Ren and Yi
REN AND YI
REN AND YI are basic terms in Confucian thought. Ren is often translated as "benevolence" or "humaneness," and yi as "propriety" or "rightness"; in combination, the expression ren-yi refers to the Confucian way of life and is often translated as "morality."
Ren was probably cognate with another term, ren * (human beings, persons, others), and there are two main scholarly views regarding the early use of ren. One theory takes it to refer originally to the desirable attributes making one a distinctive member of certain tribes or aristocratic clans. The other takes it to refer originally to love or the tender part of human feelings, especially the kindness of a ruler toward his subjects. The term is used in the Analects of Confucius (sixth to fifth century bce) more often in a broader sense, but sometimes in a narrower sense. In the broader sense, it refers to an all-encompassing ideal for human beings that includes such desirable attributes as wisdom, courage, filial piety, conscientiousness, trustworthiness, or even caution in speech and the ability to endure adverse circumstances. In the narrower sense, it emphasizes the part of the ethical ideal having to do with affective concern for others, and on one occasion ren is explained in terms of love for fellow human beings. This latter use of ren is highlighted in the Mengzi. Mengzi (also known as Mencius, fourth century bce) characterizes ren in terms of love or concern for others, a concern that involves gradation—one's concern for and obligations to those closer to oneself go beyond one's concern for and obligations to those more distant from oneself. Ren also involves a reluctance to cause harm and the capacity to be moved by the suffering of others, where the scope of this concern includes not only human beings but also animals of certain kinds.
Yi was probably a near relative of, if not derived from, wo (I, me, myself), and it was used in early texts in relation to distancing oneself from disgrace—someone with yi has a proper regard for himself or herself and would not brook an insult or accept disgraceful treatment. By the time of Confucius, yi had come to be used more generally in connection with proper conduct, where what is proper is measured against certain ethical standards that go beyond ordinary social honor or disgrace. Both Mengzi and Xunzi (third century bce) highlight the distinction between what is truly honorable or disgraceful, as measured by certain ethical standards, and what is honorable or disgraceful by ordinary social standards. Unlike Mozi (fifth century bce), who explains yi in terms of li (profit, benefit), Mengzi often contrasts yi with li, emphasizing the priority of yi over profit. Mengzi uses yi to refer not just to the propriety of conduct but also to a desirable attribute of a person. As such, it involves one's regarding as tainting to oneself what falls below ethical standards, and one's insistence on distancing oneself from such occurrences.
Mengzi contrasts ren and yi by saying that the former concerns xin (heart, mind) of human beings and is that in which one resides, and the latter is the path for human beings and is that which one follows. Also, the former concerns what one cannot bear while the latter concerns what one would not do. Thus, ren has to do with affective concern for others, while yi has to do with strictness with oneself, a firm commitment to not falling below certain ethical standards. This contrast between ren and yi is highlighted by the Han Confucian thinker Dong Zhongshu (179–104 bce), who points to the link of ren to ren * (others) and of yi to wo (oneself). According to Dong, ren has to do with love for others (rather than oneself) and yi with straightening oneself (rather than others). The Tang Confucian thinker Han Yu (768–824) thinks that loving broadly is what is meant by ren, while acting in a way that's appropriate is what is meant by yi.
The understanding of ren and yi continued to undergo significant evolvement in later Confucian thought. Yi is often related to dao (way) and to li * (pattern, principle) in early texts. The Song Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130–1200) distinguishes between these concepts by saying that dao emphasizes the proper way of life for human beings in general, while yi emphasizes what is proper in relation to specific situations and affairs. Li * pertains to things and affairs, and is that which accounts for the way things operate and the way they should operate. Yi, by contrast, pertains to the actual dealings with affairs by human beings; a person acts with yi by following li * that pertains to the situation. While still often contrasting yi with li (profit, benefit), Zhu also endorses another early idea that regards li as arising from yi. While li * (pattern, principle) is ultimately one, its instantiation in things is differentiated and everything has its own feng (allotment, proper place). Yi involves following li * in things, thereby enabling each thing to attain its proper place (feng ) without interfering with other things; this is what is truly beneficial (li ) to things.
The early texts Yijing (Book of changes) and Li ji (Record of rites) refer to ren as the xin (heart, mind) of heaven and earth, and the Song Confucian thinker Zhang Zai (1020–1077) also speaks of the ren of heaven and earth. According to Zhang Zai, ren should encompass every thing and affair without omission, and the sage is like heaven in being without regard for himself. Following Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi explicates ren in terms of forming one body with ten thousand things; everything is part of oneself, so there is no longer a distinction between self (wo ) and other things. Following the brothers Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107), Zhu Xi characterizes ren as the xin of giving life to and nourishing things, endorsing the Cheng brothers' comparison of ren to the life-giving power of a seed of grain. Again drawing from the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi compares the use of ren in an ethical context to its use in a medical context. Everything is part of oneself, just as the four limbs are part of one's body. Just as numbness in a limb is referred to as the lack of ren in a medical context, a failure to be sensitive to the wellbeing of other things reflects a lack of ren in oneself. This does not mean that one should treat everything equally; just as one might sacrifice one's hand to protect one's head, the wellbeing of those closer to oneself can have priority over the wellbeing of others who are more distant. This is an application of the idea that although li * (pattern, principle) is one, its instantiation in things is differentiated; differential treatment of things is an appropriate response to the different relations one maintains to different things.
See Also
Bibliography
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Graham, A. C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill., 1989.
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Kwong-loi Shun (2005)