Dworkin, Ronald 1931- (R.M. Dworkin, Ronald M. Dworkin, Ronald Myles Dworkin)

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Dworkin, Ronald 1931- (R.M. Dworkin, Ronald M. Dworkin, Ronald Myles Dworkin)

PERSONAL:

Born December 11, 1931, in Worcester, MA; son of David and Madeline Dworkin; married Betsy Celia Ross, July 18, 1958; children: Anthony Ross, Jennifer. Education: Harvard University, B.A., 1953, LL.B., 1957; Oxford University, B.A., 1955, M.A; Yale University, LL.B., 1965.

ADDRESSES:

Home—Woodbridge, CT. Office—College of Arts and Science, The Silver Center, 100 Washington Sq. E., Rm. 910, New York, NY 10003-6688. E-mail—[email protected]; [email protected].

CAREER:

Admitted to the New York Bar, 1959. Sullivan & Cromwell (law firm), New York, NY, associate, 1958-62; Yale University, New Haven, CT, assistant professor, 1962-65, professor, 1965-68, Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, 1968-69; Oxford University, Oxford, England, Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, 1969-98, Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, 1990-2004, Bentham Professor of Jurisprudence, beginning 2004, became professor emeritus; fellow of University College, 1969-98, emeritus fellow, 1998—; New York University, New York, NY, professor of law, 1975—, Sommer professor of law and philosophy, 1984—. Harvard Law School clerk for Judge Learned Hand, 1957-58. Princeton University, visiting professor of philosophy, 1963, 1974-75, Gauss seminarian, 1965-66; Stanford University, visiting professor of law, 1967; Western Reserve University (now Case Western Reserve University), Case Lecturer, 1967; delegate to the Democratic National Convention, 1972, 1976; Northwestern University, Rosenthal Lecturer, 1975; University of Witwatersrand, Academic Freedom Lecturer, 1976; Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, professor-at-large, 1976-82; Harvard University, visiting professor of philosophy and law, 1977, visiting professor of philosophy, 1979-82; University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Roscoe Pound Lecturer, 1979. Member of Democratic Charter Commission and Ditchley Foundation (member of program committee).

MEMBER:

Democrats Abroad (chairman, 1972-74), Oxford American Democrats, Garrick Club.

AWARDS, HONORS:

Honorary degree from Yale University, 1965; LL.D. from Williams College, 1981, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1983; fellow of the British Academy, 1979; fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Letters.

WRITINGS:

NONFICTION; UNDER NAME RONALD DWORKIN, EXCEPT AS NOTED

(With Herbert W. Titus; under name Ronald M. Dworkin) The Perils of Decriminalization (sound recording), Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, CA), 1976.

Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1977.

(Editor under name R.M. Dworkin) The Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press (New York, NY), 1977.

Political Judges and the Rule of Law (lectures), Longwood, 1977.

(Editor, with Karl Miller and Richard Sennett) David Rieff, general editor, Humanities in Review: Volume I, Cambridge University Press (New York, NY), 1982.

A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1985.

Law's Empire, Belknap Press (London, England), 1986.

A Bill of Rights for Britain, Chatto & Windus (London, England), 1990.

Justice and the Good Life, University of Kansas (Lawrence, KS), 1990.

Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, Knopf (New York, NY), 1993.

Conferencias de Ronald Dworkin en Chile, Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (Santiago, Chile), 1994.

The Rise of the Imperial Self: America's Culture Wars in Augustinian Perspective, Rowman & Littlefield (Boston, MA), 1996.

Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1996.

Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 2000.

(Editor, with others) The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, New York Review of Books (New York, NY), 2001.

(Editor) A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, and American Democracy, New Press (New York, NY), 2002.

Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin, edited by Justine Burley, Blackwell Publishing (Malden, MA), 2004.

Justice in Robes, Belknap Press (Cambridge, MA), 2006.

Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ), 2006.

Contributor, under name Ronald M. Dworkin, to The Role and Rule(s) of Law in Contemporary America, Antioch Press, 1970, and Equality and Preferential Treatment, edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ), 1977. Contributor to periodicals, including Philosophy and Public Affairs and New York Review of Books.

