Police Offenses
POLICE OFFENSES
POLICE OFFENSES , offenses arising in connection with the prevention of public mischief and for the maintenance of public security, as laid down in the Bible, that have formed the basis for elaborate regulations in later periods of Jewish law. Thus, the biblical injunction against false weights and measures (Deut. 25:13–15) led to the appointment of special inspectors who were authorized not only to enter shops and ascertain the accuracy of weights and measures in use, but also to impose penalties, e.g., *floggings or *fines. Similarly, the biblical injunction against *fraud (Lev. 25:14, 17) and *oppression (Lev. 19:13) led to the prohibition of profiteering and to the appointment of special officers charged with the supervision of prices (cf. Yoma 9a); and profiteers too were liable to be flogged. *Gambling and betting were prohibited as if they were species of larceny, and so were such potentially injurious acts as hunting in populated areas or taking animals already captured in the trap of another (Yad, Gezelah 6:8–12). The biblical injunctions for the protection of animals (Deut. 22:4, 6–7; Ex. 23:5) gave rise to the prohibition against hurting any living creature (bm 32a, b), and led to the elaboration of rules for the prevention of collisions between loaded animals in the street, and hence also between ships and vehicles (Yad, Roẓe'aḥ 13:11–12).
The injunction that "you shall not bring bloodguilt on your house" (Deut. 22:8) was interpreted as not limited to the traditional requirement of providing a *parapet for the roof lest anyone should fall from it, but as extending to any act or omission likely to endanger human life (Yad. loc. cit.). It is no excuse for a man to say that his conduct endangers himself too; even if he chooses to disregard his own safety, he cannot disregard that of others – and he is liable to be flogged if he does. Thus the supply or consumption of unclean or noxious food or water is prohibited (ibid., 11:7–16), and so is the creation of any danger to the public (bk 27a–30a). There are also express provisions for the annual inspection of streets and thoroughfares by officers of the court to make sure they are not damaged by rain and are safe for traffic (Tosef. Shek 1:1). Where particular roads or journeys were dangerous, the court would appoint officers to accompany travelers and guard their safety; if they failed in watchfulness, the officers were regarded as if they had shed innocent blood (Yad. Evel 14:3). Where there were dangers of overcrowding or public licentiousness, court officers would mingle among the crowds to maintain law and order (Yad, Yom Tov 6:21).
The biblical prohibition against a woman putting on a man's clothing, and vice versa (Deut. 22:5), may have served as the authority and pattern for later regulations governing dress and appearance. As dressing in the clothing of the opposite sex was regarded as conduct conducive to sexual perversion, so was dressing in the gentile fashion regarded as a first step toward assimilation. Sumptuary laws against extravagance and luxury became increasingly frequent, not only to prevent the following of the practices of gentiles (cf. Lev. 20:23), but also to ensure humility in walking before God (cf. Micah 6:8). Penalties were imposed mostly as fines, but we find also public denunciations (see *Ḥerem). In some places, regulations were also laid down to make certain dresses or robes obligatory, e.g., for judges and notables (Takkanot Mehrin, 530). Generally, the biblical injunction to appoint executive officers in addition to judges (Deut. 16:18) was interpreted as imposing a duty to attach to each court "men with sticks and rods, standing at the service of the judges, to patrol markets and streets, inspect shops, rectify prices and measures, and redress all injury: they act only on the orders of the court, and when they detect a breach of law, they bring it before the court for adjudication" (Yad, Sanhedrin 1:1). It appears that until the destruction of the Temple, petty offenses were not, in Jerusalem, brought before the ordinary criminal courts, but before two or three police courts (dayyanei gezerot, Ket. 13:1), who were sitting full time and therefore (in contradistinction to judges) entitled to remuneration (Ket. 105a).
