GRIER, ROBERT C. (1794–1870)

The senate on August 4, 1846, unanimously confirmed Robert Cooper Grier as the thirty-third Justice of the Supreme Court. President james k. polk nominated Grier because of his states ' rights Democratic principles, his position on the fugitive slavery issue, and his familiarity through thirteen years of previous judicial experience with Pennsylvania's unique law of real property. The bar of Pennsylvania thought the last of these particularly important since Grier's duties included presiding over the Third Circuit which included Pennsylvania.

Grier embraced the concept of dual sovereignty. He believed that the inherent state police powers included the power to curb the flow of liquor for purposes of public health and morality. (See license cases.) Yet Grier also believed that the states could not interfere in areas of responsibility granted by the commerce clause to the Congress. Thus, he sided with the narrow majority in the passenger cases (1849) in striking down taxes levied by two states on ship masters bringing immigrants to the United States.

Grier contributed significantly to the constitutional law of corporations and patents. He formulated an important legal fiction in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (1853) by holding that for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction federal judges could assume that corporate officers resided in the state of incorporation. The decision aided litigants seeking access to federal courts and prevented a corporation from electing officers in the state of a complaining party in order to avoid a suit in federal court.

Because of his experience with patent litigation in the Third Circuit, Grier spoke for the Court in several important patent cases. He wrote the opinions in Seymour v. McCormick (1854) and McCormick v. Talbot (1858), which involved the exclusivity of Cyrus McCormick's patent on the reaper. In the 1864 case of Burr v. Duryee, the most important patent decision to that time, Grier, writing for the Court, held that the patent clause protected inventors of machinery but did not extend to scientific principles. The decision guaranteed accessibility to technical information in a rapidly expanding economy while protecting manufacturers in recovering the costs of developing new machinery.

Grier staunchly enforced the fugitive slave acts. He regularly charged circuit court juries to find for the rights of masters, even when it meant a hostile public reaction. Contrary to the position of Justice joseph story in prigg v. pennsylvania (1842), Grier employed the dual sovereignty theory (in Moore v. Illinois, 1852) to assert that state and national governments shared a concurrent power of rendition over fugitive slaves so long as the states did not interfere with the performance of federal officers.

Grier compromised his dual sovereignty principles in dred scott v. sandford (1857). He initially opposed any decision that addressed the issues, and he urged his colleagues to adopt the rule of strader v. graham (1851) that the laws of the state in which a slave resided should prevail. President james buchanan, at the urging of Justice john catron, wrote Grier urging him to add bisectional unity to a forceful resolution by the Court of the slavery controversy. Grier succumbed, although he did so equivocally. His one-paragraph opinion concurred in Chief Justice roger b. taney's holding that the missouri compromise was unconstitutional and in Justice samuel nelson's position that the laws of Missouri established Dred Scott's legal status.

Grier's participation in the Scott case faded before his loyal unionism. His most notable constitutional contribution while a member of the Court came during the prize cases (1863). The owners of vessels and cargoes seized as prizes at the beginning of the civil war argued that President abraham lincoln had imposed an unconstitutional blockade of southern ports, because Congress had not declared war. Grier spoke for a 5–4 majority in holding that Lincoln had acted constitutionally when confronted with hostilities of sizable proportions. The Justice circumvented the constitutional issues of presidential ursurpation and the definition of the conflict by stressing the President's inherent obligation to preserve the Union.

Grier tarnished his reputation by lingering on the Court after senility had taken its toll. The crisis came when the Justices considered the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts. In conference Grier voted in favor of the acts in Hepburn v. Griswold (1870), but when the Justices moved to consider the next case involving the same issue Grier's mind wandered. He switched his vote. (See legal tender cases.) With the prodding of Justice stephen j. field, Grier submitted his resignation in December 1869 and left the Court the following February. Six months later he died at his home in Philadelphia.

Kermit L. Hall
(1986)

Bibliography

Gatell, Frank O. 1969 Robert C. Grier. Pages 873–892 in Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions. New York: Chelsea House.