DUNS SCOTUS, JOHN, BL.

Franciscan philosopher and theologian; b. Duns, Scotland, c. 1266; d. Cologne, Nov. 8, 1308. He is known by the scholastic titles of Doctor subtilis, Doctor maximus, and Doctor Marianus. This article describes his life and works and summarizes his principal doctrines.

LIFE AND WORKS

One of the most distinguished British thinkers of the late Middle Ages, John Duns Scotus was formed in the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition at Oxford and Paris. Although only 42 when he died, he created a new school of scholastic thought that had considerable influence on later thinkers even outside the Franciscan school (see scotism).

Academic Career. As a boy Scotus was trained by his paternal uncle, Elias Duns, at the Franciscan friary in Dumfries, Scotland. At the age of 15 he entered the Franciscan Order and was sent to Oxford during the 1280s. Whether he went to Paris before or after his ordination on March 17, 1291 at Northampton is unknown, but it is likely that he went to Paris at some point in the late 1280s or early 1290s to participate in the lectorate program at the Parisian studium since doing so was a necessary condition for those seeking the mastership at Paris. At Paris during his lectorate, Scotus would have been acquainted with the various theologians then teaching either as bachelors or masters, including Gonsalvus Hispanus and Vital du Four. Thereafter, he returned to Oxford and lectured as a bachelor on the Sentences from 1297 to 1301, revising his work continuously. In 1302 he returned to Paris to complete the requirements for the degree, reading the Sentences for a second or possibly a third time, but in the following year he was forced to leave the university because he refused to subscribe to Philip the Fair's appeal to a General Council against Boniface VIII. After a brief exile, which may have been spent at Oxford, he returned to Paris armed with a letter of recommendation from the minister general of the order, his former master, Gonsalvo. He finally received the degree from the University of Paris in 1305 and lectured there as a regent master in the Franciscan chair until 1307. Toward the end of 1307 he was sent to Cologne, where he lectured until his death.

His body was originally buried in the Franciscan church in Cologne, near the altar of the Three Kings. Toward the end of the 16th century it was moved to the middle of the choir near the main altar. His remains were frequently authenticated in the 16th and 17th centuries, and most recently in 1954. Veneration of his remains has existed from "time immemorial" and canonical proceedings for his beatification were held in Cologne in 1706 and in Nola in 1710 and from 1905 to 1906. On Feb. 8, 1906, the bishop of Nola declared that the cult given to Bl. Duns Scotus was from time immemorial; although the Order of Friars Minor requested the Congregation of Rites to confirm this for the universal Church, nothing resulted. Finally, on March 20, 1993, Pope John Paul II confirmed the immemorial cult of John Duns Scotus, at the same time according the Subtle Doctor the title of blessed.

Authentic Writings. Not all the writings published by Luke Wadding in the Opera omnia can be considered authentic The definitive list of authentic works is possible only with the publication of the critical edition currently being produced by the Scotus Commission (Opera omnia, studio et cura Commissionis scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, Vatican City 1950–) and the Scotus Project, located first at the Franciscan Institute and then at the Catholic University of America. By the year 2001, eleven volumes had appeared in the Vatican edition of Scotus's Oxford theological writings, while three volumes had appeared of his Opera philosophica, edited by the American team of scholars.

The most important of Scotus's writings are the commentaries on the Sentences of peter lombard, of which

there are many versions (five of bk. 1, three of bk. 2, five of bk. 3, and two of bk. 4). The original lecture notes used at Oxford (Lectura prima ) were definitively arranged by Scotus in an Ordinatio (commonly known as the Opus Oxoniense ). Some of the same notes were used by Scotus in his Paris lectures (Reportatio Parisiensis ), but entirely new questions and arguments were introduced with much greater attention being paid to more contemporary Parisian authors such as Godfrey of Fontaines. It is probable that Scotus also lectured on the Sentences at Cambridge before 1300 (Reportatio Cantabrigiensis ). Among the philosophical writings printed by Wadding, the following are authentic: Quaestiones super universalia of Porphyry, De praedicamentis, Super Perihermeneias, Super libros elenchorum, De anima, and Metaphysica (lib.1–9). Other authentic writings include: the Tractatus de primo principio, Theoremata, certain Quaestiones disputatae, and the Quodlibeta.

