CAMPBELL, DONALD THOMAS

(b. Grass Lake, Michigan, 20 November 1916;

d. Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 6 May 1996), psychology, anthropology, methodology of social science, education, evolutionary theory, epistemology, science studies.

Through his unique disposition to engage in fierce but always amicable intellectual exchange across disciplinary boundaries, inspiring teaching, and more than 240 publications, Campbell made significant contributions to a wide variety of disciplines. Campbell began his career in social and cross-cultural psychology with bench science–type contributions to such issues as leadership and subordination, conformity to groups, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. Even more influential were his methodological innovations, in particular the multitrait-multi-method matrix approach to construct validity and quasi-experimental designs for field research. With more than 4,200 citations, Campbell and Fiske’s “Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait Multi-method Matrix” (1959) is one of the most frequently read papers in social science, and more than 300,000 copies of Campbell and Stanley’s monograph on experimental and quasi-experimental designs (originally published as an article in 1963) have as of 2007 been sold (see also 1979a). This methodological work earned Campbell most of his many honors and awards. In the last fifteen years of his life, he devoted most of his attention to issues in epistemology and the philosophy and sociology of science. The blind-variation-and-selective-retention (BVSR) theme lies at the basis of his groundbreaking work in evolutionary epistemology (Callebaut and Pinxten, 1987; Hahlweg and Hooker, 1989) and subsequent program for a general selection theory, according to which all complex real systems are a result of a design or selection process (1997; cf. Wimsatt, 1986; Heyes and Hull, 2001).

Scholarly Career . Campbell’s father was a farmer who moved his family first to a cattle ranch in Wyoming and then to California, where he became an agricultural extension agent. Campbell described his religious parents, Arthur and Hazel, as treating children’s opinions with respect. Several of his family members belonged to Appalachian Bible-belt free churches, and although he had “by high school or early college … drifted away from whatever belief in God [he] had had as a child” (1988c, p. 21), he respected tradition, as evidenced by his presidential address to the American Psychological Association (1975a). He even “recognized in himself the zeal and persistence of an evangelical itinerant preacher” (Heyes, 2001, p. 2). After high school, he worked for a year on a turkey farm before going off to San Bernardino Valley Union Junior College, where he learned about evolutionary biology from a squirrel hunter.

In 1937 Campbell went to the University of California at Berkeley to study psychology. When he completed his undergraduate education there in 1939, he and his younger sister, Fayette, graduated first and second in their class. He was most influenced by Robert Tryon, whom he assisted as data analyst on a project examining inheritance of maze-running ability in rats; by the moderate behaviorist Edward Tolman, who treated organisms as goal-seeking; and by his “beloved Professor” Egon Brunswik, who was at the time Tolman’s assistant. After Campbell served his country’s war effort, he obtained his PhD from Berkeley in 1947 with a dissertation on “The Generality of Social Attitude.”

Campbell’s first appointment as assistant professor was at Ohio State University (1947–1950), where he taught social psychology, did research on opinion polling and leadership, and joined a regular philosophy of science table at which Kurt Wolff introduced him to the sociology of knowledge. When the relativistic sociology of science emerged thirty years later, Campbell, unlike his contemporaries, the sociologists Robert Merton and Edward Shils, would enthusiastically engage in critical dialogue with Bloor, Collins, Knorr Cetina, Latour, and others. He even dared ask Popper, “Why are you so hard on the relativists? After all, you say, ‘We don't know, we can only guess’ and you agree that the facts which ‘falsify’ theories are but conventions agreed to among the scientists working in the field” (Callebaut, 1993, p. 5; see also 1988d).

This epistemological interest was first reflected in his inaugural colloquium “On the Psychological Study of Knowledge” at the University of Chicago, where he was an assistant professor from 1950 to 1953, working first in the Committee on Education Research and Training in Race Relations, and subsequently in James Grier Miller’s Committee on Behavioral Sciences with its focus on cybernetics, general systems theory, and information theory. Campbell’s work on the relationships between W. Ross Ashby’s cybernetics and other natural selection analogues to learning and perception resulted in his first papers on evolutionary epistemology (1956a, b; 1959a), whereas information theory inspired his work on biases (systematic errors) on behalf of humans considered as links in communication systems (1958; cf. Wimsatt, 1980, a Campbellian exploration of biases in scientific research strategies).

