elections in 1960 and gained control of the federal government.

In 1966, following a military coup d'état, or violent overthrow, that left many national leaders dead, the predominantly Ibo eastern region attempted to secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria and establish its own country, known as Biafra. The Biafrans were motivated to create their own country both because of ethnic violence against Ibos in the north and because recent discoveries of oil in the southeast promised great wealth—so long as it did not have to be shared with the rest of the country. After three years of brutal civil war the Biafrans were defeated and the eastern region was forcibly reunited with the rest of Nigeria. In 1973 the Arab oil embargo of the United States led to a massive increase in the value of crude oil, and the economy of Nigeria underwent an oil boom. A huge influx of earnings and lavish government spending on public works such as schools, hospitals, and education helped to ease ethnic and religious tensions in the country.

In the 1980s, however, the price of oil dropped rapidly. As the oil boom turned to an oil bust, the Nigerian economy collapsed. Nigeria went from being one of the world's twenty-five richest countries to one of the twenty-five poorest. The value of the naira, the Nigerian currency, went from two dollars to the naira to eighty naira to the dollar in just a few years. People's life savings were wiped out and those in the middle class could no longer afford imported goods. As competition for increasingly scarce state funds became more desperate, rivalries between different ethnic and religious groups became fiercer. Violence between religious groups, particularly in the north between southern Nigerians living in the sabon gari's, new towns, and the region's mostly Hausa indigenous population became increasingly common. Such conflicts were often sparked by disputes over land, trade, or national political struggles—but the lines of division were often along the lines of religioun and ethnicity.

Military rule has also been an important factor in Nigeria since 1966. Excepting a three-year period from 1980 to 1983, Nigeria has been primarily ruled by the country's military. Coups were common. As Africa's largest country, many hoped that a transition to democratic rule would help Nigeria lead by example and help reestablish democracy on the continent. In 1999, after the death of the military dictator Sani Abacha, Nigerians held elections and returned to democratic rule. Olesegun Obasanjo, a retired general and former head of state, was elected president. Interestingly, Obasanjo was the only Nigerian military ruler to have previously turned power over to a civilian government—which he did in 1980.

The shari'a controversy added yet another potential source of conflict into the complex ethnic, religious, and political environment of Nigeria. The newly elected governor of Zamfara State, Alhaji Ahmed Sani, signed the shari'a bill on October 27, 1999, thus fulfilling a central promise of his campaign. The bill stated that shari'a would become the official law of Zamfara State on January 27, 2000, replacing the Nigerian penal code. As a result, the new civilian government of Nigeria was faced with a major challenge almost immediately after taking power.

What exactly is shari'a, and why would the Muslim population of Zamfara State desire such a religious system of law? Shari'a uses the holy Qur'an, also known as the Koran, and the Sunna—the example of the life of the Prophet Muhammad—to determine what is right and what is wrong. Shari'a thus involves all aspects of a Muslim's life, not just matters of criminal law, but also issues of how one should pray, the nature of family relations, and proper forms of personal conduct. Further, support of shari'a is a key factor by which Muslims judge the legitimacy of their governments. Some Muslims living in Nigeria's south declared that they would immigrate to northern states once Islamic law was established. In Islam, unlike in the American tradition of government, there is no desire for a division of church and state. Rather, it is the duty of the state to support the practice of Islam. This situation is similar to the call by many Christian fundamentalists in the United States for prayer in schools and the posting of the Ten Commandments in courtrooms.

The Muslim population of Zamfara State responded enthusiastically to the establishing of shari'a. In addition, Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia and Libya sent word of their support for the move. Reports in the press stated that taxis in Zamfara State had segregated themselves to carry only men or women, since Islamic law stresses that men and women who are not related should not mingle in public. The consumption of alcohol was outlawed and physical punishments ranging from caning to amputation to death were instituted for theft and violent crimes. Many Muslim Nigerians and even a few non-Muslims believed that the implementation of shari'a would guarantee peace and safety for everyone. In the climate of poverty created by the oil bust, Nigerians have become increasingly concerned with crime and security. Just as many politicians in the United States have called for "get tough" policies on crime, Nigerian Muslims see shari'a as a way to protect their lives and property. Indeed, Governor Sani of Zamfara claimed that the implementation of shari'a would be a cure all not only for violent crime, but also for domestic disputes and civil crimes such as tax dodging. As he stated in an interview with the Abuja Mirror newspaper in February 2000, "the most important thing is the fear of God. With that, we don't even need the police."