It is certain that roughly half of the works ascribed to Scotus in the Wadding and Vivès editions are not authentic. At the time of Scotus's premature death, many of his writings were incomplete or imperfect. His disciples hastened to complete and arrange his works, thus creating some uncertainty about the authentic text. Scarcely 15 years after the death of Scotus, one of his disciples was already insisting on the need to compare the version then in circulation with Scotus's original. However, the authentic doctrine of Duns Scotus can be determined with reasonable accuracy from the numerous MSS.

PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES

Duns Scotus was a man of acute and subtle intelligence. Reared as he was after the condemnation of certain Averroist and Thomist doctrines (1277), he tried to construct a new synthesis of philosophical and theological thought drawn from the ancient tradition of augus tine, bonaventure, avicenna, and the Oxford school of Franciscan thought. "Writing after the condemnation of 1277," writes É. Tilson. "which was for him an established fact, Duns Scotus finds himself in a different relationship to the philosophers than was Thomas Aquinas. In the advance of philosophical naturalism, the pressing matter seemed to him to be the defense of theological autonomy rather than the further assimilation of philosophy" (664). Describing the sources of Scotus's thought, Maurice o'fihely says that "he constantly relies on Avicenna among the philosophers, except where he is contrary to the faith, on Augustine among Catholic doctors, on Paul among the Apostles, and on John among the Evangelists" (Annot. in Meta. Scoti 4.1.16; ed. Wadding 4:579B). While O'Fihely's statement may be considered accurate enough for characterizing the more ancient and classical sources for Scotus's writings, the Subtle Doctor's texts show that his interpretation and appropriation of philosophical sources was governed to a large extent by the writings of Henry of Ghent, especially in reference to Avicenna.

An attentive study of Scotus's doctrine reveals the intimate unity of his philosophy and theology. Although his philosophical doctrines cannot be considered corollaries of Christian faith, it would be a mistake to think that his philosophy was developed independently of the faith. The primacy of being constitutes the basis of his epistemology and metaphysics; the primacy of will characterizes his ethics; and the notion of Infinite Being who is Love dominates his entire theology.

Philosophy. The main elements of Scotus's philosophy may be sketched under the headings of the univocity of being, matter and form, individuation, the formal distinction, God's existence, divine infinity, and morality and freedom.

Univocity of Being. The basic Scotistic thesis in the theory of knowledge is the univocity of being. For Scotus the primary object of the intellect is neither the divine essence, as many in the Augustinian tradition thought, nor the essence of material things, as most Aristotelians held, but pure being, ens inquantum ens, in the purest possible sense, perceived prior to every determination it might have in reality. This purity and universality of being can be predicated univocally of all things, and without it nothing can be understood. Although universal, this concept of being is not a genus differentiated into species, for there is nothing outside being to differentiate. Being as such is in every reality and in every aspect of reality. It is univocally predicated of Infinite Being and finite being, which are two intrinsic modes of the universality of being as such. Since Scotus's univocity of being is more epistemological than ontological, it would be erroneous to accuse him of pantheism. He clearly taught the essential difference between finite and Infinite Being, and he rejected every theory of emanationism and pantheism.

Matter and Form. Having established the univocal character of being as the primary object of knowledge, the Subtle Doctor developed a metaphysics that contained many new elements, nuances, and clarifications of traditional Augustinianism. In his view, primary matter has also a different sense from that of Aristotelianism. While agreeing with his contemporaries that all material beings are composed of matter and form, he conceived both as positive and actual entities. Matter as distinct from nothing is a positive reality and therefore actually something. Hence, for Scotus primary matter is not a pure potentiality, as it is for the Aristotelians, but an actuality capable of receiving further perfection. The unity of the composite, although resulting from two entities, is not eliminated, since the two elements are essentially and not accidentally ordered to one another. The union is therefore substantial and not accidental. (see matter and form.)

Individuation. Besides matter and form, Scotus held also that universality and particularity are metaphysical components of concrete reality. In every being there is to be found a common nature (natura communis ) that is indifferent to universality and particularity. For a common nature to be rendered particular and individual, a distinct principle of individuality is required. Scotus called this principle, at various points in his writings, either positive entity, individual entity, individual difference or haecceitas ("thisness"). It is a distinct, positive modality of individuals by which the common nature is rendered individual.