SIDELIGHTS:

Political philosopher Ronald Dworkin is highly regarded as an expert in jurisprudence, the science of law. A professor of law at New York University and of jurisprudence at Oxford University, Dworkin advanced his own controversial theory of legal principles in several books, including Taking Rights Seriously, A Matter of Principle, and Law's Empire. Critics have praised his works for their clarity, soundness of logic, and accessibility to the general reading public.

Dworkin's first solo effort, a collection of essays titled Taking Rights Seriously, was deemed "the most sophisticated contribution to [jurisprudence] yet made by an American writer" by Marshall Cohen in the New York Review of Books. In the volume, Dworkin rejects two prevailing models of law: legal positivism and utilitarianism. Legal positivism holds that individuals possess only those rights that have been granted by political decision or social practice. Utilitarianism maintains that the law should provide for the happiness of the greatest number and, in so doing, subordinates the individual moral rights of a minority to the desires of a majority. Finding both theories inadequate, Dworkin developed an alternative view of rights based on a distinction between legal rules and legal principles.

Dworkin's "major contribution to jurisprudence," wrote Cohen, is his attempt to "show that even in a hard case one of the parties has a legal right to win." Dworkin readily admits that different judges might decide the same case in different ways, but he proposes that a strict adherence to his tenets could increase the consistency of judges' verdicts. In a difficult case that lacks precedent or involves ambiguous or conflicting rules, a judge must exercise judicial discretion based on principle, the origin of which, explained Cohen, lies "in a sense of appropriateness—often … moral appropriateness—developed in the legal profession and in the public during a considerable period of time." The judges, in effect, take on legislative responsibilities, making new rights when issues cannot be decided on the basis of preexisting rights.

Dworkin exemplifies his theory in Taking Rights Seriously, applying the logic of his principles to several court cases. One essay in the volume cites Riggs v. Palmer, the 1889 case that questioned an heir's right to inherit his grandfather's estate after murdering the grandfather. Statutory law would yield the property to the murderer. But the court noted, as cited in the New York Review of Books, that "all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law." The court's decision that "no one shall … profit by his own … crime" reflected, in Dworkin's terms, the invocation of a principle. According to positivist doctrine, the murderer was denied his property. Dworkin contends, however, that because the law includes both principles and rules, the murderer had no right to the property under the law.

Alluding to several historic court cases, including Bakke v. the Regents of the University of California and the DeFunis discrimination case, Dworkin, as quoted by David Beckwith in Time, theorized that "the right to be treated as an equal" does not necessarily mean "the right to equal treatment." In both the Bakke and DeFunis cases, white males claimed that their right to equal protection of the law was violated by an educational institution's admissions policy favoring minority groups—Bakke was denied admission to the University of California's Davis medical school and DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington's law school. Dworkin argues that no individual has a right to a medical or legal education. Any admissions policy will place some group, be it the less intelligent, the more intelligent, a racial minority, or a racial majority, at a disadvantage. But because, as Cohen related, the policy in question "displays no lack of respect for those it disadvantages," it does not violate any student's right to be treated as an individual.

Michael Walzer asserted in the New Republic that under Dworkin's model "the rights that belong to all of us are ultimately entrusted to some of us, judicial Guardians, an elite of judges." But Dworkin counters the fear that such a system could be easily abused and sets up a broad scenario—which was cited by Walzer—to explain his theory: if a judge when confronted with a difficult case refers to a political theory that encompasses the convictions of a society then "the judge discovers rather than invents the rights that he enforces: his decision is really a ‘finding.’ Whether he likes what he finds or not, he is bound by it."

Despite the controversy it incited, Dworkin's first book was highly acclaimed. Roger Errera, writing in the Times Literary Supplement, echoed the majority of reviewers when he called Taking Rights Seriously "a tightly packed, energetic and profound book, the result of deep study and teaching … [that] is also well written and easy to read." Dworkin's second collection of essays, A Matter of Principle, was published in 1985 and also fared well with the critics. Called "a philosophical feast" by Steven Shiffrin in the New York Times Book Review, the book expanded on Dworkin's notion of principle in relation to the law. The author makes a distinction between arguments of principle, which are based on individuals' rights, and arguments of policy, which are based on the promotion of the public good. He suggests in one essay, as excerpted by Shiffrin, that liberalism, "an authentic and coherent political morality," revolves around an argument of principle: that "government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life." Dworkin emphasizes throughout the book that fair interpretations of the law are rooted in a moral framework and must expose and defend the fundamental principles relevant to each specific case.

