MATERIALISM, DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL

Dialectical materialism and historical materialism are two components of the philosophy associated with Marxism-Leninism, the theory of communism. This theory, apart from its distinctive philosophy, embraces also political economy and scientific socialism. Political economy deals with the analysis of capitalist and socialist economic structures; its theoretical sections overlap those of historical materialism. Scientific socialism, though not fully developed within Marxism-Leninism, is supposed to deal with the realization of theory in practice. Philosophy itself is there defined as the science of the most general laws of nature, society, and human thought. Since it is divided into dialectical materialism and historical materialism, these constitute the main divisions of the present treatment.

Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism is pleonastically defined as the science of the most general laws of nature, society, and human thought. Thus it is given the same definition as philosophy in general, although in actual practice it is concerned only with the formal components that enter also into historical materialism.

General Characteristics. Dialectical materialism, as the central component of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, is purported to be a complete philosophical system, containing all the disciplines necessary for an explanation of reality. Nothing is regarded as outside its purvey. Moreover, it is said to be scientific, and this in two senses. First, it is proposed as the only contemporary philosophical system capable of explaining the world in accord with the results of progress in modern science; secondly, it is scientific in the sense that it operates according to scientific rules and logical procedures. This philosophy is also said to be Marxist, again with two meanings. First, it is Marxist because it is supposedly the doctrine of Karl marx as developed and passed on by Friedrich engels and V. I. Lenin. Secondly, it is Marxist because it is revolutionary, providing the world outlook of the "revolutionary Marxist party." It is the philosophy of the proletariat, permitting the victorious march toward communism.

Materialist Aspects. As a materialism, dialectical materialism derives from a long tradition and shares some of the characteristics of previous materialisms, especially those of the 18th and 19th centuries. First, it is a thorough-going rationalism. All that is can be known and explained; what now is unexplained will remain so only temporarily. Secondly, it is a complete scientism; the natural sciences are proposed as the last word in human knowing, and all philosophical activity must be based on the certitude provided by science. Thirdly, it is antimetaphysical (in the traditional sense of the term metaphysics) and, by the same token, antiphilosophical.

Dialectical Aspects. To these fundamental characteristics that it shares with other materialisms, dialectical materialism adds the new note that it is a completely different materialism—a "dialectical" materialism. This overcomes the basic defect of previous materialisms, i.e., their mechanistic reduction of the higher forms of material reality to lower and simpler forms. Its dialectical character also attentuates the rigidity of the first three characteristics. Thus, dialectical materialism is rationalist, but talks of the "dialectic of absolute and relative truth [knowledge]"; it is scientistic but insists that philosophy cannot be reduced to a mere "science of sciences"; it is anti-metaphysical, yet it develops doctrines on being and other ontological categories.

Monist Determinism. Finally, there are two characteristics that, although they mark previous forms of materialism, are nevertheless distinctive in the form they take in dialectical materialism. The first is monism: dialectical materialism is purported to be a materialist monism, meaning that it recognizes one reality—matter. The second is determinism: the complete intelligibility of reality postulated by the rationalism of dialectical materialism is based on the affirmation "for every effect, a cause." In turn, each of these basic principles has a dialectical interpretation that supplies its distinctive flavor; behind the materialist monism there is a "dialectic of being and thought," and behind the determinism there is a "dialectic of chance and necessity."

Basic Doctrines. For dialectical materialism, philosophy begins with the "basic question" as to which is primary, being (matter) or thought (spirit): materialists give primacy to the first and idealists to the second. Accordingly, there are three main chapters to dialectical materialism's exposition of the content of philosophy, dealing respectively with matter, with dialectic, and with thought.

Matter. This is consistently defined in the epistemological terms first used by Lenin: "Matter is the philosophical category for the designation of that objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, reflected in sensations, [while] existing independently of them" (V. I. Lenin, Works 14.133, in Russian). All matter is in motion. Without motion, there is no matter; without matter, there is no motion. Space and time are existential forms of matter. Again, without space and time, there is no matter; without matter, there is no space and time. The unity of the world consists in its materiality.

Dialectic. The dialectic—the Hegelian element in dialectical materialism—has two different, albeit complementary, meanings. First, the distinct components of reality are all in mutual interconnection: reality forms an organic whole in which the identity of the components is fully recognizable only as a function of the whole. Secondly, this organicity is of a dynamic nature, and the dynamic rhythm is determined by the "basic laws of the dialectic." For Engels, there were three such laws; for Lenin, sixteen (in the form of "points"); for Stalin, four; for mid-20th-century Soviet philosophy, the three that follow.

First, the "law of the unity and conflict of contraries" designates the causa efficiens (and materialis ) of the movement of matter. Matter moves because the "real contradictions" it contains are in a triadic conflict that leads from "thesis vs. antithesis" to "synthesis"; this, in its turn, constitutes a new "thesis" for the continuation of the eternal process. Second, the "law of the transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes" defines the nature of the movement of matter: the accumulation of a series of changes in quantity leads to a leap (skačok ), the result of which is a qualitative change. Finally, the "law of negation of negation" explains the continuity of material reality throughout the process of change: in negating the "antithesis" (which is the negation of the "thesis"), the "synthesis" preserves all that was "positive" in the other two, but does this on a (qualitatively) higher plane.

