Marriage Squeeze

The phrase marriage squeeze refers to the demographic imbalance in which the number of potential brides does not approximately equal the number of potential grooms. When not everyone has an opportunity to marry, some will be squeezed out of the marriage market. An excess of eligible women is called a female marriage squeeze; an excess of eligible men is called a male marriage squeeze.

Three issues are examined. First, how are potential marriage partners defined and selected?

Second, what causes a marriage squeeze? Third, what are the consequences of a marriage squeeze for family systems and for the people who live in them?

Social Dimensions of the Pool of Eligibles

Mates are selected out of a pool of eligibles. Norms of homogamy dictate that a potential mate should have social characteristics similar to one's own: like marries like. Almost universal age norms dictate that couples are supposed to be of the same generation, with the husband slightly older. People seek others who are homogenous in salient aspects of social identity: race, religion, ethnicity, education, occupational prestige, affluence, and marital status.

Exemptions and exceptions. Some people have such special appeal for the opposite sex that they are considered eligible for marriage even if they do not meet conventional criteria. Alluring people include those of great beauty, talent, celebrity, rank, or achievement, as well as those of great wealth. Charismatic people are few in number but are desired by many, and their pool of eligibles is very large. Romantic love invests the loved one with alluring and unique features. A person in love may see any person as charismatic and may woo them regardless of circumstances.

People may be rejected from the pool of eligibles because of personal defects, disfigurements, or disabilities, whether physical, psychological, or social. Such people have, in effect, the opposite of charisma. Although a stigmatized person may be accepted in the role of friend or colleague, many are rejected for the role of spouse. People with debilities may still marry: however, their de facto pool of eligibles is restricted to those who can and do accept them as they are. The definitions of stigmata, and the degrees of social rejection associated with them, vary markedly among cultures.

The Mating Gradient

In choosing a marriage partner, the first requisite is homogamy. However, within those limits, it is almost universally accepted that hypergamy, a situation in which the woman marries up, is more common and more acceptable that hypogamy, a situation in which the woman marries down. Both husband and wife are most comfortable when the husband has higher status than the wife. The cultural preference for hypergamy results in a mating gradient: women prefer men who are of equal or higher status than themselves, and men prefer women who are of equal or lower status than themselves. The result is that two categories of people tend to be squeezed out of the marriage market: high status women and low status men.

The mating gradient is apparent in terms of height and weight. Tall women have trouble finding even taller men, and short men have trouble finding even shorter women. In more general terms, the mating gradient means that when men increase in status, they widen their pool of eligibles; when women increase in status, their pool of eligibles becomes narrower, leading to an exacerbation of the female marriage squeeze.

Sex Ratios: Measuring the Marriage Squeeze

The term sex ratio is calculated by dividing the number of males by the number of females and multiplying by 100. A ratio of 100 indicates equal numbers; a low ratio indicates an excess of females and a high number an excess of males. Researchers have operationalized a marriage squeeze in a variety of ways, taking into account age, race, labor force status, marital status, rates of homosexuality, and the census undercount (Veevers 1988). Sophisticated measures often yield results correlating with simple sex ratio measures, which in most instances serve as an adequate basis for research (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991).

How Do Sex Ratios Become Unbalanced?

The sex ratio at birth is almost even, with about 105 boy babies born for every 100 girls. By adolescence, higher male mortality usually results in balanced populations. In theory, if everyone picked a mate at that time, everyone would be able to marry. In reality, many demographic factors contribute to unbalanced outcomes.

Fertility rates: Baby booms. The phrase marriage squeeze was coined by the American demographer Paul Glick (1988). In the early 1960s, he observed declining marriage rates among young women and realized this outcome was in part due to the interaction of two factors: the sharp increase in fertility known as the baby boom and the reality of the mating gradient. Consider the Canadian example: in 1944, the crude birth rate was 24.0 per 1,000; in 1947, it was 28.9. Twenty years later, girls born in 1947 sought grooms two to four years older than themselves, but there were not enough for a oneto-one match. Glick observed that some of young women were squeezed out of the marriage market and predicted that some would never marry.

