ETHICAL PLURALISM

Pluralism is a term used to describe a number of positions from different fields. This entry will confine itself to a discussion of ethical—as opposed to political, social, or metaphysical—pluralism.

Basic Definition and History

Ethical pluralism (also referred to as value pluralism) is a theory about the nature of the values or goods that human beings pursue, and the pursuit of which make up the substance of their moral lives. Most simply ethical pluralism holds that the values or goods legitimately pursued by human beings are plural, incompatible, and incommensurable. That is, there are many genuine human values, which cannot all be reduced to, or described in terms of, a single overriding value or system of values. This is because certain human values, by their very nature, come into conflict with other, equally valid, human values. Individual liberty, for instance, can conflict with equality, public order, or technological efficiency; impartial justice with compassion and mercy; scientific truth with public utility; and so on.

Sometimes compromises between values can be achieved, or solutions to value conflicts found; at other times, one is forced to choose between values. Such a choice may entail the sacrifice of a genuinely important, attractive, binding value or good, and so a moral loss. Finally, pluralism holds that values are incommensurable in that they cannot be ranked: There is no single most important or ultimate value, nor can values be ranked in a stable or universal hierarchy, nor is there a single principle or source of truth—such as utility, or a rational principle of moral duty, or natural law or the will of God—that can serve as a sure guide in making choices or compromises between values. Whether there can be any comparison between values of a less general and more practical sort is an issue that divides exponents of pluralism.

The first self-avowed pluralist was the U.S. philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910), who applied pluralism to the theory of knowledge and metaphysics. An early, forceful application of pluralism to ethics was made in 1918 by the German sociologist, historian, and philosopher Max Weber (1864–1920). The first full exposition of ethical pluralism under that name and in the form in which it is now known was given by the U.S. philosopher Sterling P. Lamprecht (1890–1973) in 1920. The thinker who did the most to develop and popularize ethical pluralism was the British historian, philosopher, and political theorist Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), and it is from his work that most contemporary discussions of pluralism take their bearings.

Contemporary Problems and Debates

The theory of pluralism expounded by Berlin contained a number of ambiguities and possible weaknesses, and these have been the basis for recent debates among the proponents and opponents of pluralism. One of the most persistent debates concerns the meaning of the claim that values are incommensurable. Berlin used the term to suggest that there is no single standard by which all values can be ranked, or that can be used to determine which value should be chosen in a particular case; and that no eternal scale or hierarchy of values exists—liberty is not inherently more valuable than equality, or spontaneity than dependability, or beauty than practicality. But Berlin also suggested that human beings can, at least sometimes, compare the relative importance and desirability of different courses of action or different values in particular circumstances; and that sometimes, at least, this comparison will lead to the conclusion that one value or course of action is more valid or desirable than another.

Other theorists have given a more radical account of incommensurability, holding that different values are wholly incomparable—they cannot be compared, or rationally chosen among, in any circumstance or way. This could lead to the conclusion that choices among values must be arbitrary, because, values being incomparable, there is no way to give a reason for regarding one value as inherently more important or better than another in any circumstance.

Many critics of pluralism maintain that it is no different from relativism—a claim that is difficult to evaluate in part because such critics rarely define exactly what they mean by relativism. Berlin insisted that pluralism is different from relativism by defining relativism in terms of a denial of common human understanding and common rules and values. Relativism, in Berlin's definition, holds that a Homeric Greek's admiration of ferocity, pride and physical prowess as moral attributes, for example, is as difficult for a person living in the early-twenty-first century to understand or share, as it is for one person who strongly dislikes peaches to understand another person's enjoyment of peaches. A person in the early 2000s may not admire Homeric heroism. Tastes simply differ; and values are ultimately a matter of taste. Berlin's pluralism holds, on the contrary, that one can understand the attractiveness and value of the Homeric ethic, even if one ultimately rejects that ethic in favor of other values, which are of greater importance to that particular individual.

One problem with this argument is that it rests on a distinctive and tailor-made definition of relativism that not everyone would accept. Another more common definition of relativism is the view that there simply is no inherently right or good course of action or true answer. On this definition, too, pluralism is opposed to relativism, because it holds that there are such things as inherently right or good courses of action and true values and answers; but right and goodness and truth are not singular. This is why pluralism insists that there are genuinely tragic moral dilemmas and conflicts, while relativism cannot allow that such dilemmas are genuinely tragic—they may be frustrating for individuals who feel pulled in different directions, but those individuals need not feel so conflicted.

Relativism can also be defined as holding that certain things are valuable or good solely in relation to their context. This, too, is opposed to pluralism, in at least two ways. First it can be taken to mean that, relative to a particular context, there is a correct value or way of being, which is not appropriate to a different context; pluralism holds that there are a variety of values that remain valid regardless of context, and that in many cases there will not be a single value which is obviously best or most important in a given context. Thus the relativist might say that social cohesion is of greater importance than individual freedom in, say, a traditionalist, pre-industrial society, while the opposite is the case in a modern, advanced society; while the pluralist would hold that both values are important to both sorts of society, and that people in both societies will be drawn to, and torn between, and have to choose or find a balance between both values.

Finally relativism can be interpreted as denying the existence of a universally valid, binding, and morally limiting core or horizon of human values; yet, Berlin—and other writers after him—have insisted on the existence of such a core or horizon as part of pluralism.

