Johnson v. Louisiana 406 U.S. 356 (1972)

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JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA 406 U.S. 356 (1972)

APODACA v. OREGON 406 U.S. 404 (1972)

In duncan v. louisiana (1968) the Supreme Court declared that every criminal charge must be "confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve jurors," and in williams v. florida (1970) the Court found little reason to believe that a jury of six people functions differently from a jury of twelve "particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained." Justice byron r. white, the Court's spokesman in these cases, also wrote its opinion in Johnson and for a plurality of four Justices in Apodaca; he found nothing constitutionally defective in verdicts by a "heavy" majority vote and no constitutional mandate for verdicts by unanimous vote. The Court upheld the laws of two states that permitted verdicts of 9–3 and 10–2 respectively. These 1972 cases, according to the dissenters, diminished the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and made convictions possible by a preponderance of jurors.

For centuries the standard of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was inextricably entwined with the principle of a unanimous verdict, creating a hedge against jury bias. The requirement of jury unanimity had meant that a single juror might veto all others, thwarting an overwhelming majority. Accordingly, Johnson contended that due process of law, by embodying the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, required unanimous verdicts and that three jurors who possessed such doubt in his case showed that his guilt was not proved beyond such doubt. White answered that no basis existed for believing that the majority jurors would refuse to listen to the doubts of the minority. Yet Johnson's jurors, who were "out" for less than twenty minutes, might have taken a poll before deliberating, and if nine had voted for a guilty verdict on the first ballot, they might have returned the verdict without the need of considering the minority's doubts. The dissenters saw the jury as an entity incapable of rendering a verdict by the undisputed standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt if any juror remained unconvinced. The Court majority saw the jury as twelve individuals, nine of whom could decide the verdict if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of minority views.

If the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not change when a 9–3 verdict is permissible, verdicts returned by a nine-juror majority ought to be the same as those returned by unanimous juries of twelve. In fact, the 9–3 system yields a substantially higher conviction ratio and substantially fewer hung juries by which defendants avoid conviction, thus substantially lowering the prosecution's burden of proof.

Johnson also contended that Louisiana's complicated three-tier system of juries—unanimous verdicts of twelve in some cases, unanimous verdicts of five in others, and 9–3 verdicts in still others—denied him the equal protection of the laws. In fact, the standard of proof varied with the crime, but White rejected the equal protection argument, claiming instead that Louisiana's three-tier scheme was "not invidious" because it was rational: it saved time and money. The Court hardly considered whether it diluted justice.

In Apodaca, the 10–2 verdict came under attack from an argument that the fourteenth amendment extended to the states the same standard as prevailed in federal courts, where unanimity prevails. Four Justices, led by White, would have ruled that the sixth amendment does not require unanimous verdicts even in federal trials; four, led by Justice william o. douglas, believed that because the amendment embodies the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts, no state can permit a majority verdict. lewis f. powell's opinion was decisive. He concurred with the Douglas wing to save the unanimous verdict in federal criminal trials and with the White wing to allow nonunanimous verdicts for states wanting them. In Apodaca, White contradictorily conceded that the reasonable doubt standard "has been rejected in Johnson v. Louisiana. " Douglas proved, contrary to White, that the use of the nonunanimous jury altered the way the jury functioned, stacking it against the defendant. He interpreted the majority opinions as reflecting "a "law and order' judicial mood."

Leonard W. Levy
(1986)

(see also: Jury Size.)