MOLINISM

A system of theological thought concerning God's perception of the free futuribles and futures through His middle knowledge (scientia media ), the conciliation of efficacious grace and free will, some aspects of predefinition, predestination, reprobation, and the nature of internal actual grace. It is called Molinism because it was fathered by Luis de molina, although not explicitly stated by him in its modern formulation. This article explains the Molinist position on the topics mentioned above, and compares Molinism with congruism. Grace hereafter in this article always means internal actual grace.

Futuribles, Middle Knowledge, Futures. The free futurible, unlike the possible, is always one definite thing, whose being is "would be." It is therefore always infallibly known by God's infinite intelligence. Being only a conditional existent, it requires only a subjectively conditional decree in God—"Thomas would believe if God gave him grace." Consequently, God knows free futurible acts of creatures prior to His absolute decrees about them. This is God's middle knowledge—middle between His knowledge supposing no decrees (possibles) and that supposing subjectively absolute decrees (futures).

Less important is the question of how God knows free futuribles before His absolute decrees. Molinists agree that they cannot be known by God in Himself as determining their objective truth, for example, that a creature would consent to, rather than reject God's grace, if it were given. Any divine decree or grace determining futurible consent would have to derive its determining power from its very nature and would therefore conflict with any creature's power of futurible dissent. Hence any grace that God would give to men, though always inclining to good, must of its nature not determine man's futurible consent rather than dissent. Hence futuribles cannot be known in God's futurible decrees or graces as determining them. In the conditional order, God's grace is efficacious entirely from man's free futurible consent and can be known as efficacious only presupposing this fact.

Beyond this point Molinists dispute among themselves whether God's middle knowledge perceives the futuribles in God, as in a mirror reflecting their futurible being without determining it. Many Molinists, considering this impossible, say free futuribles are known by God only directly and immediately in themselves. This means that the "would be" of the futurible is sufficient objective reason why it terminates the divine cognition, itself subjectively activated by the divine essence to know whatever has determinate being. Some Molinists say God sees the futuribles in His "supercomprehension" (Molina never uses the word) of the human will—He sees the will and the act proceeding from it, and this seems equivalent to the preceding theory.

Molinists conceive that man would determine himself to consent to, rather than reject God's grace, if it were given. God's grace of its very nature would give sufficient power to consent; but its effectiveness to produce conditional consent, rather than dissent, arises solely from the fact that man would freely choose to consent, for reasons which would seem good to him. Man shares the determining power of God in the futurible order, but God gave such power to man by creating him free. Just as man is an agent by sharing God's productive power, so is he a free agent by sharing God's determining power.

Therefore, the reason that God has at His disposal efficacious and inefficacious graces is not that there are two intrinsically different kinds of grace; it is the fact that man would freely consent to some and would freely resist others.

Absolute futures, whatever "will be," are known by God, according to Molinism, in His absolute decree to give that grace, to which by middle knowledge He had foreseen man would consent or not, as the case may be. This absolute decree fulfills the condition upon which man's futurible action depended for its future existence. It changes "would consent" to "will consent." It predefines the future free consent of man, even before that consent is given, and definitely precontains it. In it, as in a mirror, God knows infallibly, by knowledge "of vision," man's future consent.

By this absolute divine decree, man's future acts become from all eternity events of human history, occurring in due time, and God is the "Lord of History," who has "got the whole world in His hands." For as He alone has power to distribute His graces and distributes them as He wills, He decides all future events and could just as well have given man other graces, which He foresaw man would resist, if they were given, thereby changing the course of history. By this decree He differentiates the saint from the sinner; by it also, made freely with knowledge of what would happen, every good human action becomes God's special benefit to man.

Conciliation of Efficacious Grace with Free Will. The efficacious grace, which God decrees to give man in the absolute order of time, has its efficacy or infallible ability to obtain man's future consent, not from man's consent, but before that consent is given. Yet it is a dogma of faith that, under the influence of grace that works, man's will is free (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum, ed. A. Schönmetzer [Freiburg 1963] 1554). Hence the question: whence does efficacious grace derive its infallible power to obtain man's future consent without detriment to human liberty?

