Johnson, William (1771–1834)

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JOHNSON, WILLIAM (1771–1834)

Justice William Johnson of Charleston, South Carolina, was thomas jefferson's first appointee to the Supreme Court. Johnson was the son of a blacksmith and revolutionary patriot. After attending Princeton and reading law with charles cotesworth pinckney, Johnson was elected to serve three terms in the state legislature as a member of the new Republican party. During his third term he became speaker of the House. In 1799, he was elected to the state's highest court, and on March 22, 1804, he was appointed to the Supreme Court, where he served until his death. Of all the fifteen Justices who sat on the marshall court, Johnson was, at least to 1830, the most independent and vocal in advancing opinions different from those of Chief Justice john marshall. In treating the accountability of the members of the Court, the distribution of the national power among the three branches, the powers reserved to the states, and vested rights, Johnson often found himself in disagreement with the majority of the Marshall Court. At the time of his appointment, Johnson objected to Marshall's practice of rendering unaminous opinions. He felt that the judicial role required freedom of expression, and he fought to revive the practice of seriatim opinions. "Few minds," he protested in a separate opinion in 1816, "are accustomed to the same habit of thinking.…" From his advent until 1822, Johnson wrote twelve of twenty-four concurring opinions and sixteen of thirty-two dissenting opinions. Toward the end of his career, new Justices joined the Court who agreed with Johnson and frequently spoke out separately with him. Johnson succeeded in establishing the right to dissent, so important in later years.

Johnson also ran into conflict with other members of the Court concerning the allocation of power among the branches of the national government. Like the rest of the Marshall Court, he believed that a strong national government was vital to national unity, and he was willing to delegate broad powers to the government. However, he believed that Congress should be the chief recipient of these powers, and he was willing to construe more narrowly the powers of the judiciary and the President, as he did, for example, in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin. In relation to Congress, Johnson made assertions of broad power that surpassed even those of Marshall. For a unanimous Court, in Anderson v. Dunn, Johnson upheld Congress's legislative contempt power, and in so doing defended the legislative discretion. Every grant of congressional power draws with it "others, not expressed, but vital to its exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate." Johnson thought implied powers were essential to a responsive government that served the needs of the people. Securities against the abuse of discretion rested on accountability and appeals to the people. Individual liberty stood in little danger "where all power is derived from the people, and at the feet of the people, to be resumed again only at their will."

Johnson's conception of federalism was in many ways quite modern. In broadly construing powers of Congress, he looked on these less as limitations on the states than as means of strengthening national unity and improving the lot of individuals. In a separate opinion in gibbons v. ogden, Johnson wrote that where the language of the Constitution leaves room for interpretation, the judges should consult its overriding purpose: "to unite this mass of wealth and power for the protection of the humblest individual: his rights civil and political, his interests and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest are nothing but means." Chief among the means was "the independence and harmony of the states." As Justice Johnson knew from experience, some collisions between state and federal government was inevitable; the only remedy where two governments claimed power over the same individuals was a "frank and candid co-operation for the general good."

Finally, on the rights of property, Johnson showed somewhat less reverence than did the rest of the Court. Toward the end of his career, Johnson lost some of his esteem for a powerful judiciary enforcing property rights against the states, and he began to look to the states for economic and social regulation. In ogden v. saunders Johnson spoke for the majority. He argued that the contract clause did not prohibit "insolvent debtor laws" as applied to contracts made subsequent to the laws' enactment. In Ogden Johnson objected to construing that contract clause literally. He argued that contracts should receive a "relative, and not a positive interpretation: for the rights of all should be held and enjoyed to the good of the whole." Johnson seemed to foresee the notion of state police powers when he insisted that the states had the power to regulate the "social exercise" of rights.

In winning tolerance for dissenting opinions and in contributing creatively and prophetically to the body of constitutional doctrine, William Johnson won a niche as an outstanding member of the early Court.

Donald G. Morgan
(1986)