Immunity of Public Officials

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IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

State and federal officials enjoy traditional immunity from state-law tort claims. These traditional immunities are more readily available for the discretionary functions of officials than for their ministerial functions. The post-1950s growth of constitutionally-based civil rights actions created forms of public official liability not contemplated by the immunities. A federal body of official immunity doctrine developed simultaneously with the new civil rights actions.

Federal immunity of public officials can be absolute or qualified. Both kinds of immunity shield officials from liability to disgruntled constituents, and thus promote fearless decisionmaking. Allowing immunity defenses implicitly rejects a literal interpretation of section 1983, title 42, u. s. code, which states that "every person … shall be liable" if they cause a deprivation of federal rights.

Absolute immunity shields legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial officials from liability even if they maliciously violate constitutional rights. Under the speech or debate clause, members of Congress have absolute immunity from civil or criminal actions based on legislative acts. Under tenney v. brandhove (1951) and Bogan v. Scott-Harriss (1998), the legislative acts of state and local legislators are absolutely immune from federal civil rights actions. The Supreme Court endorsed absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts in Randall v. Brigham (1869), reaffirmed it in pierson v. ray (1967) and stump v. spark-man (1978), but denied it in cases seeking injunctive relief in Pulliam v. Allen (1984). The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 narrowed Pulliam 's exception to cases in which declaratory relief is unavailable or has preceded injunctive relief. Absolute prosecutorial immunity has its recent origins in imbler v. pachtman (1976). Prosecutors, however, are not absolutely immune for making false statements of fact in seeking an arrest warrant, Kalina v. Fletcher (1997); for conduct at a press conference, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993); or for legal advice to the police during pretrial investigation, Burns v. Reed (1991). In lake country estates v. tahoe regional planning agency (1979) and butz v. economou (1978), the Court extended absolute legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial immunity to officials, such as federal administrative law judges, who perform functions similar to absolutely immune officials but who are not traditional legislators, judges, or prosecutors.

Only nixon v. fitzgerald (1982) has granted an executive official, the President, absolute immunity for official actions. clinton v. jones (1997) holds that the President has no immunity while in office from civil-damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before the President took office.

Qualified immunity from civil rights liability has its origins in common law immunities of officials, especially police officers. Immunity at common law, however, is no longer a prerequisite to qualified immunity. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), an official enjoys qualified immunity from damages actions whenever a reasonable official would believe his act to be constitutional, whether or not the act is in fact constitutional. To shelter officials further from the discovery and trial process, denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable, Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985), and multiple appeals of a denial are possible, Behrens v. Pelletier (1996). Officials may assert a qualified immunity defense whether or not they are eligible for absolute immunity.

Theodore Eisenberg
(2000)