Dworkin's 1986 book, Law's Empire, dubbed "a jurisprudential epic" by Bill Blum in the Los Angeles Times Book Review, offers perhaps the deepest explication of Dworkin's previously established philosophy. It presents another Dworkinian alternative to the conventional and pragmatic view of the law. Conventionalist doctrine is based on tradition and sees established authority as the source of the law. The pragmatist view of the law is more flexible, allowing individuals to interpret the law to their own advantage. With "elegance and power," wrote Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., in Washington Post Book World, Dworkin argues his alternative, "law as integrity." As quoted by Yoder, Dworkin claims in his book that the law as integrity "begins in the present and pursues the past only so far as and in the way that its contemporary focus dictates. It does not aim to recapture … the ideals or practical purpose of the politicians who first created it. It aims rather to justify what they did … to provide an honorable future."

Commenting on the controversy and criticism that Dworkin's theories have set off among scholars of jurisprudence in recent years, Beckwith noted that the author "has succeeded in stimulating his colleagues": editors of the Georgia Law Review seeking articles for an issue on jurisprudence "found that virtually every contribution [from scholars to the journal] addressed the challenging thoughts of the Yank at Oxford." Graham Hughes, a professor of law at New York University and colleague of the author, noted in the New Republic that Dworkin "is more honored among philosophers and political scientists than among lawyers." He called Dworkin's "partial exile" to England "unfortunate" because "Dworkin speaks with a specially American voice, bearing a hopeful gospel that the parched community of American lawyers and law professors needs to hear and debate."

Dworkin has continued to tackle the thorniest legal and moral questions of the modern era. His 1993 book, Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, delves into the religious, biological, and deeply held personal beliefs surrounding the sanctity of life. Dworkin arrives at the theory that people's views on the matter differ so greatly that they become a set of religious beliefs in and of themselves. Therefore, for the government to regulate such matters, such as overturning the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision that guarantees the right to abortion, creates a veritable establishment of religion itself—which the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty for all expressly prohibits. A Kirkus Reviews critic's assessment of Life's Dominion called it "an original contribution to the abortion debate, as well as a stimulating discussion of our contradictory feelings about the meaning of human life."

While at Harvard Law School in the late 1950s, Dworkin clerked for Judge Learned Hand, a New York state federal judge who was sometimes referred to as the Supreme Court's "tenth justice." Hand wrote extensively about the Constitution and the High Court, most famously in his 1952 book, The Spirit of Liberty, in which he asserted that, ideally, it is a spirit that "is not too sure that it is right." Dworkin's own body of writing has diverged from that view in favor of a moralbased interpretation of the Constitution. Hand and his ideas are discussed in the last chapter of Dworkin's 1996 book, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, a collection of essays that were previously published in the New York Review of Books between 1987 and 1994. Other chapters analyze the constitutional theories of Robert Bork, a rejected Supreme Court nominee in 1987, and Justice Clarence Thomas, who claimed to have formed no constitutional philosophy at all. The first two sections of the book are given over to discussions on abortion and freedom of speech. These essays discuss the Constitution and how judges should interpret a document that was written more than two centuries before in a far different era with different customs and morals; Dworkin argues against strict historical interpretation in favor of a moral interpretation. The framers of the Constitution, he asserts, deliberately set down abstract moral principles that could stand the test of time. "Complex and compelling, learned and readable, it goes to the heart of what it means to live in a democracy," stated a Publishers Weekly reviewer. Cass R. Sunstein, writing in the New Republic, called the essay on Learned Hand "the most intriguing chapter in the book, largely because of the tension between Dworkin's evident affection for Hand and Dworkin's equally evident antipathy to Hand's views."

Freedom's Law incited debate within the legal community. Michigan Law Review writer Thomas D. Eisele disagreed with Dworkin's assertion that the Constitution speaks in a moral voice. "Dworkin's recommended ‘moral reading’ of the Constitution is based upon an as- sumption that he, Dworkin, knows or understands what kind of a document the Constitution is," Eisele stated. "At the most basic level, Dworkin seems to think that he knows how the Constitution works and, in particular, that he knows how it speaks." Eisele compared it with other "statements of moral absolutes" from past philosophers and concluded that the Constitution fails to measure up as the moral document that Dworkin terms it. In contrast, Eisele argued, its language is similar to a corporate charter. In a lengthy California Law Review article, Edward J. McCaffery discussed the criticism of Dworkin's writings and theories. "We should stop arguing at or against Ronald Dworkin and start arguing with him," McCaffery concluded. "Dworkin has consistently stood up for what is best in liberal society," he added. "Freedom's Law amply demonstrates that he is still doing so with considerable skill, at precisely a time when our public political culture, liberal no less than conservative, is most in need of principles."

