Jurors, Death-Qualified

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In a process unique to criminal law in the United States, jurors in capital trials are subjected to a process known as “death qualification.” Since 1976 all criminal trials for which the death penalty is a possible sentence have been held in two different phases (producing what is known as a “bifurcated trial”): a guilt-determination phase, followed by a penalty phase if the defendant is found guilty of a capital crime. The rationale for death qualification is that justice in capital cases cannot be properly administered if jurors’ views about the death penalty are so strong that they prevent impartial decision making. So, during the voir dire jury-selection process, the prosecution and defense lawyers have an opportunity to “death-qualify” potential jurors by questioning them about their views regarding the death penalty.

Contemporary death qualification under the Supreme Court decision in Wainwright v. Witt (1984) eliminates potential jurors if they believe that their ability to function as a juror in a capital case would be impaired because of their views on the death penalty. This standard differs notably from that established previously by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), which excluded only those jurors who indicated such a strong opposition to the death penalty that they would not consider voting for a guilty verdict if there was even a possibility that a death sentence would be ordered.

Criticism of the death-qualification process has focused on two basic arguments: (1) that the process is unreliable, and (2) that the process creates systematic bias among the pool of eligible jurors such that they are predisposed toward guilty verdicts during the penalty phase. Research in this area generally has relied upon mock-juror and mock-jury studies in a social-psychological tradition, although sometimes researchers have been able to question jury-pool members and jurors who have served in actual capital cases.

A mock-juror study conducted by Ronald Dillehay and Marla Sandys (1996) suggested that the current Witt standard for excluding jurors in death penalty trials is unreliable, eliminating those who would ultimately be able to perform adequately as capital jurors and failing to identify some potential jurors known as “automatic death penalty” jurors who would always vote for the death penalty if a defendant had been convicted of murder. In addition, the death-qualification process itself may cause jurors to believe that the defendant is guilty and that a penalty of death is expected. Social science research also suggests that the death-qualification process may increase the likelihood of guilty verdicts during the first stage of bifurcated trials.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dillehay, Ronald C., and Marla R. Sandys. 1996. Life Under Wainwright v. Witt : Juror Dispositions and Death Qualifications. Law and Human Behavior 20: 147–165.

Marc W. Patry