Fertility rates: Baby busts. In the 1970s, in the developed world, the baby boom became the baby bust. In the 1990s, young men of those cohorts sought wives two to four years younger than themselves and found them in scarce supply, creating a male marriage squeeze. Stable fertility rates yield stable sex ratios among young adults; it is fluctuations in them that produce a marriage squeeze. For a marriage squeeze, the most important factor is the stage of the population in terms of the demographic transition. Other things being equal, a sharp increase in fertility or in population growth leads to a female marriage squeeze, a circumstance found throughout the developing world. A sharp decline in fertility and a declining population, lead to a male marriage squeeze, a situation now emerging in industrialized countries.

Sex differences in mortality. In the developed world, mortality rates for males are generally higher than for females. From early adulthood, the sex ratio declines with advancing age. A contributing factor is that unmarried persons have higher mortality rates than do spouses, a difference more pronounced for men than for women. Males, especially young males, are more prone than females to institutionalization, incarceration, and violent death, an outcome that in the United States has lead to a much lower sex ratio among blacks than among whites. Male mortality is also disproportionately high in times of war, an outcome reflected in sex ratios in Vietnam and Cambodia (Goodkind 1997; Huguet et al. 2000).

Natal inequality: Missing girls in Asia. In Asian countries such as China, India, Taiwan, and South Korea, there is a strong cultural preference for sons rather than daughters. Traditionally, sex ratios in such countries have been kept low by high mortality among girl babies due to neglect, abandonment, and infanticide.

Within this cultural backdrop, two other factors have been added: the concerted effort to curb population growth and the availability of sex-selection technologies, which allow female fetuses to be identified and aborted. When the total number of children is reduced, as it is with China's one-child policy, it becomes increasingly important to not waste a pregnancy on girls. Sex-selection is most often used for second and third pregnancies (Chu 2001). In the 1980s, prenatal sex selection became widespread in spite of some official policies intended to control it. By 1992 in India, China, Taiwan, and South Korea, there were 110 to 119 boy babies born for every 100 girl babies. This practice alone, apart from other variables, guarantees a shortage of brides and a surplus of grooms, in subsequent generations.

Sex differences in migration. Migrating populations consist disproportionately of young unmarried men. In Vietnam, high male mortality due to war was further exacerbated by high out-migration of young men, creating a larger female marriage squeeze for the women left behind, and a male marriage squeeze for minority men in the host country (Goodkind 1997). In the United States, sex ratios among ethnic immigrants have been high for the first generation, but subsequently declined for second and third generations (McCaa 1993).

Regional variations: Local marriage markets. Sex ratios vary not only among countries, but also from one region to another. High sex ratios occur in areas devoted to primary industries, such as Newfoundland, Maine, Montana, and Utah (Hamilton and Otterstad 1998; Hooper and England 1988). Such regions provide good employment opportunities for young men, but few jobs for young women. Sex ratios are especially low in capital cities such as Ottawa or Washington, where government bureaucracies attract many women.

The smaller the unit of analysis, the more differences in sex ratio are observed. In Los Angeles, black women living in the inner city face a much more extreme marriage squeeze than other black women. In San Francisco, where male homosexuality is not uncommon, sex ratios calculated on the basis of male/female ratios may seem high, but in terms of heterosexual marriage, the actual sex ratio is considerable lower.

Demographic Consequences of a Female Marriage Squeeze

It could be argued that where there are women without marriage, there will be sex without marriage. Where there is sex without marriage, there will be babies without marriage. When there are enough illegitimate babies, the social significance of bastardy is eroded, which erodes the social significance of being married or not married.

A significant female marriage squeeze tends to destabilize traditional family systems based on universal marriage, lifelong monogamy, and babies born within wedlock. Breaking the sacrosanct link between fertility and marriage leads to changes in many interdependent demographic rates. Increases are observed in, among other things, women never married, premarital sex, premarital conceptions, common-law marriages, illegitimate births, and mother-child households. Age at first intercourse declines, but age at first marriage increases.

When the unmarried can act as if they were married, the married can act as if they were single. Redefining relationships leads to rising divorce rates. When divorce is defined as a right rather than as a privilege, grounds for divorce are widened, and eventually evolve to divorce on demand. The female marriage squeeze is again exacerbated by sex differences in remarriage: divorced men and widowers are more likely to remarry than are divorced women and widows, and they do so in a shorter period of time.