In Dworkin's Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, published in 2000, he discusses, over the course of several essays dating back to 1981, the slippery political ideal of "equality" and its vital importance to democracy. "No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance," Dworkin writes. In a line of reasoning leading from this assertion, Dworkin argues in favor of legislation that recognizes that not all citizens are created or born equal, and he concludes that a government should ensure that all have equal access to resources. With this in mind, he explores some contemporary political issues such as universal health care, cloning, and campaign finance reform. Dworkin judges the 1996 Welfare Reform Act harshly and also condemns the lack of universal health-care coverage in the United States as "a national disgrace." In the final chapters of Sovereign Virtue, Dworkin argues in favor of the idea that all human life should flourish, but that each person, on the other hand, is also responsible for his or her own flourishing. National Review essayist Peter Berkowitz disagreed with Dworkin's reasoning. "Dworkin is a powerful and persuasive advocate of the view that law and politics do indeed at crucial junctures depend on moral philosophy's services. At the same time, exposing the subtle maneuvers and clever obfuscations he employs to advance his particular derivation of law and public policy from morality is a powerful reminder that we have good reason to limit our dependence on philosophers." A Publishers Weekly reviewer termed it an "ambitious investigation into the very bedrock of a democratic society," and said its author is "one of our leading legal thinkers."

In his book The Rise of the Imperial Self: America's Culture Wars in Augustinian Perspective, Dworkin examines contemporary American culture and the similarities between modern cultural conflicts and those of antiquity. Dworkin believes that Americans of earlier generations, which he calls "Tocquevillian Americans," acted on principles he identifies with the teachings of St. Augustine. Tocquevillian Americans, according to Dworkin, were motivated by duty toward God, whereas modern Americans are mostly motivated by self-love and the urge to satisfy their own desires. He believes that there is an ongoing tension between those who adhere to the Augustinian viewpoint and those who oppose it. "Dworkin pursues his interesting thesis with creativity and with some success," stated Stuart Rosenbaum in the Journal of Church and State. Rosenbaum considered The Rise of the Imperial Self an "ambitious" book, even though he felt that there were important questions posed in Dworkin's writing that remain unanswered in the book.

Dworkin edited a collection of essays discussing the 2000 U.S. presidential race, titled A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court and American Democracy. The 2000 election, which pitted incumbent George W. Bush against Senator Al Gore, was marked by controversy, a questionable vote, and a Supreme Court decision to halt a recount effort. The contributions to this collection examine the electoral college system, the constitutional aspects of the decision, and the contradictions inherent in it. Americanstyle democracy is contrasted with democracies in other countries, where voter participation is substantially higher. A reviewer for Publishers Weekly found A Badly Flawed Election somewhat uneven in its coverage, but stated: "The book is a good place to start for readers wanting some perspective on the 2000 election."

Dworkin again took on an ambitious project with his book Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate. In it, he examines the degradation that, in his opinion, has affected American politics in recent years and which poses a threat to the very legitimacy of American politics. He suggests that two basic principles, which could be embraced by anyone, should be used to guide American politics: the idea that each human life has value, and that each person must be responsible for making the most of his or her own life. Working from the basis of these principles, he goes on to offer arguments on the proper way to deal with a variety of controversial issues, including treatment of suspected terrorists, taxation, and religion in public life. Writing for Library Journal, Robert F. Nardini called Is Democracy Possible Here? "among the most accessible of Dworkin's many books," and termed it "essential" for academic libraries.