Obviously not everyone agreed that shari'a would improve conditions in Nigeria. Christian minorities in the north and organizations in the south, such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), spoke out against the proposed move to implement shari'a in Zamfara. They feared that their rights would be violated, a charge denied by supporters of shari'a, and argued that Nigeria's 1999 constitution made such a move illegal. The Muslim leaders of Zamfara stated that since the constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to all Nigerians, and because their state was over ninety percent Muslim, they were within their rights to implement shari'a. Notably, not all Muslims in the north agreed that Zamfara State's move was constitutional. The Guardian reported on October 21, 1999, that Sadiq Abdullahi Mahuta, the chief justice of Katsina State, declared the move unconstitutional. Perhaps more surprising was the comment by Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzaky to Compass Direct on September 21, 1999. Zakzaky, who is often labeled as an extreme Muslim fundamentalist, declared that establishing shari'a at the current time "might end up creating an instrument of oppression and exploitation in the hands of the leadership, particularly when they lack commitment and discipline."

Despite such opposition and the danger of conflict, the state governments of Sokoto, Kano, Niger, and Kaduna states soon announced their plans to implement shari'a. While each of these states is in the predominantly Muslim north, some, particularly Kaduna, have very large Christian populations. Various Christian and civil rights organizations in Nigeria filed suits challenging the constitutionality of establishing a religious-based code of law. Just as in the United States and other Western countries, however, such lawsuits take months or even years to work their way through the court system before reaching the Nigerian Supreme Court, which would then judge the constitutionality of the issue. Further, some states in the southeast, including the predominantly Christian state of Cross-River, threatened to establish "Christian Law" in response. Many press reports suggested that Nigeria might go the way of Sudan in the 1970s—a north/south civil war along Muslim and Christian lines.

On February 21, 2000, the situation became violent. In the northern city of Kaduna, the CAN organized a protest march against the state's proposal to implement shari'a. At some point during the march, violence broke out. Each side blamed the other for the outbreak. Hundreds were killed as fighting spread throughout the city. A great deal of property, in the form of automobiles, homes, and businesses, was destroyed. Many southern immigrants to the north prepared to flee their homes for safety in the south. Condemning the riot, President Obasanjo declared it to be the worst outbreak of violence in Nigeria since the civil war of the 1960s. As mentioned earlier, such outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence are not unheard of in the north. What followed, however, was unusual. In southern cities such as Aba, Owerri, and Uyo, there were large reprisals against Muslim minorities—some-thing that had never occurred before. Dozens more were killed and homes and businesses were destroyed. Sources outside of Nigeria feared the country was moving toward civil war. Inside Nigeria, some suggested that the conflict was an example of the inability of a civilian government to keep the peace. Still others suggested that the violence was being incited by supporters of military rule simply to discredit the new civilian government.

Either way, it is true that Obasanjo's government had not taken many concrete steps toward resolving the issue. Up to the riots in Kaduna and the southern cities, Obasanjo and other federal government leaders had attempted to deal with the shari'a controversy through existing channels, such as the courts and personal contacts with state governors. Faced with the possibility of even wider outbreaks of violence, Obasanjo announced on March 1 that shari'a would be suspended in any state that had implemented the Islamic code of law. These states, particularly Zamfara, did not immediately accept Obasanjo's presidential order, arguing that he did not have the constitutional right to prevent them from implementing shari'a. On March 22, 2000, the Zamfara state government upset Nigerian human rights advocates by publicly amputating the right hand of a man named Bello Garki Jangebe for stealing a cow.

The debate over the constitutionality of the shari'a and over the relative balance between federal and state authority gave new life to another political debate. For years, many groups in Nigeria, particularly those sponsored by smaller ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and the south, have been calling for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), which would bring together representatives from as many interest groups in Nigeria as possible to debate the very nature and organization of the Nigerian nation. As a sovereign body the conference would have the right not only to write a new constitution—the 1999 constitution being seen as faulty—but also to determine the very future of the Nigerian state. Many in Nigeria feared that such a conference might lead to a radical redistribution of state power and wealth or even a break-up of the country. Using the conflict over shari'a as an example of the failings of the current political structure of Nigeria, advocates of the conference bombarded national and regional newspapers and news programs with calls for the SNC.

Recent History and the Future

On April 3, 2000, under pressure from the federal government and numerous Nigerian organizations, the governors of all nineteen northern states met at Arewa House, the former home of the first premier of the northern region after independence, in order to discuss the issue of shari'a. The meeting was opened by the Sultan of Sokoto, who is the traditional leader of northern Nigerian Muslims. The meeting called upon the states of Zamfara, Niger, Kano, and Kaduna to put their move to shari'a on hold until a panel composed of Muslim and Christian leaders could be formed to investigate a compromise on the issue. In particular, the groups would be charged with finding a way to harmonize the penal code with the needs of Muslims. Named the National Council of State, such a panel did meet in early May 2000. The council was comprised of all northern and many southern governors, former heads of state General Yakabu Gowan, General Ibrahim Babangida, General Muhammadu Buhari, Earnest Shoinikan, President Obasanjo, and numerous Christian leaders. After extensive meetings, the council reached a consensus that the calls for shari'a should be set aside and the penal code once again put into force. Minor modifications to the penal code would be allowed, however, to make it more appealing to the Muslim population.

