Sartori, Anne E. 1966–

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Sartori, Anne E. 1966–

PERSONAL:

Born 1966. Education: Yale College, B.A., 1988; University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1998.

ADDRESSES:

Office—Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Scott Hall, 601 University Pl., Evanston, IL 60208. E-mail—[email protected].

CAREER:

University of Wisconsin, Madison, instructor, honorary fellow, 1997, instructor, 1998, assistant professor of political science, 1998-99; Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, assistant professor of politics, 1999-2007, Charles G. Osgood preceptor, 2003-07; Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, associate professor of political science and (by courtesy) of managerial economics and decision sciences, 2007—.

AWARDS, HONORS:

University Fellowship, University of Michigan, 1990-91; MacArthur Fellowship in Peace and Security, fall, 1991; Rackham One-Term Dissertation Fellowship, winter, 1997; Princeton University Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences research grant, summer, 2001.

WRITINGS:

Deterrence by Diplomacy, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ), 2005.

Associate editor of World Politics, 1999-2007; on the editorial board of the Journal of Politics, 2007—.

SIDELIGHTS:

In Deterrence by Diplomacy, Anne E. Sartori analyzes the use of international diplomacy to defuse potential crises between militarized states. As she explains on her home page, the book "explains why states often are able to use diplomacy to resolve their differences, though diplomacy is only ‘cheap-talk.’ This work contrasts both with ‘audience cost’ models of international crisis behavior, which suggest that diplomacy works primarily for democracies, and with the traditional deterrence-theory view that credibility comes from shows of force." Drawing on game theory and statistical methodology, Sartori shows how and why states choose either to bluff or to use diplomacy in an honest way. According to Steven W. Hook, writing for Perspectives on Political Science, of central importance is "whether or not they have recently been seen as using diplomacy honestly." Indeed, Sartori makes clear, states' reputations "for honesty and bluffing affect the progression of the international disputes, even controlling for the military balance." Diplomacy often works, she explains on her home page, "precisely because it is so valuable. States take pains to use diplomacy honestly most of the time because doing so allows them to maintain reputations for honesty, which enhance their ability to resolve future disputes using diplomacy rather than force."

According to Sartori, much conventional thinking about diplomacy is wrong. Many analysts equate diplomatic leverage with a state's material or military power; dismiss the effectiveness of diplomatic discourse; and emphasize the constraining psychological effects of diplomacy. As Hook summarized Sartori's argument, pragmatists "are wrong in equating diplomacy with power politics, and liberals are wrong in emphasizing the human frailties and cognitive limitations of statespeople as they manage interstate disputes…. But the evidence suggests that, more often than not, the substance of diplomatic exchanges … plays a crucial role in determining whether peace or war will follow."

Sartori draws on several examples to illustrate her point about the importance of diplomacy. In 1950 U.S. leaders failed to take seriously China's threats to intervene in Korea, because Mao Tse Tung had developed a reputation as a bluffer on the international stage. But in this case Mao was not bluffing, and war ensued—a war that, in Sartori's view, could have been avoided had the diplomatic climate been more honest. According to Richard J. Harknett, writing in the Political Science Quarterly, the book's clearest example comes from the crisis in 1968 following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Rather than risk damaging its reputation with a bluff, the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson let the Soviet Union know that the United States would not get involved; at the same time, though, U.S. diplomats made it clear that the United States was resolved to protect West Berlin. As Harknett observed, "Sartori's notion of honesty challenges post-Munich-based conceptions of appeasement, which assume that indications of a lack of resolve in one crisis will only encourage challenges in the future and that, thus, states must be very concerned about appearing resolute." Citing the relevance of Sartori's argument, Harknett observed that Deterrence by Diplomacy "raises some interesting ideas for those interested in security studies, particularly deterrence theory and crisis management."

Sartori, an associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, teaches courses in statistics for use in the study of politics, international relations, and game theory as applied to international relations and comparative politics. Among her particular research interests are international rivalries such as those between India and Pakistan, and between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which account for a disproportionately large number of wars. Sartori is also engaged in research on theories of reputation formation, especially as this dynamic affects international security.