[Haim Hermann Cohn]
Offenses that Harm the Entire Public
Particular severity attaches to offenses that harm the entire public, or any undefined group of people. Their severity stems from the fact that when a person causes an injustice to the public at large or an unidentified person or persons, he cannot directly rectify the injustice, neither to a specific person, nor to the society at large. An example of such an offense is stealing from the public, regarding which the Sages said, "Theft from the public is more severe than theft from an individual, because one who steals from an individual can compensate him by returning what he has stolen, while a person who steals from the public cannot compensate them by returning what he has stolen" (Tos. to bk (ed. Zuckermandel) 10:14). Another example of theft which cannot be compensated is an act of fraudin weights and measures (see *Weights and Measures): Rabbi Levi said, "The punishments for offenses relating to weights and measures are more severe than for sexual offenses" (bb 88b). The reason is explained by the posekim: "The punishment for [offenses concerning] weights and measures is very severe, because it is impossible for one who weighs and measures to repent properly" (Sh. Ar., Ḥm, 231: 19) – "Because it is impossible to restore [the amount improperly taken to its owners, since he cannot know to whom and how often he gave a [false] measure" (Sema to Sh. Ar., Ḥm, 231:34). The offender's act can be redressed to a certain extent by his working in community service for the benefit of the public, but this is not considered full redress, which necessitates returning the full return of what he has stolen to the victim (Rashbam, bb 88b).
Based on these principles, the Israeli Supreme Court decided on a severe sentencing policy against public officials who embezzled public funds (Cr. a 291/81, Ploni v. The State of Israel, 35 (4) 438; per Justice Menachem Elon).
Different Aspects of Police Activities
maintaining public order
The obligation to maintain public order has implications for the saving of life (pikku'aḥ nefesh), which, as is well known, overrides almost all biblical and rabbinical prohibitions. When a large public is concerned, the fear of jeopardizing lives is even greater. Thus, to prevent public damage and risk, even when the life threatening risk is not obvious, some authorities permit certain otherwise forbidden actions on Shabbat, precisely because the public is involved (Shab. 42b; Ḥidushei Haran, ad loc.; Yad, Shabbat 10: 25 and in Maggid Mishneh, ad loc.). Following the establishment of the State of Israel, these principles were relied upon to justify various aspects of police activity intended to maintain public order and peace, including various police activities on the Sabbath or operations entailing risk to the life of an individual in order to maintain the peace and security of the entire public.
the prohibition on the humiliating or interfering in the work of the police
The humiliation of policemen, who are officers of the court, is considered as contempt of court (see *Contempt of Court). A punishment of excommunication (see *Ḥerem) may be imposed on anyone found to have humiliated or interfered with the police in their work, even if based on the sole testimony of the policeman concerned. Policemen are exempt from liability if causing financial damage to a person who interfered in their work, and are even entitled to strike such individuals (Sh. Ar, Ḥm 8.5., Rema, ad loc.).
[Menachem Elon (2nd ed.)]
bibliography:
M. Block, Das mosaisch-talmudische Polizeirecht (1879); Frankel, Mishnah; C. Roth, in: jqr, 18 (1927/28), 357–83; et, 3 (1951), 63f.; J.R. Marcus, The Jew in the Medieval World (1960), 193–7. add. bibliography: M. Elon, Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1988), I:636, 642, 649f, 654, 663, 995, 1102; idem, Jewish Law, (1994) 2:788, 795, 803f, 809, 815, 820; 3:1203, 1325; idem, Jewish Law (Cases and Materials) (1999), 213–17; S. Yisraeli, Amud ha-Yemani (1991) no. 17; D. Nativ and M. Slae, in: Teḥumin, 1 (1980), 372–96; U. Dasberg and Y. Rozen, "Ha-Shabbat ba-Mishtarah," in: Teḥumin, 2 (1981) 66; I. Warhaftig, "Shimush be-Neshek Ḥam be-Pizzur Hafganot Allimot," in: Teḥumin, 3 (1982) 371–76.