FREE WILL AND PROVIDENCE

That God has a providence implies that He has omniscience and omnipotence and that His providence extends to all things. A question concerning man's free will arises. How can this exist if his every action is eternally foreseen and determined?

Pre-Christian Thought. Among the Greeks the denial of freedom was common. In the universe there is an inescapable law, devoid of intelligence and love, determining every event, binding men and gods. This is destiny, necessity, or inflexible fate. Even those who admitted a supreme being's existence, providence, and man's freedom did not always clearly perceive these realities. Thus Plato held to a hierarchy of gods; Aristotle was a monotheist. Both discussed human liberty not as a special power of the will but more in a political or social context.

Jewish thought asserted the existence of divine providence and human freedom. Deuteronomy clearly stated the ability to choose between good and evil. If Josephus' statement (Antiquities 18.1.3–5) is accepted, at the time of the second Temple the Sadducees, to safeguard man's liberty, denied God's influence in his actions. The Essenes are pictured as having been absolute determinists. The Pharisees seemed to have held a middle position, admitting the creature's liberty in certain matters.

Christian Thought. With a deeper notion of man's supernatural destiny, the question of human liberty under the mysterious influence of predestination to grace and final glory became more complex in the Christian Era. Gnosticism, which in some cases rejected responsibility, and Manichaeism, with its denial of freedom, gave no answer. Augustine set forth the difficulty when he wrote that some so defend the grace of God that they deny man's free will; and others so defend man's free will that they deny the grace of God (Grat. et lib. arb. 1.1; Patrologia Latina 44:881). He himself maintained that the divine precepts of the Old and New Testaments would be worthless without freedom (ibid. 2.2, Patrologia Latina 44:882; 2.4, Patrologia Latina 44:883).

St. Thomas Aquinas affirmed both divine providence and man's freedom. God's knowledge and existence are not the same as those of His creatures. He does not know things successively but with one eternal act; otherwise He would be subject to change and imperfection (Summa theologiae 1a, 14.4; 14.7). Nor does He exist in time (Summa theologiae 1a, 14.13 ad 3). Thus the manner and limitations of created intelligence and power must not be ascribed to Him. On the other hand man is free. If he were not, counsels, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be purposeless (Summa theologiae 1a, 83.1). To harmonize these two truths Thomas distinguished between primary and secondary causality. To be free the creature need not be the first but only the secondary cause of his actions. An analogy is proposed. When man makes something, he works on an already existing thing, yet he is the real cause of what is produced. God is the first cause of all things; man, acting under His influence, is the true secondary cause of his own actions (Summa theologiae 1a, 83.1 ad 3).

This reasoning applies both to natural and supernatural providence, but with a difference. Strictly speaking the former is not beyond human understanding; yet such understanding is incomplete. Man's knowledge of the divine essence is not proper but analogical; this is imperfect because it is only proportional. The teaching of faith, while only morally necessary here, increases certitude. In the supernatural order, however, man's liberty under grace and predestination to eternal life is a mystery; the created intelligence alone cannot prove it; an appeal to faith is, therefore, absolutely necessary.

The core of the argument on faith is had in the Church's response to various errors. Martin Luther maintained that divine providence and omnipotence were incompatible with human freedom. Original sin also left permanent damage. Free will exists only in God. If applied to man, it should be restricted to things below him, such as the right to use or not use his goods or possessions. In matters of salvation or damnation he is a captive either to the divine will or to that of Satan. M. Baius taught that without grace man is not free; he can only sin.

The Council of Trent affirmed that in Adam's sin man lost his original innocence; his will, though weakened, remains free; under the influence of actual grace it can consent or dissent (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum, ed. A. Schönmetzer (32d ed. Freiburg 1963) 1521, 1554). St. Pius V asserted that even without grace man naturally has the choice between good and evil (Enchiridion symbolorum 1927). Vatican Council I mentioned both divine providence and man's freedom:

All things which He founded God by His providence protects and governs, "reaching from end to end mightily and governing all things well" (cf. Wis 8.1). "For all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb 4.13), even those things which are future by the free actions of creatures." [h. denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 3003.]

In the post-Tridentine period a controversy arose among Catholic theologians concerning the divine influence and human freedom. Luis de molina, SJ, proposed his system of scientia media. From all eternity God knows what use each individual will make of his free will. With His aid the creature makes its own self-determination; His decree, either absolute or permissive, follows such choice (see molinism). Domingo Báñez, OP, maintained an eternal but free predetermination of man's actions (see bÁÑez and baÑezianism).

Depending on its concept of God and human freedom, modern philosophy often gives a different picture. When it denies the supernatural order, as does Deism, it rules out consideration of the mystery of grace and free will. When it is materialistic it denies true liberty. Many psychologists hold that man's conviction of freedom as the result of personal experience is an illusion.

Bibliography: augustine, The Problem of Free Choice, tr. and annot. m. pontifex (Ancient Christian Writers 22; 1955). a. d'alÈs, Providence et libre arbitre (2d ed. Paris 1927). v. j. bourke, Will in Western Thought (New York 1964). j. de finance, Existence et liberté (Lyons 1955). a. c. gigon, Divinae scientiae causalitas quoad res temporales humanamque libertatem (Fribourg 1948). r. hourcade, "Prescience et causalité divines," Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 39 (1938) 181–203. l. jerphagnon, Servitude de la liberté? Liberté-providence-prédestination (Paris 1958). m. pontifex, Freedom and Providence (New York 1960). c. spicq, "Liberty according to the N.T.," Spiritual Life 6 (1960) 323–336. w. g. thompson, "The Doctrine of Free Choice in Saint Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies 18 (1958) 1–8.

[e. j. carney]