Suffering under the publication pressure of the University of Chicago’s tough tenure policy, Campbell moved to Northwestern University’s Psychology Department in 1953, where he became tenured and spent very productive years working on social attitude measurement, ethnocentrism, and social science methodology, engaging in field work, and teaching social psychology and a seminar course on “Knowledge Processes” until his retirement as professor emeritus in 1979. During this period he was also a visiting associate professor at Yale University (1954), a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford (1965–1966), Fulbright lecturer and visiting professor in social psychology at Oxford (1968–1969), and visiting professor in psychology and social relations at Harvard University, where he delivered the William James Lectures of 1977 (circulated widely in preprint form and published later in 1987a, 1988b; see in particular 1988a).

In 1979, needing a new setting for personal reasons, Campbell moved to Syracuse University. From that time epistemology was his principal focus, resulting in a plethora of publications. In 1981 he co-organized the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference, which assembled naturalistic philosophers and relativistic sociologists of science along with psychologists, anthropologists, and historians of science—a rather unusual combination at that time, which prefigured a common practice in the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology some years later. Campbell was preoccupied with the justification of claims to knowledge and the issue of scientific validity (e.g., 1986, 1987b, 1997) and chided available evolutionary-epistemological histories of science for being “epistemologically vacuous” (1990, p. 1). He thought of ERISS as “a successful failure” in retrospect: “it failed utterly to address the agenda I had intended, mainly because the sociologists focused on a well-articulated skepticism, being unready for a speculative comparison of social systems of belief change and belief retention” (1988b, p. 25).

ERISS left no significant written record, but a conference (ERISS II) at Ghent University, Belgium, in 1984 that followed up this endeavor, with some of the same participants, did (Callebaut and Pinxten, 1987). It took several years to sort out the separate issues of realism (“theories represent aspects of the real world”) and rationalism (“there are rational principles for the evaluation of theories”) underlying the divide between the philosophers and the sociologists of science (Giere, 1988), which persisted into the early 2000s.

In 1982 Campbell followed his second wife, anthropologist Barbara Frankel, to Lehigh University, where he was appointed as university professor of sociology-anthropology, psychology and education. He remained active until his death, apparently from the complications of surgery, in 1996. Campbell had two sons, Martin and Thomas, with his first wife, Lola, and two grandchildren.

A Master of Many Disciplines . A social psychologist by disciplinary identification, Campbell was a “master of many disciplines” (Thomas, 1996). His sophisticated methodological suggestions were a constructive answer to his critical questioning of certain behaviorist and logical-positivist tenets such as perceptual foundationalism, epitomized by the imperative to define theoretical parameters operationally. They took into account rivaling, postpositivist philosophical positions, including critical or hypothetical realism, which leaves a role for “Nature herself” in “editing” claims to knowledge (1973a, 1993; see also 1974b, 1988d for Campbell’s assessment of Popper’s philosophy), Quine’s naturalized epistemology (1988a), Kuhn’s historicism (1988b), and even hermeneutics (e.g., 1986). He thus provided “conceptual bridges between the scientific and humanistic perspectives” on the methods, metatheory, and philosophy of social science (Overman, 1988) that helped revolutionize the fundamental principles of scientific inquiry common to all the social sciences, including evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1995). He endorsed “a common denominator among a quite diverse set of critics of logical positivism and sense data phenomenalism,” namely, that there is no nonpresumptive and infallible knowledge: “All knowledge claims go beyond their evidence, are highly presumptive and corrigible” (1969b, p. 42). Even the best of physical science experimentation “probes” theory rather than “proves” it.

