The Military Organization

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The Military Organization

Fubing System. In the middle of the sixth century a new fubing (militia) system was created. Every family with more than 2 sons had to send 1 man for permanent service fu (garrisons) located throughout the empire. The militia-men themselves, rather than their families, had an exemption from taxes and other labor levies. The state provided their essential needs, but the garrisons were required to become self-sufficient by farming state-assigned lands in intervals between military activities. The system, consisting of a series of militias, each of 800 to 1,200 men, continued to exist in Tang times (618-907), but it was not based on universal conscription for short terms. This type of service was highly respected, and well-to-do families tried to get officer positions for their sons. Young men were chosen at the age of twenty-one on the basis of their physical fitness and respectable family backgrounds. There were about six hundred garri-sons clustered in the Tang capital and scattered along the northern frontier. Militiamen remained on duty until they retired at sixty years of age. In rotation, groups of militiamen were sent to the capital for a month of service. In another rotation, the garrisons dispatched men to serve for three years in the frontier units. They also sent contingents to join in special military campaigns in times of war.

Imperial Guard. The core of Tang armies in the seventh century was aristocratic; the great families in North China provided the best troops. Their men served in the elite corps—the imperial guards (palace troops). Their nomad background and the prolonged influence of the steppe culture in North China had an impact on these aristocrats’ taste for military affairs and their love of horses. The imperial guards were concentrated around the capital, and their essential tasks were to protect the empire against invasions from the border-lands and to defend the imperial court against local rebellions. They also provided an escort for the emperor when he traveled outside the palace.

Northern Army. In addition to the imperial guards, there was a standing army at the capital—the Northern Army, which served as the emperor’s personal force. It was established by the Tang court during the rebellion against the Sui dynasty (589-618) and was replenished with sons of the aristocracy. The Northern Army, a permanent body of professionals, came to have the greatest military prestige and was the core of battle strength for the Tang empire.

Frontier Armies. Tang frontier armies had two different roles: they were either expeditionary troops of cavalry or garrisons responsible for holding the lines of defense and centers of communication. The troops quartered in the provinces represented only a small fraction of the total Tang forces since the imperial court did not rely on the army to maintain peace in regional areas.

Song Army. The army of the Song dynasty (960-1279) comprised mainly professionals, and the best troops were

stationed around the capital under leaders directly controlled by the emperor. Contingents from the palace troops were rotated out to frontier defense units for three-year tours. Frontier commanders thus did not have any opportunity to build personal followings among their troops. In addition, soldiers in and around the capital often outnumbered the combined frontier forces. Less-capable soldiers were assigned to small garrisons that were scattered throughout the empire under the control of military intendants. Conscripted militiamen often supplemented regional units. Both the Northern Song dynasty (960-1125) and the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1279) each fielded about one million troops. The cost of maintaining this army was so enormous that it exhausted Song financial resources. Song armies were well equipped with armor and weapons because of the development of the iron and steel industry, and they occasionally fought well against invading Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols. By the twelfth-century Song armies had effectively used fire bombs and tank-like carts sheathed in iron armor against the invaders.

Reform. After the Song armies (including various contingents of former nomads and mountaineers) participated in the campaigns of 963-979, the empire had difficulties recruiting any efficient auxiliaries, and military expenditure absorbed most of the state budget, causing economic depression. Thereafter, reformer Wang Anshi began to carry out military reforms between 1068 and 1085 in an effort to build an efficient army as well as reduce military costs. He restored the universal militia obligations of former dynasties and created special frontier units. He formed the baojia registration system to make household groups provide and provision con-scripts. This system was organized on the basis of households, eachyYtf being made up often households, and each bao often jia. The baojia draftees, however, refused to serve in other frontier garrisons, and the professionals refused to introduce draftees into the palace guards. Wang’s military reform program failed.

