NORTHERN PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. MARATHON PIPE LINE COMPANY 458 U.S. 50 (1982)

If Congress were to make a wholesale transfer of jurisdiction over matters within the judicial power of the United States to administrative agencies or legislativecourts, the result would be a serious risk of undermining the independence of the judiciary. Then, under what circumstances can Congress make any such transfer? The question blurs constitutional doctrine with practical state-craft. In Marathon the Supreme Court had an opportunity to illuminate this subject, which has long seemed impervious to light.

In the bankruptcy act (1978) Congress created a category of bankruptcy judges, who would hold office not during good behavior (as do judges of constitutional courts) but for fourteen-year terms. The act authorized the bankruptcy judges to decide not only matters peculiar to bankruptcy, such as the marshaling and distribution of assets and the discharge of bankrupts from certain liabilities, but also "related" matters, including actions on behalf of bankrupts against other persons, based on state law. The Supreme Court, 6–3, held that the grant of jurisdiction over the "related" matters exceeded the limits of Article III.

Four Justices concluded that federal jurisdiction over matters not involving "public rights"—dealings between the national government and others, or subject to that government's regulation—must be vested in constitutional courts, with certain limited exceptions. Three Justices espoused balancing Article III's concerns for judicial independence against other practical needs of administering the governmental system. Neither view commanded a majority of the Court, and the doctrinal murk deepened.

Kenneth L. Karst
(1986)

(see also: Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.)