Campbell contributed the concept of downward causation to the debate on reductionism in evolutionary biology: Biological systems are hierarchically structured, and there is downward causation whenever “the distribution of lower-level events and substances” is partially determined by higher-level factors (1974a, p. 180), that is, when a higher structure operates causally upon its substructure. With his “vehicles carrying knowledge” (1979b; not to be confused with Dawkins’s vehicles: Hull, 2001), he departed from the tendency of traditional epistemology (including Popper’s “epistemology without a knowing subject”) to treat belief and knowledge as disembodied and abstract. By calling attention to the specific physical nature of carriers of information (primordially genes in biological evolution; mosaics, paper, electronic chips, etc., in cultural evolution) and their inherent limitations, but also to the “social structural requirements of being a self-perpetuating social system,” he helped pave the way for the early twenty-first century, postcognitivist emphasis on distributed, embodied, and situated cognition and activity (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). Campbell (e.g., 1965) also was arguably the first scholar “to give cultural evolution its due weight without divorcing culture from biology” (Boyd and Richerson, 2005, p. 17), although he has sometimes been misunderstood as a residual dualist (but see Hull, 2001).

Through the cognitive turn in psychology of the 1970s and 1980s until the current, postcognitivist wave, Campbell remained true to a uniquely personal approach to the phenomenon of knowledge, “combining the rigor of his behaviorist education with the daring speculation of an evolutionist interested in that ephemeral organ called ‘mind’” (De Mey, 1997, p. 81).

Validity, Evaluation Design, and Social Experimentation . The behaviorism that Campbell confronted early in his career carried with it the expectation that personal traits, social attitudes, and behaviors can be observed and measured, and the conviction that the window on the world that the observable opens has epistemological primacy over scientists’ theorizing. Definitional operationalism was the claim that single measurement operations could be regarded as defining terms in a scientific theory. In Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) nomological network, developed as part of the American Psychological Association’s effort to develop standards for psychological testing, “laws” accordingly related observable manifestations among each other and to the network of concepts (theoretical constructs). A new construct or relation had to generate laws confirmed by observation, or reduce the number of laws required to predict observables (see Trochim, 2005).

Campbell considered definitional operationalism “positivism’s worst gift to the social sciences” (cf. Hull, 1988, on the use and abuse of operational definitions in physics and biology). He objected that the term “definition” acquires its major connotations in language and logic, where the concepts of synonymity and analytic truth are appropriate. But the names for important concepts in science, he argued, are of an altogether different kind; they are

contingent allegations of syndromes of attributes, … terms for entities given real status, and hence with innumerable attributes, known and unknown. What are loosely called “definitions” are in fact abbreviated descriptions used for designation. They contain not “essentials” nor even “defining attributes,” but instead those features useful in diagnosing the presence or absence of the object or process and useful in distinguishing it from similars with which it might otherwise be confused. (1988b, p. 31)

These “diagnostic descriptions” differ depending on the user: an ordinary dictionary definition of “cat” will have little or no overlap in mentioned features with that of, say, a paleontologist, and yet refers to the same “syndrome” while privileging a different abbreviated set of features. In place of definitional operationalism, Campbell proposed multiple operationalism (convergent operationalism, methodological triangulation). It is “on the grounds of self-critical hard-headedness that we face up to our very unsatisfactory predicament: we have only other invalid measures against which to validate our tests; we have no ‘criterion’ to check them against” (1988b, p. 33). Allied to this reasoning is Harvard biologist Richard Levins’s independent notion of our truth lying at the “intersection of independent lies” (Levins, 1966, p. 423).

The multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM) provides a concrete method for multiple operationalism (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). It is an approach to assessing the construct validity of a set of measures as part of an attempt to provide a practical methodology (as opposed to the nomological network idea, which was at best theoretically useful). Along with the MTMM, Campbell and Fiske introduced two types of construct validity: convergent validity, the degree to which concepts that should be related theoretically are interrelated in reality, and discriminant validity, the degree to which concepts that should not be related theoretically are, in fact, not interrelated in reality. To be able to claim that measures have construct validity one must demonstrate both convergence and discrimination. Both can be assessed using the MTMM. Trochim (2005) provides an introduction.