Navy. After retreating to the Yangzi valley between 1126 and 1127, the Song court began to develop a substantial navy with bases on the great rivers and on the coast. At that time the Song navy began to use boats with paddles actuated by a crank or by a system of connecting rods, some of which had as many as twenty-five paddle wheels. The Song navy employed these boats in battles against the Jurchen in 1130 and 1161. This kind of fast boat in fact appeared as early as the eighth century, while the European paddleboats did not develop until 1543.

New Techniques. From the eleventh century to the thirteenth century, remarkable progress occurred in military techniques, which changed the nature of warfare and had great impact on the world. In recruitment, for example, certain objective principles of selection were adopted. Soldiers were recruited after a series of tests of physical ability, such as running, jumping, and shooting, and the taller and stronger individuals were sent to the crack units. Special units equipped with incendiary weapons, crossbows, and catapults were formed. The theory and technology of siege warfare also developed considerably.

Yuan Army. The army of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) was a superb force in terms of organization and the toughness and ability of its soldiers. Mongol soldiers lived in the saddle, and they could even sleep on horseback. Their horses were so strong that they could endure extremes of climate and find food in winter by digging it out from under the snow or strip-ping bark from trees. The Mongols were excellent at planning and carrying out their operations, and rapid movement, precise coordination, and superb tactical discipline made them formidable combatants. The Mongols broke up the tribal organization of the Khitans and Jurchens into a more centralized hierarchy. These military units, known as hundreds, thousands, and ten thousands, were stationed throughout the empire and were supported primarily from the produce of confiscated lands cultivated by slaves. As in Song times, the largest and most reliable armies concentrated in the capital as palace guards. The elite force known as the kesig was a large imperial bodyguard. The kesig was divided into four units that served in daily rotation as palace attendants. Consisting of sons of Mongol aristocrats, it was virtually above the law. It also played a disruptive governmental role similar to that of palace eunuchs in the Song dynasties. Of the Yuan armies, Mongol tribesmen were the most privileged, and other auxiliary units, in descending order of prestige and privilege, were Central Asians, northern Chinese, and southern Chinese. Service in all the regular Yuan armies was hereditary. The civilians were called on to provide militiamen for limited local police duty, but they were prohibited from owning weapons of any sort or engaging in military training. Since the iron and steel industry had decreased from its high level of development during the Song dynasty, Yuan military technology fell back to the bow-and-arrow stage.

Weisuo System. The founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) built a strong military by combining some elements of the Yuan system with others, such as thefubing militia system. He concentrated most of his garrisons around the capital and along the northern frontier and located other garrisons at strategic places throughout the country. Each garrison was allotted a tract of government-owned land known as tuntian (military colony), where the soldiers were required to work in shifts to provide for their own food. The basic garrison unit was a wei (guard) of about five thousand men; wet were sub-divided into so (battalions or companies). Soldiers and officers of wei and so were required to participate periodically in special training at the capital. Soldiers of the garrisons along the northern frontier guarded the Great Wall fortifications, and those of other garrisons guarded coastal forts. All soldiers were on rotational deployment from their garrisons, under the leadership of tactical commanders directed by regional commanders. In large-scale military campaigns, soldiers were gathered from wei and so throughout the country into unplanned tactical units directed by military officers specially sent from the central government. This division of authority between garrison and tactical commanders was to prevent regional military officers from declaring independence.

Problems. The weisuo system was designed to reduce the military cost to the public and to make the Ming army more efficient. Desertion, however, became a serious problem, and it was hard for the government to replace deserters and battlefield casualties, according to prescribed hereditary principles. In addition, few garrisons produced enough food, especially in the poor farming regions along the frontiers where large forces were located. After the fifteenth century, the imperial government began to provide annual financial support, and these subsidies increased year by year. Even with these subsidies the strength and fighting ability of the weisuo standing army continued to decline. Supplemented by local militiamen and by conscripts from the general population, the military rolls swelled to a total of four million men in the late Ming era, but they were inadequately equipped, poorly trained, and erratically fed and clothed.