For Scotus the individuating principle is conferred through the form, which actualizes matter more specifically (see individuation). The first form that matter receives in order to be a physical body is a corporeal form (forma corporeitatis ). Without this, matter cannot be a "body," but with it matter is disposed to receive the higher form called "soul." Thus the form of corporeity is the ultimate actual, specific, individual determination prior to the entry of the soul into matter. It also remains for a time after the soul has left the body, thus preserving the substantial identity of the living and dead body.

Formal Distinction. While every being has a unity, not every being is simple, or devoid of multiplicity. For Scotus every concrete being has a multiplicity of metaphysical elements that are real, positive, and distinct. Some distinctions are real and independent of mental consideration; others depend exclusively on mental consideration. Between these two types of distinction Scotus recognized a third, the formal distinction (distinctio formalis a parte rei ). This special kind of distinction arises from the concept of various elements that are objectively and formally different in themselves, although not really distinct. The foundation of this distinction lies in the different positive formalities (formalitates ) that constitute the inner richness of a single being. For Scotus this kind of distinction is to be found between the soul and its powers and between the various powers (see faculties of the soul). In his view, the intellect and will are not completely identified with the spiritual substance of the soul, as in the Augustinian tradition, nor are they really distinct as accidents from an underlying subject, as in the Thomistic tradition. Similar distinctions exist, according to Scotus, between the concepts of unity, truth, and goodness insofar as they are transcendental properties of being, and between the divine persons within the divine essence.

God's Existence. Scotus manifested even greater originality in his natural theology. He was not satisfied with Anselm's ontological argument. Yet in Anselm's attempt he saw valuable elements for a valid affirmation of an Infinite Being. Instead of beginning with the existence of things, as St. thomas aquinas had done, Scotus began with the essence and metaphysical properties of creatures. Seeing the intrinsic possibility of every created being, Scotus proved the possibility of a first efficient cause. Its actual existence is demonstrated by the principle of non-contradiction. Since created beings exist, it is absolutely certain that they can exist, even if they did not. The reason for this possibility cannot be found in nothing, for nothing cannot be a cause; to say that a thing has nothing for its cause is to say that it has no cause. Nor can creatures themselves be the cause of their own possibility, for they cannot cause anything before they exist. Therefore the cause of the intrinsic possibility of creatures must be found in a being distinct from all producible beings. This being either exists of itself or exists by reason of another. If its existence is of itself, it is possible of itself and the cause of all possibility. But if this being exists by reason of another, the series of prior causes cannot be infinite; otherwise the possibility of beings would have no cause. Scotus therefore concluded that a necessary being exists, capable of producing all things that are possible. For Scotus the possibility of some being demonstrates the possibility of a necessary, uncaused being. But for him it is precisely the impossibility of being caused that justifies the assertion of its actual existence. For if this uncaused being did not exist in actuality, then (1) something can cause itself, or (2) there is no first cause but only mutual dependencies or (3) such a being is impossible. Scotus rejected the first hypothesis as absurd and the other two as previously excluded. Thus to admit the possibility of a first efficient cause is to admit the necessity of its actual existence.

Divine Infinity. For Scotus the essential characteristic of the first being is its infinity. It must be infinite because it is the first efficient cause of all finite beings. As the final cause of all, it must be infinite, for the natural love and desire rooted in each being are toward something infinite. As the most perfect being it cannot be other than infinite, for otherwise it would not be most perfect. Infinite being thus conceived must have intelligence and will in order to know and love before acting as efficient cause.

Morality and Freedom. The moral philosophy of Duns Scotus was strongly influenced by the condemnation of 1277 (see averroism, latin). In opposition to Averroës, Scotus firmly asserted the absolute freedom of God's will and the preeminence of freedom in man. The objective norm of the moral law, for Scotus, is the divine essence, which always operates most reasonably and fittingly. Although he strongly asserted the absolute liberty of God, he did not imply that God could ever act capriciously or blindly. The norm of divine activity is the divine nature itself, which is essentially rational (ens rationabilissime, ordinatissime volens ).