There are today two probable answers to the question. One is: from the internal nature of efficacious grace, which, prior to any consideration of man's reaction to it, differs intrinsically from inefficacious grace. There are several ways of describing this grace. Molinists say: not from the internal nature of grace, but from external sources consequent upon man's futurible reaction to it. Molinists unanimously reject the first solution, especially because it seems destructive of human liberty. It also seems to eliminate ineffective, but truly sufficient grace.

Positively, Molinists unanimously say all efficacious grace derives its infallible power to obtain man's future consent from three extrinsic sources: (1) the objective fact that man would freely consent to a grace if it were given, that is, from man's futurible consent; (2) God's foreknowledge of that fact, before He absolutely decrees to give the grace, that is, from His middle knowledge; and (3) from God's benevolent absolute decree to give this grace, in the light of that foreknowledge, for reasons known to God—not necessarily because man would consent.

This grace does not conflict with man's liberty or power of dissent, even when it is acting on man's will, because its whole connection with man's future consent arises from the original supposition that man would freely consent to it, if it were given, and not from the intrinsic nature of the grace. This grace, when given, takes from man the act of dissent, but leaves intact the power.

This implies the doctrine that liberty is not an act, but an active power of the will to determine itself to act or not act when all the prerequisites for action are present. The will has the passive capacity to receive these prerequisites, such as motivation and divine grace. These remove the passive indifference of the will toward action; but when they are present, there must remain in the will, if free, active power to determine itself to act or not act. A gasoline tank has the passive capacity to receive a lighted match, but no active power to explode or not once the match is thrown in. When the will has motivation and God's grace acting on it, it still has the active power to respond or resist. This, according to Molinism, is freedom; and this is preserved in the Molinist explanation of efficacious grace. According to Molinism, efficacious and inefficacious (purely sufficient) graces do not differ in their internal structure; grace, so far as its inner nature is concerned, can be effective in one person, not in another; to graces intrinsically alike one will consent, another dissent; no new entity need be added to the inner make-up of sufficient grace to render it efficacious; efficacious grace is of its nature repudiable; although efficacious grace intrinsically is not a greater benefit than inefficacious, it is in its totality, because it is willingly given by God, in the light of His knowledge that man would consent to it.

Predestination, Predefinition, Reprobation. In the order of time or execution, God gives the reward of glory to adults after and on account of merit, but there has always been dispute among Catholic theologians about the order of intention. Does God first absolutely intend, for His own reasons, to give the reward of glory to some (formal predestination), and consequently absolutely intend that they acquire merit, and so absolutely intend that they receive graces infallibly procuring these acts (formal predefinition); and does He consequently "not elect" other adults for glory prior to their foreseen death in sin (negative antecedent reprobation)? Or does He ordinarily simply will, for reasons known to Him, to give some men graces, with which He had foreseen they would correspond, thereby decreeing their meritorious acts (virtual predefinition), and only after and on account of these foreseen future merits, intend to give them the crown of glory (virtual predestination), while the rest He positively intends to reprobate on account of their foreseen death in sin (positive consequent reprobation)?

One's response to these quotations is ultimately linked with one's response to the question (also debated among Catholics): Under what condition does God will to save all men in the order of intention? Is it some consideration prior to the foreseen state of man's death, like the predetermined order of the universe, or manifestation of God's glory, or some other reason known to God, or is it solely the foreseen state of man at death?

Most non-Molinists hold the first opinion, as do many who follow Molina on grace and free will (F. Suárez, Bellarmine), because this opinion can be maintained by one who holds God's middle knowledge of the futuribles; but Molina and strict Molinists (Lessius, G. Vázquez) hold the second position. To them the first opinion is unproved; it seems to liken God to one who promises a reward, for which all are to strive, and then arbitrarily chooses only certain ones to be the winners— which seems to nullify God's universal salvific will. These think that the final purpose of God, our Father, is the communication of His goodness to us. The final end of men, His children, is the order of the universe, the manifestation of God's glory; but as men are free, God cannot absolutely intend this end, which involves the number of the saved, except as it proves obtainable by the free cooperation of men.