During a female marriage squeeze, unmarried women may be without a consort for a major period of their lives. The absence of financial support from men requires an investment in employment. Married women know that their marriages are vulnerable: marriage is difficult, divorce is easy, and remarriage is uncertain. An investment in employment provides some security. In either case, responsibility for children rests, or may rest, with the mother alone. A female marriage squeeze further reinforces two existing trends: an increase of women in the workforce and a decline in fertility.

Brides in India: A special case. The rapid increase in population in India, and the subsequent increase in cohort size, has lead to an extreme female marriage squeeze, which as been extensively described and analyzed (Bhat et al. 1999). The scarcity of suitable grooms is associated with marked increase in the size of dowry given away with the bride. It involves, in effect, a "rising price of husband" (Rao 1993). This outcome reinforces the prevailing cultural devaluation of daughters in favor of sons. The incentive for sex selection has already increased the sex ratio at birth, and subsequent generations will experience a male marriage squeeze.

Black Americans: A special case. The female marriage squeeze occurred much earlier, and much more intensely, among black Americans that among whites. "Approximately two-thirds of blacks are single. By contrast, approximately two thirds of whites are married" (Davis and Emerson 1997). Research on the demographic and interpersonal effects of the marriage squeeze draw heavily from research on them (Albrecht and Fossett 1997; Crowder and Tonlay 2000; and Fossett and Kiecolt 1991). The seminal work in this area is Too Many Women? The Sex Role Question (Guttentag and Secord 1983). Subsequently, this extensive literature has been integrated in The Decline in Marriage Among African Americans (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995) and Family Life in Black America (Taylor, Jackson, and Chatters 1997).

Unacceptable compromises: Exogamy. When it comes to major issues, such as race and religion, rates of interracial or interreligious exogamy are not greatly increased. For example, Israeli women who married young, when they had many men to choose from, were no more likely to marry out that those who married later, when they had fewer options (Stier and Shavit 1994). In America, there have been only modest increases in black-white marriages (Crowder and Tonlay 2000).

Unacceptable compromises: Employability. Among black women, the sex ratio is even lower than it seems, in that black women tend not to compromise on issues of employability. Usually they are willing to remain single rather than marry an economically unattractive man. "Market conditions—good or bad—have little to do with women's willingness to marry heterogamously. Generally, they are not willing to cast a wide net in the face of market constraints" (Lichter and Anderson 1995). The criterion that a potential husband should be employed, or at least employable, holds firm. In reality, the low sex ratio among blacks is even lower than it seems because men who are incarcerated, institutionalized, or unemployable are rejected. This is the distinction between the quantity of mates available, and the quality.

A survey in the United States found that, in every age category, available black women outnumbered available black employed men by two to one; they outnumbered black employed men, with earnings above the poverty line, by at least three to one (Crowder and Tolnay 2000).

Mixed marriages: Black husbands, white wives. Successful black men have disproportional rates of ignoring rules of homogamy and selecting white brides. The ones most likely to intermarry are those at the highest levels of education, income, and occupational prestige (Crowder and Tolnay 2000). For professional black women with high education and income, the mating gradient substantially reduces their pool of eligibles. Their prospects are further eroded when the most eligible men select themselves out of the pool by marrying white women.

Mixed marriages: Education. Every person who marries makes some compromises by accepting a person who does not meet all of their ideal criteria. Black women do tend to compromise to some extent in that, compared with white women, they are more willing to accept a husband with less education than themselves, a husband who has been married before, or a husband who is much older (Albrecht and Fossett 1997).

Consequences of a Male Marriage Squeeze

A male marriage squeeze is less common than the female one and has received less attention. The social consequences are less clear (Hooper and England 1988). A female marriage squeeze tends to destabilize the traditional family, but a male marriage squeeze tends to reinforce it. In a male marriage squeeze, where all available women are taken in marriage, the distinction between an eligible woman and one who is already taken is crucial.