Thought. Thought, or consciousness (soznanie ), is for dialectical materialism—again following Lenin—a reflection (otraženie ) of material (objective) reality. Knowledge progresses through the attainment of "relative" truths to the possession of "absolute" truths. Absolute truth is an ideal limit, but there are some "absolute truths" already known to man, e.g., the basic laws of the dialectic. Truth is the correspondence of thought to reality; but it is also the process of the accumulation of relative truths. "Practice," or practical transformatory activity, is the basis of knowledge and the criterion of truth. It is the basis of knowledge because only in work does man come into concrete contact with reality and with problems that cognitive activity must solve; it is the criterion of truth because only by verifying his ideas in practical activity can man see if they correspond to reality. Logic, the "logical," is a summary of the essential points of the "historical," which is reality in all its diversity. Thought (the "subjective dialectic") is, as a reflection of reality (the "objective dialectic"), abstract: the opposition of subject and object can be overcome only by an "ascent from abstract to concrete" (vosxoždenie ot abstraktnomu do konkretnogo ).

Origins and Development. Although elements of dialectical materialism can be traced to most of the previous materialisms, especially the scientific materialism of 19th-century Germany represented by Karl Vogt, Ludwig Büchner, Jakob Moleschott, et al., its real formation began with the "Hegelian left," M. Stirner, D. F. Strauss, L. feuerbach, B. Bauer, and K. Marx (see hegelianism and neo-hegelianism). This radical reaction to Hegelian idealism stressed a philosophy of action and advocated a pure rationalism. Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums (1841) explained away religion as the creation and worship by man of an "alienation" (God) that was merely his conception of the ideal man. Marx made this notion fundamental, and pushed the analysis of alienation down to its economic roots. For him, all alienations—religious, civic, political—are derived from a basic alienation that is economic, i.e., that of man from his work and its fruits: this is a "dehumanization," because work is the prime property of man. Man is here conceived as the sum of his material needs and work as the means of satisfying them. But, it was Engels, not Marx, who—in his Dialectics of Nature (published posthumously 1925) and Anti-Dühring (1878)—began the development of dialectical materialism as such. Historically seen, dialectical materialism is a distillation made by Engels from Marx's historical materialism. Lenin, while giving a revolutionary twist to historical materialism, developed the epistemology of dialectical materialism in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909). Stalin's contribution to dialectical materialism (a chapter in the History of the Communist Party of 1938) is a popular presentation of the basic doctrines of Lenin.

Communist philosophy as promulgated by proponents in the Soviet Union falls into three periods: (1) from the death of Lenin (1924) to the decision of 1930; (2) from 1930 to 1947; and (3) from 1947 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. The first period was marked by intense philosophical activity that culminated in the discussion between the "Deborinites" (followers of A. M. Deborin, a Hegelian) and the "mechanicists," or fundamentalist materialists. This discussion was decided by Stalin in favor of an orthodox wing, led by M. B. Mitin. Stalin's intervention discouraged independent philosophical thought, and the second or "quiet" period was marked by the dominance of "quotationism," where Soviet philosophers limited themselves to repeating what the "classics" (Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin) had said. The third period was again one of intense activity. It began with the 1947 discussion of G. F. Aleksandrov's History of Western European Philosophy. Although this book was condemned for its "neutrality," Stalin—through A. A. Ždanov—encouraged Soviet philosophers to develop fresh views and gave them permission to do so.

The final period was marked by several discussions of some importance. The discussion of logic in 1950–51 dealt with the nature of dialectical logic and its relation to formal logic; it was decided that the dialectical logic of the classics is a higher form of logic, of which formal logic represents only a special case. The discussion on psychology (1950) decreed a "re-Pavlovization" of Soviet psychology, but failed to resolve the basic problem of the relationship between matter and spirit. The 1957 discussion on practice as an epistemological category has led to a redefinition of practice as "sense-contact." A large-scale attempt to develop dialectical logic as a logic began in 1958.

The most significant event of this period was Stalin's intervention in 1950 on the question of language. A Soviet linguist, N. J. Marr, had proposed that a theory of proletarian language be developed because of the unique class position of the proletariat. As it has its own art and philosophy, so the proletariat must have its own linguistic superstructure corresponding to its base. Stalin rejected this proposal, maintaining that language was one of the instruments of production, that it was not a part of the superstructure and, therefore, was not class-bound. Soviet philosophers took advantage of this loosening of the dogmatic strictures and argued that since logic is a matter of language, it is not class-bound either; and, since natural science is, like language, directly bound up with production, it too is not subject to class considerations. Thus, there was a general widening in the freedom of movement of Soviet philosophers and a restriction on the party's right to intervene in purely philosophical questions.