The most lively debate among political theorists about pluralism is the connection between pluralism and political liberalism. While Berlin attempted to link pluralism with liberalism, arguing for liberalism on pluralist grounds, the British political theorist John Gray
(b. 1948) has argued that pluralism actually undermines the authority of liberalism. Liberalism is a theory of government that privileges, and seeks to promote, certain values—primarily individual liberty—against and above other, non-liberal values. Gray asserts that if one take ethical pluralism seriously, one cannot assert the superiority, or impose on others, a single form of life, political system, or culture, because these embody and promote certain values to the detriment or exclusion of others.

While liberalism is certainly a valid choice for certain societies that, given their historical development and present situation, are more oriented toward the values that are central to liberalism, other forms of social and political organization have their own validity, and people in liberal societies must respect the claims and rights of societies that pursue other, non-liberal values. Other political theorists have tried to show that, while pluralism may not entail allegiance to liberalism, liberalism is a preferable political system to others because it better recognizes a genuine plurality of values, and allows for and protects greater freedom and variety of individual choice in pursuing these values.

The Relevance to Science, Technology, and Ethics

Pluralism presents a radical and important challenge to most traditional ethical doctrines, such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, as well as an alternative to relativism, while also offering a distinctive and versatile perspective on moral experience.

One of the few major exponents of pluralism to address the ethics of the use of science and technology is Gray. Earlier pluralists have generally shared an anthropocentric perspective, treating pluralism as a theory concerned with human values. Gray, however, has expanded pluralism beyond the human sphere, arguing that anthropocentrism—and thus humanism—are misguided. The world should be viewed as a whole—a biosphere—with human beings counting as but one species among many. Human-centric conceptions of humanity's place and stature are akin to monism in their denial of the incommensurability and conflict between human and non-human goods. Moral philosophers and ethicists should cease to always put human beings first, and should denounce humanity's arrogant subordination and abuse of nature—Gray has remarked that homo sapiens should be re-christened homo rapiens—in favor of a moral outlook that takes into account the whole of the earth. Few other pluralists have followed Gray's lead.

Much work remains to be done in applying pluralism to the ethical consideration of science and technology. A pluralistic ethics would suggest that people be aware of the varied and sometimes conflicting values that science and technology seek to serve. A pluralist perspective would recognize the inherent value of scientific research as conducive to the acquisition of knowledge—a genuine value in itself—as well as the value of applied science and technology in increasing human happiness, physical well being, and power. But it would also recognize the costs of the scientific quest, and of the employment of technology. It is a further reminder that, in using science and technology in the pursuit of other values, human beings are faced with choices between the competing values that science and technology may serve.

In doing so pluralism does not provide answers, but rather affirms the validity, difficulty, and intractability of the problems. A pluralist will, for example, recognize that both sides in the debate over the use of animals for medical experiments appeal to genuine values, and that a victory for either side would mean a serious moral sacrifice. A pluralist might also see the conflict between economic growth and environmental safety as embodying a genuine conflict of values—between the well being provided by jobs, economic expansion, and greater human control over nature, and thus comfort, versus the health of the environment, the existence of other species, and, ultimately, human health as well. A pluralist will advocate deciding between contending parties advocating conflicting values on a case-by-case basis, and will be wary of the use of monistic ethical theories (such as utilitarianism) to derive authoritative answers to such conflicts.

Pluralism thus provides ethicists, scientists, political activists, and policy makers with no certain answers to their moral problems, or sanction for their agendas. But it may inspire an increased awareness of, and respect for, the importance of such problems, promoting a greater moral seriousness and honesty in confronting the conflicts of values and possible moral sacrifices and losses that are involved in the pursuit and use of scientific knowledge and technology, and fostering a spirit of greater deliberation, humility, and respect for the priorities and perspectives of others.

JOSHUA L. CHERNISS

SEE ALSO Berlin, Isaiah;Values and Valuing;Weber, Max.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berlin, Isaiah. (1997). The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer. London: Chatto and Windus. A collection of Berlin's major essays, including his lengthiest expositions of pluralism.

Crowder, George. (2002). Liberalism and Value Pluralism. London and New York: Continuum. An argument for the compatibility of pluralism with a liberal political theory.

Galston, William. (2002). Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. An attempt to bring the insights of pluralism to bear on questions of political theory and public policy; argues that pluralism can support and improve liberalism, rather than undermining it.

Gray, John. (1996). Isaiah Berlin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. An exposition of Berlin's thought that offers a fuller, more systematic, and possibly more radical account of pluralism than Berlin himself did.

Gray, John. (2002). Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. London: Granta Books.

Hampshire, Stuart. (1983). Morality and Conflict. Oxford: Blackwell. A set of terse and withering reflections by a major exponent of pluralism, condemning humanity's use of science and technology to master nature.

Kekes, John. (1993). The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lamprecht, Sterling P. (1920). "The Need for a Pluralistic Emphasis in Ethics." Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17: 561–572. The first explicit articulation of what has become familiar as the theory of ethical pluralism.

Lukes, Steven. (1998). "Berlin's Dilemma." Times Literary Supplement March 27, 8–10. Discusses the problem of whether pluralism is distinguishable from relativism.

Walzer, Michael. (1983). Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books. Develops a pluralistic theory of distributive justice, thus applying pluralism to questions of government policy.

Weber, Max. (1946 [1918]). "Politics as a Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and eds. Hans
H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max. (1946 [1918]). "Science as a Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

INTERNET RESOURCE

Hardy, Henry. "Writings about pluralism before/independently of Isaiah Berlin." The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library. Available from http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk//lists/pluralism/onpluralism.htm.