The debate over the place of shari'a in Nigeria is not a new one. In 1958 the northern region of Nigeria moved to replace the existing system ofshari'a—which had long been supported by the British colonial rulers—with a national penal code, thus establishing the roots of the modern system of the contemporary legal system in Nigeria. Even in the 1950s this was considered a very substantial move and was extensively debated by the Muslim population. Local shari'a courts continued to operate, but they only had jurisdiction over matters of civil and family law, not over criminal proceedings. The issue once again came to national attention during the constitutional convention of 1978, when, under Obasanjo's military leadership, the country was making the transition to civilian rule. There was a call for the establishment of a national shari'a court of appeals. Extensive and often divisive debates continued until the motion was withdrawn. A similar issue was raised during constitutional proceedings in 1988. When the angry nature of the debates threatened to derail the constitutional process General Babangida, the current military ruler, declared the issue of shari'a to be a "no go" area, with that section of the new constitution to be authored by representatives of the military government.

Babangida's government was also sensitive to religious conflict in that it had sparked national controversy in March 1986, when Babangida declared that Nigeria had joined the Organization of Islamic Conference, an international organization of Islamic nations. Protests by Christian groups and conflicts between Muslims and Christians led to Babangida's public withdrawal of Nigeria from the organization.

The nature of the Western press coverage of the shari'a controversy is worth examination. While quick to point out what is seen in the United States as Muslim fundamentalism, the media dedicated little to the discussion of why so many Nigerian's find shari'a appealing. Further, press coverage peaked when the conflict turned violent. Even news organizations that had largely ignored the issue suddenly ran stories, complete with color photos of burned cars, armed police, and angry crowds, that focused only on the loss of life and property and which described the conflict only in simple terms of Christian-Muslim violence. Africans frequently complain that the Western press pays no attention to their news unless it is bad. Such would seem to be the case in the issue of shari'a in Nigeria. There has been almost no coverage of the efforts by the Nigerian government to find a peaceful resolution to the issue, a resolution that was based on consensus rather than being forced by the federal government. Those who read about the violence from the Western press were missing important points of the issue and learned little about the Nigerian government's attempts to resolve the matter.

For the time being the immediate problem—the call for shari'a by northern states—has been addressed. The underlying challenges facing Nigeria, however, remain. Nigeria, like most African nations, is still faced with the huge task of forming a common consciousness between hundreds of ethnic groups who are divided by history, language, and religion. As citizens of a country forcibly created by outsiders and burdened by debt and poverty, Nigerians must also find a way to create a national identity and live together despite their differences.

Bibliography

Aborisade, Oladimeji and Robert Mundt. Politics in Nigeria. New York: Longman, 1998.

Enwerem, Iheanyi. A Dangerous Awakening: The Politicization of Religion in Nigeria. Ibadan, Nigeria: IFRA, 1995.

Reynolds, Jonathan T. The Time of Politics (Zamanin Siyasa): Islam and the Politics of Legitimacy in Northern Nigeria, 1950-1966. Bethesda, Md.: University Press for West Africa, 1999.

Sanneh, Lamin. The Crown and the Turban: Muslims and West African Pluralism. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

Jonathan T.Reynolds

Chronology

1900 British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria is established.

1914 The protectorates of northern and southern Nigeria combine to form Nigeria, still a British colony.

1960 Nigeria achieves independence from the United Kingdom.

1967-70 Eastern Nigeria secedes to form the new country of Biafra along ethnic lines. Nigeria fights a bloody civil war and the secessionists are defeated.

1973 The Arab oil embargo drives up oil prices, making Nigeria a relatively wealthy nation.

1980s The drop in the price of oil has a devastating effect on the Nigerian economy, leading to increased crime and violent.

1995 Political parties are permitted.

1999 Nigerians return to democratic rule. The Zamfara state announces it will set aside the Nigerian Penal Code in favor of shari'a, Islamic law. Other states follow suit.

2000 Riots—resulting in many deaths—break out all over Nigeria. After suspending the shari'a, the government convenes the National Council of State that recommends that Zamfara return to the Nigerian Penal Code, with some changes made to accommodate shari'a.