Influence and Critique. For better or worse, the influence of dialectical materialism on the philosophical currents of the Western world is almost nonexistent. With the exception of notorious communists or fellow travelers—Roger Garaudy in France, Maurice Cornforth in England, John Sommerville in the United States—only a few Western philosophers pay any serious attention to dialectical materialism. On the one hand, this is understandable since most of the valuable elements in this doctrine have been borrowed and simplified from other philosophers, notably Hegel and Aristotle; on the other, it is regrettable since, through historical materialism, this doctrine had a strong (though indirect) influence on the world's intelligentsia.

Thorough criticisms of dialectical materialism in general and of specific doctrines in particular are to be found in the books of Wetter and Bocheński (see bibliog.). The first thing that strikes one about this doctrine is its naïveté: almost all its affirmations are prephilosophical and commonsensical. Secondly, there is an obvious contradiction between the Hegelian dialectic and the basically realist epistemology. Again, the belligerent attitude of Soviet philosophers not only renders discussion unproductive; it also has a deleterious effect on the doctrine itself, since only the polemically useful parts are developed. Finally, there is a fundamental dishonesty in a philosophy that maintains rank nonsense in order to prove an extraphilosophical point, e.g., its tenacity in affirming the existence of real contradictions in order to eliminate God. Soviet philosophers did not realize that putting the source of movement within matter was no explanation; or that their fear of the introduction of God was unfounded, since the philosopher's concept of deity (prime mover, etc.) does not necessarily entail the personal God of Revelation.

Historical Materialism

Historical materialism is dialectical materialism as applicable or applied to society and history. It is the study of society and history in terms of the categories and laws of dialectical materialism. Like the latter, it is complete, scientific, and revolutionary. It is materialist insofar as it considers the production of material goods basic. It is dialectical because it is "historicist," i.e., history is conceived as the evolution of reality and humanity, and these, as explained above, form an organic whole. Finally, it conforms epistemologically to dialectical materialism, where thought is a reflection of being, since "social thought" (ideology) is defined as a reflection of "social being" (production).

Basic Doctrines. The basic elements of the Marxist-Leninist explanation of society and history are the forces of production (tools, raw materials, muscular power, etc.) and the relations of production (commercial relations like those between worker and employer, creditor and debtor, etc.). The relations of production form the "base" of society and determine the "superstructure" (political and legal doctrines, art, philosophy, and religion). Since the base is in constant evolution (all matter is in movement), and since the superstructure tends by nature to lag, there develops a tension expressing itself in the formation of classes that can be exhaustively divided into two main groups, the "progressive" and the "reactionary." These main classes are the "contradictories" in society and their conflict follows the basic laws of the dialectic.

History falls into five main periods, according to the dominant forces and relations of production and classes: primitive, ancient, feudal, capitalist, and socialist. The tension between classes builds up (quantitative changes) to a "revolutionary situation": revolution is a leap in which a new qualitative situation comes to be wherein one class negates the other. The ideologies are reflections of the base, i.e., of the class-conditions of their exponents. Thus, bourgeois ideology (philosophy, art, etc.) serves the interests of the exploiters, while proletarian ideology (Marxism-Leninism) serves the interests of the proletarian masses; the latter are the best interests of all of humanity. The Communist party, which is the "vanguard," "conscience," and "honor" of the proletariat, therefore represents the best interests of all of humanity and is entitled to govern all domains. Mankind, finally, is moving toward a final state of paradise on earth, communism, and it is led to this goal by the proletariat, i.e., by the Communist party.

Origins and Development. Elements of historical materialism are to be found in the writings of Jean Jacques rousseau, saint-simon, Fourrier, et al., but its true founder was Karl Marx. Engels contributed little to its formulation. Lenin attenuated Marx's economic determinism with his revolutionary voluntarism; he affirmed that revolution did not have to wait for changes in the economic base, but could be effected by a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries. Stalin's only contribution of note was the interpretation of language mentioned above.

Influence and Critique. It is difficult to overestimate the influence that this doctrine had, especially on the nonphilosophical intelligentsia. For those who put a price on certainty in the explanation of social and historical events, historical materialism purported to offer a doctrine that is simple (two basic elements), clear (everything follows from the conflict of these two), inspiring (history has a glorious goal), and directive (one knows what to do to aid history). Add to this the fact that the whole doctrine is couched in seemingly simple terms, and it becomes easy to see why it was most popular among the substitutes for religion in the twentieth century.

Yet historical materialism was also an a priori schematism with a conceptual coherence almost completely lacking in the events it was supposed to explain. Secondly, its conceptual apparatus was much too rough: e.g., the notion of class, which is fundamental, was always left vague. Finally, it was based on several gratuitous assumptions, e.g., on the nature of man, the origin of society, and "communism of the future," which were all unacceptable, the last shown to be false with the fall of the USSR in 1989.

Bibliography: g. a. wetter, Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union, tr. p. heath (New York 1959), ample bibliography. i. m. bocheŃski, Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (3d ed. Bern 1960), ample bibliography. For more analytic treatment of special questions, see the books in the series sovietica (Institute of East-European Studies, University of Fribourg). Also ref. Studies in Soviet Thought, quarterly of the same institute. t. j. blakeley, Soviet Philosophy: A General Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Thought (Dordrecht, Holland 1964).

[t. j. blakeley]