Applying this analysis to divine positive law governing mankind, Scotus maintained that God can command what was previously forbidden and forbid what had been commanded, thus altering the moral value of certain actions. At least he held that in the beginning God could have created a different rational relationship among values, provided they were consistent with the supreme goodness and lovableness of God. Consequently Scotus asserted that God can change or suspend the last seven commandments of the Decalogue, but not the first three, for this would be contrary to His supreme rationality. God cannot permit creatures to hate Him.

In man as in God, liberty is the supreme value. For Scotus, free will expresses the highest perfection of human nature—the primacy of this will is characteristic of his ethics. Since knowledge is prior to action, the intellect has a priority of origin. But since the will commands the intellect, and not vice versa, the will enjoys a superiority and primacy over the intellect. Although Scotus did not admit a real distinction between intellect and will, he saw human rationality as most perfectly expressed through love and voluntary activity.

Theology. The basic intuition of Scotus's theological speculation is the perception of God as the Infinite Being who is Love. Scotus made first a distinction between the knowledge God has of Himself (theologia Dei ) and the knowledge man has of Him through revelation and theological speculation (theologia nostra ). Consonant with the Franciscan tradition, Scotus emphasized the affective and practical role of theology rather than the abstract and speculative. For Scotus the purpose of theology is to love God above all things.

God's Infinite Love. The primary object of theology is God's own essence, which is love. The metaphysical concept of Infinite Being as "I am who am" (Ex 3.14) thus attains perfection in the biblical definition of God as love (1 Jn 4.8). Infinite Being, the proper modality of the very essence of God, is formally love, Infinite Love.

Between the essential and personal attributes of God and between the divine attributes themselves, Scotus introduced a formal distinction a parte rei. At the same time he insisted on the absolute simplicity of God. For him the notions (rationes ) of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct from the notion of God. Similarly, the notions of divine wisdom and goodness are formally distinct in the divine essence itself.

Since God is love, everything has its origin in love. God created creatures not out of necessity but out of love, in order to communicate to others the fullness of His love. Although independent and full of love in Himself, He wished to manifest His goodness, happiness, and love to others in a most reasonable and orderly way. In this communication of God's love, Scotus distinguished a hierarchy of objects, even though God, being utterly simple, willed all creatures in a single act of His will. In this hierarchy, the highest manifestation of God's love and glory is the God-Man, Jesus Christ. From all eternity, God predestined Christ to be the sublime manifestation of the Trinity (In 3 sent. 7.3; Report. 3.7.4–6). All others predestined to glory are willed in relation to Christ, as "co-lovers" (condiligentes ) of the Trinity. It is in view of this end that God wills the means, namely, grace. Nature, the lowest in the hierarchy, is directly ordained to the supernatural order of grace and glory.

Christology. The theology of Duns Scotus is essentially Christocentric in the sense that Christ, "God's greatest work," is the supreme glorifier of the Holy Trinity. Conscious of St. Paul's statement that "All things are from God, who has reconciled us to himself through Christ" (2 Cor. 5.18), Scotus developed a theological system of speculation consistent with the Christocentric spirituality of the Franciscan tradition. One can say that he supplied the theoretical and speculative structure for the spirituality lived by St. Francis and developed by St. Bonaventure.

For Scotus, the Incarnation in itself is a manifestation of God's infinite love and willed by God from all eternity independent of any foreknowledge of Adam's fall. However, Christ "would not have come as a mediator, as one who was to suffer, as one who was to redeem, unless someone had previously sinned" (Report. 3.7.5). In other words, the primary purpose of the Incarnation, for Duns Scotus, was the manifestation of God's love for man. The fact that Christ had to come as a Redeemer was secondary in the mind of God. Scotus could not admit that the greatest good, the Incarnation, was occasioned by an inferior good, the Redemption of mankind. God, however, having willed to create angels and men with freedom of choice, and having foreseen their fall, also willed to send Christ to redeem mankind by His suffering and death.

For Scotus, the Redemption is an expression of highest mercy, supreme justice, and infinite love. Mercy is manifest in the Persons of the Trinity, who sent the Word Incarnate, and in Christ, who offered Himself on the cross for man, alienated by sin. Justice is manifest both in repairing the damage caused by man and in the reconciliation of man with God. Above all, love radiates the entire drama of Redemption. When Scotus described the Passion of Christ and considered the blood that was shed, he strongly emphasized love as the formal element of Christ's merit. Scotus saw the Passion as the culmination of Christ's love for the Trinity and for mankind, the ultimate service predestined for him. By this service, Christ became the one and only mediator between God and man; He became man's unique means of salvation.