Strict Molinists, in affirming this position, say God would have given men the same graces and would have permitted sins, had He foreseen their rejection. The fact of God's permission of sin must be faced by any theory. According to Molinism God gives men inefficacious grace, with which man infallibly sins; but the inefficacy is due, not to some deficiency in the grace, but solely to the fact that men would freely reject it if it were given. When God gives men grace foreseen as ineffective, He gives it, in spite of its inefficacy, with a sincere intention of efficacy; for the grace is truly sufficient, and its ineffectiveness is due, not to the grace, but entirely to man's free dissent. Of course God could give other graces, to which man would respond, but He does not, so great is His respect for human liberty.

The strict Molinist doctrine, up to this point, may be summarized as follows:

(1) By "simple intelligence" God sees the possibility of creating A and B, of giving them truly sufficient grace, with which both can be saved.

(2) God decrees to create both, to give them sufficient graces, and, if they cooperate, merit and glory— God's universal salvific will, antecedent, conditioned solely on man's future cooperation with grace.

(3) By middle knowledge God sees A would cooperate with grace, if it were given, and would be saved; and that B would do the opposite.

(4) God absolutely decrees, for His own reasons (here is the mystery of predestination), to give to A graces, to which He foresaw A would consent, if they were given, out of predilection for him; and to give B truly sufficient grace, from which He foresaw B would dissent, if it were given. God loves B, but does not force Him—virtual predefinition of the good acts of A; permission of the sins of B. Their good acts and sins are now absolute futures.

(5) By "vision" God sees in these decrees the meritorious acts of A, the sins of B as absolute futures.

(6) God absolutely intends to give A the crown of glory on account of his absolutely future merits; and positively to reprobate B on account of his absolutely future demerits—virtual predestination of A to glory on account of merit in order of intention; also in the same order the positive reprobation of B consequent on demerit. No antecedent reprobation.

(7) A in time performs meritorious acts, B commits sin.

(8) God in time gives glory to A and punishment to B, on account of their merits and demerits— predestination and positive reprobation on account of final merits and demerits in the order of execution.

Nature of Actual Grace. All Catholic theologians agree that indeliberate acts of thought and volition, which draw man to a good free act, pertain to the complex of actual grace. All Molinists agree that actual grace is not a supernatural entity determining the will to the subsequent choice to do that to which it is drawn. Beyond this they differ. Some (e.g., L. Billot) say actual grace is a nondetermining, supernatural entity injected into the faculties by God. Others (Molina, Suárez) hold actual grace to be solely the acts of intellect and will elevated to the supernatural order by God's simultaneous concursus.

Molinism and Congruism. Because Suárez and Bellarmine have really different opinions from Molina and Lessius regarding predestination and allied topics, and occasional differences of expression, it is sometimes alleged that there are two systems, congruism and Molinism. Congruism is said to hold that grace is efficacious because God so tempers it to man's disposition and circumstances that the will infallibly but nevertheless freely consents to it.

However, this tempering merely explains grace's sufficiency, not its efficacy, why it will infallibly get man's consent. This, the crucial point, Suárez and Bellarmine explain exactly as Molina does. On this point there is no system of congruism as opposed to Molinism.

See Also: bÁÑez and baÑezianism; congregatio de auxiliis; free will and grace; free will and providence; freedom; grace, controversies on; grace, efficacious; grace, sufficient; omniscience; theology, history of; will of god

Bibliography: e. vansteenberghe, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. ed. a. vacant et al., (Paris 1903–50) 10.2:2094–2187. f. stegmÜller, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, ed. j. hofer and k. rahner (Freiberg 1957–65) 7:526, 527–530. r. konetzke, Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen 1957–65) 4:1088–89. l. de molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis … concordia, ed. j. rabeneck (Oña 1953). b. beraza, De gratia Christi (2d ed. Bilbao 1929). j. m. dalmau, Sacrae theologiae summa, ed. Fathers of the Society of Jesus, Professors of the Theological Faculties in Spain (Madrid 1962) 2.1:1–582. s. gonzÁlez, ibid. 3.3:1–352. h. lange, De gratia (Freiburg 1929). j. brodrick, The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Francis Cardinal Bellarmine, 2 v. (London 1927–28) v.2. a. c. pegis, "Molina and Human Liberty," Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance, ed. g. smith (Milwaukee 1939) 75–131. H. Rondet, Gratia Christi (Paris 1848).

[f. l. sheerin]