In addition to construct validity, three other types of validity may be distinguished in Campbell’s writing: internal validity, the attribution of cause to an intervention (see Bickman, 2000, vol. 2); external validity, the generalization of causal relationships (see Cook, 2000; Trochim, 2005); and statistical conclusion (see Elek-Fisk et al., 2000). In his view, validity was intimately related to social activism or planned social change (1973b), because social experimentation, say, with Head Start programs or programs to reduce highway fatalities, must be based on the concepts of validity and is never merely social activism (Bickman, 2000, vol. 1, p. viii). Campbell’s vision of the social scientist as “methodological servant of the experimenting society” (1973b) continued to spur controversial debate (e.g., Dunn, 1998), producing arguments to which he would have subscribed in part (1982).

Selection Theory Epistemology . “Between a modern experimental physicist and some virus-type ancestor there has been a tremendous gain in knowledge,” Campbell wrote in a programmatic 1960 article on evolutionary epistemology. He justified his extension of the usage of the term “knowledge” to nonhuman contexts, anathema to most philosophers and humanists at the time, as “part of an effort to put ‘the problem of knowledge’ into a behavioristic framework which takes full cognizance of man’s status as a biological product of an evolutionary development from a highly limited background, with no ‘direct’ dispensations of knowledge being added at any point in the family tree” (p. 380). And he noted that this position limits one to the third-person view of “an epistemology of the other one” (cf. 1969b). While the conscious knowledge processes of humans were recognized as “more complex and subtle” than those of lower organisms, he insisted that they cannot be taken as “more fundamental or primitive,” adding the ironical twist that “since the problem of knowledge has resisted any generally accepted solution when defined in terms of the conscious contents of the philosopher himself, little seems lost and possibly something gained by thus extending the range of processes considered” (1960, p. 380).

Whereas other approaches to evolutionary epistemology, such as that of Konrad Lorenz, remained silent on the actual relation of the ontogeny of knowledge to its phylogeny, or indeed on the basic character of knowledge itself in relation to the interaction of organisms with their environment (Campbell, 1975b), Campbell’s EE took into account that selection operates on many levels, comprising the social and, in the human case, the cultural (as does Piaget’s genetic epistemology: Parker et al., 2005). Just as EE in general was a child of the post-war penchant for interdisciplinary studies (cf. Campbell’s 1969a “fish-scale model of omniscience”), Campbell’s (1974b) nested hierarchy of vicarious selection processes was the product of systems-theoretical considerations.

In the evolutionary debates of the mid-twentieth century, an opposition between what in the early twenty-first century would be called eliminativists and those committed to preserving a role for “irreducible teleology” or “self-regulation” lingered on (Deacon, 2005, pp. 90–91). Authors such as Piaget and Bertalanffy rejected a view that reduced evolution to antecedent chance mutation honed by a posteriori competitive elimination, which was exactly the position Campbell embraced. When Bertalanffy pointed to “system, equifinality, emergent levels, wholes which shape parts, etc.” as “truths” that “any adequate biology and psychology must take account of” (Campbell’s words; 1973a, p. 1044), Campbell took on the theoretical challenge to explain these facts in terms of the natural selection model. He shared Bertalanffy’s emphasis on the role of language in focusing attention on limiting perspectives of reality and hence in shaping human view of reality. But he equally believed that “the structure of the physical world limits and edits the word meanings that can be taught and that can thus become parts of a working language” (1973a, p. 1043; cf. 1988a, pp. 450–464). Moreover, Campbell took BVSR processes to be fundamental to all increases in the fit of system to environment, including all genuine increases in knowledge (see, e.g., 1974b, 1986).

Although a “confirmed Weismannian-Darwinian,” Campbell was au fait with complementary and alternative developments in evolutionary theory past and present. This afforded him a much richer understanding of evolution than is currently common. In addition to the external selection that produces direct fit to the environment (1987a), his view gave prominence to internal factors of selection (cf. Wimsatt, 2007). When a salamander’s leg is lost, it regenerates to a length that is controlled, not by the external environment, but by an evolved internal monitor. The internal selector, then, is a “vicarious representative” of the external selector. Once organisms have become internally well-adjusted systems that fit their environment moderately well, they may remain stable over long periods of time while their environment changes, as internal selection takes priority over external selection (“punctuated equilibrium”).