Scotus refused to explain the doctrine of the Redemption simply in terms of expiating man's sin and satisfying divine justice. For him, the Redemption could be understood only by the love that inflamed Christ's free will. This infinite love, freely given, calls forth a loving response from man. "I am of the opinion that he wished to redeem us in this fashion principally in order to draw us to his love" (Oxon. 3.20). The response of man's love, for Scotus, is thus included in the purpose of the Redemption, for through love man and Christ are "co-lovers" of the Holy Trinity.

Mariology. The title Marian Doctor indicates the special role of the Blessed Virgin in the theology of Duns Scotus. His Marian doctrine, still being developed by his disciples, brings together mother and son in all the mysteries of Christ. They were united in the Incarnation and Redemption by a single decree of divine predestination. As a result, mother and son were united, according to Scotus, in their life, mission, and privileges. One of Scotus's immediate disciples developed this to mean that Mary was predestined "in the second degree after Christ" for the Incarnation, Redemption, and Salvation. In this sublime view, the Incarnate Word is the firstborn, the greatest of beings, while Mary is the first of all women. Together with Christ, Mary is the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of all creation. In this doctrine, Christ is the glorifier of the Trinity, Mary the coglorifier; Christ is the Redeemer, Mary the co-redemptrix; Christ is the source of all grace, Mary the dispenser. While these conclusions are not explicitly stated in the writings of Scotus, they must be considered Scotistic.

Immaculate Conception. The name of Scotus is indissolubly associated with the doctrine of Mary's immac ulate conception. One of his teachers at the University of Oxford, william of ware, had earlier spoken in favor of this Marian privilege, but Scotus was perhaps the first to defend it in Paris (Report. 3.3.1). For the great doctors of the Middle Ages, the principal difficulty was that Mary—as all other descendants of Adam—had to be redeemed by Christ. Scotus admitted fully that "Mary would greatly have needed Christ as a Redeemer, for she would have contracted original sin by reason of human propagation unless she had been preserved through the grace of the Mediator" (In 3 sent. 18.13). Thus, for Scotus, Mary was preserved from all sin, actual and original, by reason of Christ's Redemption. This view was heatedly debated for five centuries before it was definitively declared a doctrine of Catholic faith.

Scotus considered Mary the trophy of the Redemption, the most perfect product of Christ's love of man. He established a principle in Mariological studies that contributed greatly to the scholastic development of Marian doctrine: "We can with probability attribute to Mary all that has the greatest perfection, provided it is not opposed to the authority of the Church or the Scriptures" (In 3 sent. 3.1).

Nature, Grace, and Glory. Since, for Scotus, the entire natural order is ordained to the supernatural, natural actions are rendered supernaturally meritorious by the modality of grace freely given by God. Nature finds its perfection and completion in grace, which God willed from all eternity to give man through Christ. For Scotus, the supernatural order does not transcend the natural order substantially and infinitely, as it does for St. Thomas, but only modally and determinately, because from eternity God intended the natural order to be perfected by grace.

Recognizing no real distinction between the soul and its powers, Scotus also recognized no real distinction between grace and charity. They are the same reality, a habit, whereby man's nature shares supernatural life and merits eternal salvation. However, Scotus recognized a formal distinction a parte rei between grace and charity, for grace signifies an ontological perfection, while charity signifies an operative modality. The object of grace is God, the lover and giver of gifts, while the object of charity is the lovableness of God in Himself. Thus, insofar as grace involves a certain imperfection, one does not say that God is grace but that He is charity, love.

For Scotus, the essence of eternal happiness consists in the beatific love of God. While remaining free, this love is inflexible and indefectible as a result of God's positive predetermined choice. The whole of Scotus's theology is dominated by the notion of love. The characteristic note of this love is its absolute freedom. As love becomes more perfect and intense, freedom becomes more noble and integral.

