LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Should questions about "thought"—about intentionality, beliefs, and concept possession, for example—be approached directly or, instead, indirectly via the philosophy of "language"? There are two slightly different ways in which questions about language and meaning might seem to offer illumination of issues concerning thought. One way relates to language that is explicitly about thoughts, as when someone says, "Bruce believes that boomerangs seldom come back." The idea that a philosophical investigation of thought should proceed via a study of the logical properties of language that is about thoughts is a particular case of a more general view that philosophy of language enjoys a certain priority over metaphysics.

The other way relates to the use of language to express thoughts, and this provides the topic for the present entry. Suppose that Bruce believes that boomerangs seldom come back, and expresses this thought in the English sentence: "Boomerangs seldom come back." Which takes priority, the meaning of the English sentence or the content of Bruce's thought?

A claim of priority is the converse of a claim of one-way dependence: X enjoys priority over Y if Y depends on X but X does not depend on Y. Thus, a question of the relative priority of X and Y has four possible answers: X has priority; Y has priority; X and Y are mutually dependent; X and Y are independent. But the question of the relative priority of thought and language is still unclear, until the relevant kind of priority has been specified. It is useful to distinguish three kinds of priority question: ontological, epistemological, and analytical (see Avramides 1989 for a similar distinction).

To say that thought enjoys ontological priority over language is to say that language is ontologically dependent on thought, while thought is not so dependent on language. That is, there can be thought without language, but there cannot be language without thought. To say that thought enjoys epistemological priority over language is to say that the route to knowledge about language (specifically, about linguistic meaning) goes via knowledge about thought (specifically, about the contents of thought), while knowledge about thought can be had without going via knowledge about language.

Donald Davidson denies both these priority claims. As for ontological priority, he argues (1975) that there cannot be thought without language: In order to have thoughts (specifically, beliefs), a creature must be a member of a language community, and an interpreter of the speech of others. As for epistemological priority, Davidson argues (1974) that it is not possible to find out in detail what a person believes without interpreting the person's speech.

Analytical priority is priority in the order of philosophical analysis or elucidation. To say that X is analytically prior to Y is to say that key notions in the study of Y can be analyzed or elucidated in terms of key notions in the study of X, while the analysis or elucidation of the X notions does not have to advert to the Y notions. On the question of the relative analytical priority of thought and language, there are, then, four positions to consider: two priority views, and two no-priority views.

Priority for Thought

A philosophical account of the content of thoughts—of intentionality—can be given without essential appeal to language, and the notion of linguistic meaning can then be analyzed or elucidated in terms of the thoughts that language is used to express. The analytical program of Paul Grice was aimed at an analysis of linguistic meaning in terms of the beliefs and intentions of language users, though Grice did not offer any account of the intentionality of mental states themselves (Grice 1989; see also Schiffer 1972). There are many proposals for explaining the intentionality of mental states without appeal to linguistic meaning, and these might be coupled with an elucidation of linguistic meaning in terms of mental notions. It is widely reckoned, however, that the Gricean analytical program cannot be carried through (Schiffer 1987).

Priority for Language

An account of linguistic meaning can be given without bringing in the intentionality of thoughts, and what a person's thoughts are about can then be analyzed in terms of the use of language. This view can be found in Michael Dummett's work (1973, 1991, 1993). If a theorist attempts to give a substantive account of linguistic meaning in accordance with this view, then the resources that can be invoked are seriously limited, since the account cannot presume upon everyday psychological notions such as belief and intention. Because of this, it would not be surprising to find hints of behaviorism in work that is influenced by this view.

No Priority—Interdependence

There is no way of giving an account of either intentionality or linguistic meaning without bringing in the other member of the pair. The two notions have to be explained together. This is Davidson's view (Davidson 1984). He thus maintains an ontological, epistemological, and analytical no-priority position. While the three no-priority claims go together quite naturally, it is important to note that they are separable claims and that the analytical no-priority claim is not entailed by the ontological and epistemological no-priority claims.

No Priority—Independence

The notions of intentionality for mental states and of linguistic meaning are unrelated. This view might be defended if a language is considered as an abstract entity, composed of a set of expressions together with a function that assigns a value to each expression (a proposition to each sentence, for example). On such a conception, meaning is a purely formal notion. But for the notion of linguistic meaning as it applies to a public language in use, this fourth view is implausible.

See also Behaviorism; Davidson, Donald; Dummett, Michael Anthony Eardley; Grice, Herbert Paul; Intentionality; Language; Meaning; Philosophy of Language.

Bibliography

Avramides, A. Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.

Davidson, D. "Belief and the Basis of Meaning." Synthese 27 (1974): 309–323.

Davidson, D. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Davidson, D. "Thought and Talk." In Mind and Language, edited by S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Dummett, M. Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth, 1973.

Dummett, M. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Dummett, M. The Seas of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Dummett, M. Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978.

Grice, H. P. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Schiffer, S. Meaning (1972). Oxford, 1988.

Schiffer, S. The Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.

Sellars, W. S., and R. M. Chisholm. "Intentionality and the Mental." In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, Vol. 2: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.

Martin Davies (1996)