Justice in Robes presents Dworkin's arguments for the reasons that moral considerations must be included in law, which are based in his belief that morality and law are inevitably intertwined. His philosophy has led him to support liberal positions on abortion rights, freedom of speech, and other issues. The author explains how his position has evolved over his years of scholarship and explains the influences that have led him to his beliefs. He also counters the many arguments that have been made against his position, on the basis of pragmatism and other concepts. A Publishers Weekly reviewer noted that Dworkin had long been an "influential voice" in the debate over what law is and what it should really do. That writer felt Justice in Robes is a significant work and commented: "This is a serious, difficult book that succeeds in explaining what Dworkin believes, what the other theorists argue, and why it matters who is right." A contributor to Michigan Law Review summarized: "Accessible, provocative, and enlivened by frequent clash, Justice in Robes offers an ideal primer for students beginning their study of jurisprudence, and the book also rewards close scrutiny by scholars who are already familiar with Dworkin's philosophy."

BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SOURCES:

BOOKS

Dworkin, Ronald, Law's Empire, Belknap Press (Cambridge, MA), 1986.

Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1985.

Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA), 1977.

Thinkers of the Twentieth Century, St. James Press (Detroit, MI), 1987, pp. 195-197.

PERIODICALS

Booklist, June 1, 2000, Bryce Christensen, review of Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, p. 1811.

Business North Carolina, December, 2006, J. Adam Abram, review of Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, p. 16.

California Law Review, July, 1997, Edward J. McCaffery, review of Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, pp. 1043-1086.

Chronicle of Higher Education, June 9, 2006, "The Last Judicial Idealist?"

Commonweal, December 15, 2000, David McCabe, "How Equal Can We Be?," p. 21; November 17, 2006, "Competing Values," p. 24.

Constitutional Commentary, spring, 1997, "Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's Constitution."

First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, April, 2007, "Illiberal Liberalism," p. 50.

Harvard Law Review, May, 2006, review of Justice in Robes, p. 2308.

Independent Review, spring, 2001, Daniel Choi, review of Sovereign Virtue, p. 618.

Journal of Church and State, winter, 1999, Stuart E. Rosenbaum, review of The Rise of the Imperial Self: America's Culture Wars in Augustinian Perspective, p. 157.

Kirkus Reviews, April 1, 1993, review of Life's Dominion; July 1, 2002, review of A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, and American Democracy, p. 930.

Library Journal, September 15, 2002, Steven Puro, review of A Badly Flawed Election, p. 77; July 1, 2006, Robert F. Nardini, review of Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 92.

Los Angeles Times Book Review, May 11, 1986, Bill Blum, review of Law's Empire.

Michigan Law Review, May 1997, Thomas D. Eisele, review of Freedom's Law: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, pp. 1799-1838; April, 2007, "On Dworkin and Borkin'," p. 1315.

National Review, August 28, 2000, Peter Berkowitz, "Easy Virtue."

New Republic, June 25, 1977, Michael Walzer, review of Taking Rights Seriously, p. 28; July 29, 1985, Graham Hughes, review of A Matter of Principle, May 13, 1996, Cass R. Sunstein, review of Freedom's Law, p. 35.

New York Review of Books, May 26, 1977, Marshall Cohen, "Taking Rights Seriously," p. 37.

New York Times Book Review, June 9, 1985, Steven Shiffrin, review of A Matter of Pinciple, p. 24; May 25, 1986, John T. Noonan, Jr., review of Law's Empire, p. 12.

Observer, June 8, 1986, review of Law's Empire, p. 24.

Publishers Weekly, March 11, 1996, review of Freedom's Law, p. 47; May 1, 2000, review of Sovereign Virtue, p. 57; July 29, 2002, review of A Badly Flawed Election, p. 63; February 20, 2006, review of Justice in Robes, p. 150; June 19, 2006, review of Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 54.

Reason, October, 2000, Richard A. Epstein, "Impractical Equality," p. 60.

Social Theory and Practice, April, 2006, "Ronald Dworkin, T.H. Green, and the Communal Theory of Political Obligation," p. 191.

Spectator, August 17, 1985, review of A Matter of Principle, p. 25.

Theological Studies, June, 2001, David E. Decosse, review of Sovereign Virtue, p. 433.

Time, September 5, 1977, David Beckwith, review of Taking Rights Seriously.

Times Literary Supplement, August 19, 1977, Roger Errera, "Taking Rights Seriously," p. 1007; October 25, 1985, "A Matter of Principle," p. 1195; August 22, 1986, "Law's Empire," p. 905.

Washington Post Book World, June 15, 1986, Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., review of Law's Empire.

Yale Law Journal, October 1996, Noah R. Feldman, review of Freedom's Law, pp. 229-234.