Evaluation. "Perhaps there is no medieval doctor more misunderstood than this Scottish Franciscan," wrote A. gemelli. "The very title of Subtle Doctor by which he is honored has an ironic ring. He was called an innovator, yet he followed the most ancient scholastic tradition, developing the intuitions of St. Augustine and incorporating compatible elements of Aristotelian doctrine. He was called a Franciscan who had lost the significance of love, yet his philosophy is founded on love. He was said to be a methodical saboteur, an insidious theologian, a precursor of voluntarism and immanentism, a 13th-century Kant, yet his realism is scholastic to an extreme, carefully avoiding any pretended autonomy of nature of the individual ego. His theories of the Blessed Virgin and the Incarnation received approval centuries later in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and in devotion to the Kingship of Christ" [Il Francescanesimo, 2d ed. (Milan 1933) 58–59].

This evaluation by a pioneer of neoscholasticism in Italy reveals the change brought about by research and historical criticism. In the first edition of Histoire de la philosophie médiévale, appearing in 1900, M. de wulf described Scotus as a skeptic. In the 6th and last edition (Louvain 1936) Scotism was described as an original and forceful scholasticism, "a homogeneous synthesis in which everything has been brought together in a wonderful unity" (347–348). Similarly, M. grabmann considered Duns Scotus to be "the last of the great personalities of scholasticism" [Die Geschichte der katholischen Theologie (Freiburg im Breisgau 1933) 86–87].

The whole of scholasticism, and Scotus in particular, has profited greatly from the application of historical criticism to original sources. Historical criticism has made it possible to determine the genuine works of Scotus and to appreciate their original form. It has revealed the method by which he developed his system. It has shown that he was more in agreement than in disagreement with the great theologians of his time. Finally, it has corrected the misunderstanding concerning his relation to St. Thomas and concerning the Church's attitude toward these two thinkers.

Duns Scotus did not originate opposition to St. Thomas; it existed long before Scotus (see thomism). In any case, as De Wulf has pointed out, Duns Scotus did not criticize for the sake of criticism, but for the sake of constructing his own philosophical system, which was the culmination of an ancient Christian tradition.

See Also: scholasticism.

Bibliography: Works. Opera omnia: ed. l. wadding et al., 12 v. (Lyon 1639); 26 v. (Vivès; Paris 1891–95); critical ed. c. baliĆ (Vatican City 1950–). The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus, ed. and tr. e. roche (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1949). Philosophical Writings, ed. and tr. a. b. wolter (New York 1962). Prologue de l'Ordinatio, trans. g. sondag (Paris 1999). Literature. f.c. copleston, History of Philosophy, v. 2. (Westminster, Md.,1946). a. b. emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to a.d. 1500 (Oxford 1957–59) 1:607–610; A Biographical Register of the Scholars of the University of Cambridge before 1500 (Cambridge 1963) 198–201. e. bettoni, Enciclopedia Filosofica, (Venice-Rome 1957) 4: 463–472. p. raymond, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique (Paris 1950) 4.2:1865–1947. É. h. gilson, History of Christian Philosopphy in the Middle Ages (New York 1955) 454–464, 763–768; Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales (Paris 1952). o. schÄfer, Bibliographia de vita, operibus et doctrina Iohannis Duns Scoti doctoris subtilis ac mariani, saec. XIX–XX (Rome 1955); Johannes Duns Scotus, v. 22 (1953) of Bibliographische Einführungen in das Studium der Philosophie, ed. i. m. bocheŃski (Bern 1948–). b. de saint–maurice, John Duns Scot: A Teacher for Our Times, tr. c. duffy (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1955). a. b. wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Washington 1946). m. j. grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus (Washington 1944). c. l. shircel, The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Washington 1942). j. k. ryan and b. m. bonansea, eds., John Duns Scotus 1265–1965 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Washington 1965). s. d. dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," Routledge History of Philosophy, v. 3, Medieval Philosophy (London 1998). l. honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens: Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Münster 1989). w. a. frank and a. b. wolter, Duns Scotus: Metaphysician (West Lafayette, Ind. 1995). o. boulnois, Tre et représentation: une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (XIII ^e–XIV ^e siècle) (Paris 1999). r. cross, Duns Scotus, v. 1 in the series Great Medieval Thinkers, ed. b. davies, o.p. (Oxford 1999).

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