When there is an excess of males, increasing proportions do not marry, or marry at a later age (Lloyd and South 1996). Women are valuable in part because they are scarce. The proportion of ever-married people increases, the age at marriage decreases, and fertility increases. Nonmarital sexuality of respectable women is repressed, resulting in decreased rates of common-law marriage and illegitimacy and an increased proportion of children living in intact homes. There may be an increase in rates of male sexual violence (Pedersen 1991).

When there is a male marriage squeeze, the men who are most disadvantaged in competing are those who are too young or too poor. Familial success depends largely on economic resources, resulting in a clear motive towards financially success careers. When wives are valued as wives, the trend will be toward their decreased labor force involvement and increased fertility. Grounds for divorce will be stringent, and rates of divorce will be low. Rates of remarriage for women will be high.

The extent to which these projected outcomes will actually come about is not known. In Japan, there is a definite male marriage squeeze among young adults, but a definite female marriage squeeze among older cohorts (Kono 1991). More circumstances of a male marriage squeeze will emerge if and when developing countries experience a sharp decline in cohort size.

Interpersonal Consequences of Sex Ratio Imbalances

If it is assumed that most adults are heterosexual, and that their first preference is to be in a stable and monogamous marriage, then the imbalance of sex ratios results in a substantial, nonnegotiable, and pervasive double standard. The implications of a male marriage squeeze are not yet clear, but the implications of a female one are pervasive.

Odd woman out. Women in a marriage squeeze are often treated as superfluous, described as being extras, excess, a surplus, or simply as too many, all terms that minimize their intrinsic worth. They have been euphemistically described as dyadically disadvantaged. The minority sex, female or male, has the unique experience of intra-sexual competition not only in early adulthood but also throughout the lifespan (Pedersen 1991).

Principle of least interest. A truism from social psychology, which reflects personal and political reality, is that: The person who has the least interest in the continuation if a relationship is able to dictate the conditions of the relationship. In a female marriage squeeze, men have a plethora of women who might be girlfriends, mistresses, or wives, a situation that applies to married men as well as the unmarried and the formerly married. With advancing age, men's pool of eligibles increases, whereas her small pool is made smaller still. Other things being equal, if marriage is a desired state, she will make more compromises than he does. To borrow a concept from economics, he exists in a buyer's market, while she is in a seller's market. What emerges is in effect a demographic double standard in role expectations, sexual norms, and power in general.

Antinuptialism: His. Men in a female marriage squeeze may find that marriage is not so much undesirable as it is unnecessary. If one relationship is less than perfect, other women are available. To take an extreme example, the marriage market in Brazil has been cogently described as: ". . . finding a balance by 'recycling' men through highly unstable informal unions" (Greene and Rao 1995).

Antinuptialism: Hers. If a woman is not able to find the kind of man she wants, or the egalitarian marriage she wants, she may withdraw from the market completely. The singles' subculture offers support and justification of a single lifestyle. The emergent attitude is summarized in an often-quoted aphorism: "It takes a hell of a man to be better than no man at all."

Extrafamilial roles. Single women anticipate a high probability of remaining single. Wives anticipate divorce without remarriage. Both are motivated to establish their independence with work roles. A cyclical effect is created: the greater the competence in extrafamilial roles, the less dependence on marriage; the less dependence of marriage, the greater the competence in extrafamilial roles. Taken to its logical extreme, the pattern emerging is that both men and women have, and expect to have, work roles, the only difference being a few years taken off for motherhood.

Conclusion

Racial differences in marriage-market conditions accentuate, but do not explain completely, black-white differences in marriage rates (Lichter et al. 1991; Lloyd and South 1996). The black experience suggests changes that might also appear in the white population, but there is no reason to expect they will be exactly the same. The consequences of a female marriage squeeze cannot be predicted independently of the culture in which it occurs.

For each of the outcomes that have been associated with a marriage squeeze, at the societal or at the interpersonal level, there are many other contributing factors. Thus, a marriage squeeze contributes to declining fertility, but declining fertility also reflects industrialization, medical advances in birth technology, education of women, and the population explosion. A marriage squeeze is an important factor in the continuation of traditional families or in their destabilization, but it is only one of many demographic and social forces in operation.

See also:Mate Selection

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JEAN E. VEEVERS