It takes little imagination to grasp the heuristic power of viewing perceptual systems (in particular vision), human language, or cultural accomplishments as vicarious selectors. For instance, Piaget’s dialectic of assimilation and accommodation can be interpreted in terms of internal and external selection: For a while, “the child’s behavioral logic fits the world so well that he is willing to treat the world as being appropriately described by it until he can get another, internally coherent logic that fits it better, adapting still better to the environment” (Campbell in Callebaut, 1993, p. 296). The picture becomes even more exciting if one asks how the workings of one vicarious selector impinge on another—say, vision on language, or vice versa. A related unifying theme in Campbell’s writing is pattern matching (1966, 1997). Campbell (1974b) suggested a grand scheme of ten “more or less discrete” processes from “nonmnemonic” problem solving via vicarious locomotor devices, habit and instinct, to visually and mnemonically supported thought, observational learning and imitation, language, and cultural cumulation, including science. The many processes that “shortcut” a fuller BVSR process are, on Campbell’s view, themselves “inductive achievements”—products of previous BVSR processes. In addition, they contain in their own operation a BVSR process at some level, “substituting for overt locomotion exploration or the life-and-death winnowing of organic evolution” (1974b, p. 421). In his characteristic, self-mocking way, he called this program “dogmatic,” “utterly unjustified,” and “just a leap of faith” (Callebaut, 1993, p. 297).

A BVSR process requires mechanisms for introducing variation, consistent selection processes, and mechanisms for preserving and/or propagating the selected variation. In general, the generation and preservation mechanisms are inherently at odds, hence each must be compromised (1974b, p. 421). The process is “blind” or “unjustified” (1974c) in that the occurrence of trials must be uncorrelated with the “solution” (which is not the same as “random”). The activities of individual scientists are surely intentional, yet “at a higher level of organization, there may be more to Campbell’s thesis than one might at first think” (Giere, 1988, p. 222): An appreciation for the constraining role of cognitive resources and other nonepistemic interests suggests a picture far different from the classic view of science as a highly intentional activity. Wimsatt (1980) has suggested a rapprochement between Campbell’s vicarious selectors and the heuristics dear to computationalists within cognitive science. Campbell himself (in an unpublished letter to Herbert A. Simon, October 4, 1982) agreed that he and Simon were “not all that far apart on heuristics. I suspect that my nested hierarchy of vicarious, presumptive, BVSR processes will map into your n-level search processes.”

Among Campbell’s elected offices, his presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1975 stands out. The honors and awards he received include the APA’s Distinguished Contribution Award in 1969, nominations as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the National Academy of Sciences in 1973, and as a member of the American Philosophical Society in 1992. He received honorary degrees from the universities of Michigan (1974), Florida (1975), Chicago (1978), and Southern California (1979), Northwestern University (1983), and the University of Oslo (1985).

This brief intellectual biography has left out the preoccupations of “the householder, shopper, tourist, husband, father, friend and mortal man” that Campbell also was. He tackled these “with the same inspiring blend of deliberation and playfulness, faith and fallibilism” (Heyes, 1997, p. 299). More detailed information on Campbell’s life and work as well as personal recollections are provided in Callebaut (1993), Brewer and Cook (1997), and Stanley (1998); in issues of the journals Evolution and Cognition (Callebaut and Riedl, 1997), Philosophica (Callebaut, 1997), and the American Journal of Evaluation (1998); and in a number of volumes that were posthumously dedicated to Campbell (Dunn, 1998; Baum and McKelvey, 1999; Bickman, 2000; Heyes and Hull, 2001). But the most valuable source of information, unparalleled in intellectual honesty, remains Campbell’s exemplication of his BVSR epistemology by illustrating with his own career “the inevitable wastefulness of scientific exploration, the chancy indirectness of discovery, and the further chanciness of recognition” (“Perspective on a Scholarly Career,” 1988c).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Variations in Organization Science: In Honor of Donald T. Campbell, edited by Joel A. C. Baum and Bill McKelvey (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999) contains an almost complete and quite reliable bibliography of Campbell’s publications.

WORKS BY CAMPBELL

“Adaptive Behavior from Random Response.” Behavioral Science 1 (1956a): 105–110.

“Perception as Substitute Trial and Error.” Psychological Review 63 (1956b): 330–342.

“Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communication Systems.” Information and Control 1 (1958): 334–369.

“Methodological Suggestions from a Comparative Psychology of Knowledge Processes.” Inquiry 2 (1959): 152–182.

With Donald W. Fiske. “Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait Multimethod Matrix.” Psychological Bulletin 56, no. 2 (1959): 81–105. Reprinted in Campbell (1988b).

“Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes.” Psychological Review 57 (1960): 380–400.

With Julian C. Stanley. “Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research on Teaching.” In Handbook on Research on Teaching, edited by N. L. Gage. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. Reprinted as Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966, 2005.

“Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-cultural Evolution.” In Social Change in Developing Areas, edited by Herbert R. Barringer, George I. Blanksten, and Raymond W. Mack. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1965.

“Pattern Matching as an Essential in Distal Knowing.” In The Psychology of Egon Brunswik, edited by Kenneth R. Hammond, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

“Ethnocentrism of Disciplines and the Fish-scale Model of Omniscience.” In Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences, edited by Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif. Chicago: Aldine, 1969a.

“A Phenomenology of the Other One: Corrigible, Hypothetical, and Critical.” In Human Action: Conceptual and Empirical Issues, edited by Theodore Mischel. New York: Academic Press, 1969b. Reprinted in Campbell (1988b).

“Ostensive Instances and Entitativity in Language Learning.” In Unity through Diversity: A Festschrift for Ludwig von Bertalanffy, vol. 2, edited by William Gray and Nicholas D. Rizzo. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973a.

“The Social Scientist as Methodological Servant of the Experimenting Society.” Policy Studies Journal 1 (1973b): 72–75.

“‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems.” In Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, edited by Francisco J. Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky. London: Macmillan, 1974a.

“Evolutionary Epistemology.” In The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by Paul A. Schilpp. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1974b. Reprinted in Campbell (1988b).

“Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery.” In Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, edited by Francisco J. Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky. London: Macmillan, 1974c.

“On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral Tradition.” American Psychologist 30 (1975a): 1103–1126.

“Reintroducing Konrad Lorenz to Psychology.” In Konrad Lorenz: The Man and His Ideas, edited by Richard I. Evans. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975b.

With Thomas D. Cook. Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979a.

“A Tribal Model of the Social System Vehicle Carrying Scientific Knowledge.” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 1 (1979b): 181–201. Reprinted in Campbell (1988b).

“Experiments as Arguments.” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 3 (1982): 327–337.

“Science’s Social System of Validity-enhancing Collective Belief Change and the Problems of the Social Sciences.” In Metatheory in Social Science, edited by Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

“Neurological Embodiments of Belief and the Gaps in the Fit of Phenomena to Noumena.” In Naturalistic Epistemology: A Symposium of Two Decades, edited by Abner Shimony and Debra Nails. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987a.

“Selection Theory and the Sociology of Scientific Validity.” In Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program, edited by Werner Callebaut and Rik Pinxten. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987b.

“Descriptive Epistemology: Psychological, Sociological, and Evolutionary.” In Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science, edited by E. Samuel Overman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988a.

Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science: Selected Papers, edited by E. Samuel Overman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988b.

“Perspective on a Scholarly Career.” In Methodology and Epistemology of Science, by Donald T. Campbell; edited by E. Samuel Overman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988c. Reprinted with revisions from Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences, edited by Marilyn B. Brewer and Barry E. Collins. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981.

“Popper and Selection Theory [Review and response].” Social Epistemology 2 (1988d): 371–377.

“Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory.” In Evolution, Cognition, and Realism, edited by Nicholas Rescher. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990.

“Plausible Coselection of Belief by Referent: All the Objectivity That is Possible.” Perspectives on Science 1 (1993): 88–108.

“From Evolutionary Epistemology via Selection Theory to a Sociology of Scientific Validity,” edited by Cecilia Heyes and Barbara Frankel. Evolution and Cognition 3, no. 1 (1997): 5–38.

OTHER SOURCES

Bickman, Leonard, ed. Validity and Social Experimentation: Donald Campbell’s Legacy. 2 vols. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000.

Boyd, Peter J., and Peter J Richerson. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Brewer, Marilynn B., and Thomas D. Cook. “Donald T. Campbell.” American Psychologist52 (1997): 267–268.

Callebaut, Werner. Taking the Naturalistic Turn, Or How Real Philosophy of Science Is Done. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Callebaut, Werner, ed. “Donald T. Campbell.” Philosophica 60 (1997): 1–152.

Callebaut, Werner, and Rik Pinxten, eds. Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987.

Callebaut, Werner, and Rupert Riedl, eds. Special Issue in Honor of Donald T. Campbell. Evolution and Cognition 3, no. 1 (1997): 1–100.

Cook, Thomas D. “Toward a Practical Theory of External Validity.” In Validity and Experimentation, vol. 1, edited by Leonard Bickman. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2000.

Cronbach, Lee J., and Paul E. Meehl. “Construct Validity in Psychological Tests.” Psychological Bulletin 52 (1955): 281–302.

Deacon, Terrence W. “Beyond Piaget’s Phenocopy: The Baby in the Lamarckian Bath.” In Biology and Knowledge Revisited, edited by Sue T. Parker, Jonas Langer, and Constance Milbrath. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2005.

De Mey, Marc. “Vision as Paradigm: From VTE to Cognitive Science.” Evolution and Cognition 3 (1997): 81–84.

Dunn, William N., ed. The Experimenting Society: Essays in Honor of Donald T. Campbell. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1998.

Elek-Fisk, Elvira, Lanette A. Raymond, and Paul M. Wortman. “Validity Applied to Meta-Analysis and Research Synthesis.” In Validity and Social Experimentation, vol. 1, edited by Leonard Bickman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000.

Giere, Ronald N. Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Hahlweg, Kai, and Clifford A. Hooker, eds. Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Hendriks-Jansen, Horst. Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution, and Human Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.

Heyes, Cecilia M. “A Tribute to Donald T. Campbell.” Biology and Philosophy 12 (1997): 299–301.

———. “Introduction.” In Selection Theory and Social Construction, edited by C. Heyes and D. L. Hull. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.

Heyes, Cecilia, and David L. Hull, eds. Selection Theory and

Social Construction: The Evolutionary Naturalistic Epistemology of Donald T. Campbell. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.

Hull, David L. Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

———. Science and Selection: Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Levins, Richard. “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology.” American Scientist 54 (1966): 421–431.

Nelson, Richard R. “Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change.” Journal of Economic Literature 33 (1995): 48–90.

Overman, E. Samuel. “Introduction: Social Science and Donald T. Campbell.” In Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science, by Donald T. Campbell; edited by E. Samuel Overman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Parker, Sue Taylor, Jonas Langer, and Constance Milbrath, eds. Biology and Knowledge Revisited: From Neurogenesis to Psychogenesis. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2005.

Stanley, Julian C. “Biographical Memoirs: Donald Thomas Campbell.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society142 (1998): 115–120.

Thomas, Robert McG., Jr. “Donald T. Campbell, Master of Many Disciplines, Dies at 79.” New York Times, 12 May 1996.

Trochim, William M. The Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2nd ed. Available from http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/external.htm; version as of 20 October 2006.

Wimsatt, William C. “Reductionistic Research Strategies and Their Biases in the Units of Selection Controversy.” In Scientific Discovery, Vol. 2, Case Studies, edited by Thomas Nickles. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980.

———. “Heuristics and the Study of Human Behavior.” In Metatheory in Social Science, edited by Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

———. “Echoes of Haeckel? Reentrenching Development in Evolution.” In From Embryology to Evo-Devo: A History of Developmental Evolution, edited by Manfred D. Laubichler and Jane Maienschein. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.

Werner Callebaut