Kosovo: Ethnic Tensions and Nationalism

The Conflict

In 1999, NATO and the United Nations occupied Kosovo, a province in the former Yugoslavia, in order to protect the Muslim Albanian population from the Serbian military.

Political

• Serbia regards Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.
• Albanians in Kosovo are worried they will be oppressed if Kosovo remains with Christian Serbia.
• NATO and the United Nations believe that it would show lack of moral resolve and strength if they did not prevent violence in Europe.

Ethnic and Religious

• Albanians (Muslims) feel that they would be suppressed by Serbians (Christians) and fear ethnic cleansing (the use of terror—including murder and rape—to drive an entire community from an area).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops and the United Nations (U.N.) peace-keeping mission in Kosovo occupied Kosovo in the summer of 1999 with the intention of stopping interethnic conflict and promoting a peaceful multi-ethnic society in the province. Hardly a week has gone by since then without newspaper and television coverage of continued hostility between Serbs and Albanians—and of open conflict with peace-keepers by both groups. Clearly, restoring mutual trust after the NATO air war and Belgrade's attempts at ethnic cleansing will not be a short process.

Such a conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, while relations between the Albanian and Serb inhabitants of the region have not always been bitter, the Albanians of Kosovo (or Kosovars) have, throughout this century, disliked the incorporation of the province within modern Serbia and have periodically rebelled against it. But the historic counter-proposal to join Kosovo with Albania presents its own problems—essentially, the inclusion of the province in either state would leave a large, discontented minority.

Kosovo is thus quite typical of many areas of central and eastern Europe where two (or more) national populations are mixed together within borderlands. And just as typically, while there have always been conflicts between the two groups over issues such as resources or land owning, the most recent disputes are the result of the creation of national states (states based on an ethnic or "national" identity) in the region during the nineteenth century. Sadly, in most cases the solution to problems of ethnic intermixture has been ethnic cleansing—an activity not limited to the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic cleansing is the use of violence and terror to drive a people from a region. NATO intervention, if unintentionally, has caused hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins to flee Kosovo and may have permanently changed the nature of the province.

Historical Background

Conflicting Claims of Nationalism

Although relatively little has been written in English on the subject, the history of Kosovo has been the center of a long and politically charged debate between Serb and Albanian scholars. This is rather typical for regions of mixed population—for example, there is a similar debate regarding the history of Transylvania between Hungarian and Romanian scholars. In most of these debates there is a perceived link between historical presence in a region, and contemporary rights—the nationality that settled the region first, or has most densely or continually occupied it, has the better right to incorporate it in into their modern national state.

This is not a phenomenon limited to eastern Europe, of course, but the strong linkage common in the region between medieval (and even ancient) history and modern nationality often strikes many—such as Americans or Australians—as somewhat strange. In part, this is probably because being an "American" does not entail a strict "national identity" in terms of ethnicity—any immigrant to the United States becomes an American despite ethnicity, but an immigrant to Serbia, for instance, does not so automatically become a Serb. Perhaps more importantly, the dominant theory of nationalism in the United States and western Europe is that the rise of national identity is fairly modern, dating to the time of the French Revolution. Before this, other forms of identity such as religion, family, profession, region of origin, or the village of birth were held more strongly than nationality: the average person living in France in the sixteenth century may have been little concerned (or just as likely, unaware) that he or she was "French." In central and eastern Europe, however, contemporary scholars tend to see national identity as extending centuries or even millennia into the past—the modern Greek nation, then, is the direct and unbroken descendant of the ancient Greek states.

The Serb-Albanian debate over who has the "right" to Kosovo is thus quite complicated and draws heavily upon history. It can, however, be simplified down to the crucial matters of "who was here first," and "who was here in larger numbers." Albanian nationalists tend to argue that the Albanians are descendants of the ancient Illyrian peoples and have lived in Albania and Kosovo for several thousand years, while the Serbs are relatively recent newcomers, arriving only fourteen hundred years ago. Serb nationalists counter that Albanians have only lived in Kosovo since the Ottoman conquest six hundred years ago and Albanians increased in numbers only as Serbs were forced to flee the terrible Turks. The Ottoman Empire, led from Turkey, ruled much of southeastern Europe and the Middle East from the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries. Some Serb nationalists go further to argue that the Albanian majority is even more recent, the result of mass immigration during World War II when the Germans and Italians favored their Albanian allies. A more objective historical analysis shows the issue to be somewhat more complicated than this.

Medieval and Ottoman Kosovo

Kosovo was a key province in the medieval Serbian Empire of the late twelfth to early fourteenth centuries, thus forming one of the critical components of Serb affection and claims to the province as a "heartland" of Serbia, or as the "Jerusalem of the Serbs." In fact, it was also part of the Bulgarian Empire of the mid-ninth to early-eleventh centuries, and of the Byzantine Empire before that, so while the Serb connection is undeniably strong, it is not unique. Despite some contemporary assumptions, it was not necessarily the political heartland of medieval Serbia. Czars relocated the political capital frequently as the borders shifted. But the center of the Serbian Orthodox Church was always in Kosovo, which explains in part the high number and exceptional beauty of churches and monasteries there. The region's mines, particularly silver, were also an important element for the medieval Serbian economy. Finally, it seems clear that Kosovo's population was predominantly Serbian in this period. Although there is some evidence that an Albanian presence was in Kosovo this early, it was assuredly a minority.

This began to change after the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. The Ottoman victory at the "Field of the Blackbirds" is often used as a barometer to show the fall of the Serbs and rise of the Turks; but in truth, the Serb Empire was already in decline with various Serb contenders fighting amongst themselves, and the Sultan (the leader of the Ottomans) already in possession of most of Greece and Bulgaria. For that matter, Serb rulers continued to enjoy some independence until 1455 (and isolated fortresses held out until 1459), so the battle did not end Serb independence immediately.

Ottoman rule did result in gradual demographic shifts in Kosovo. Over time, the province had a growing Muslim population (much, but not all of which was Albanian) and a declining Christian one (much, but not all of which was Serbian). The reasons for the population shift are hotly debated, but are likely a mixture of immigration by Albanians, "Albanization" of Serbs who converted to Islam or took Albanian wives and husbands, and the flight of thousands or tens of thousands of Serbs from Kosovo (to northern Serbia and the Krajina) after unsuccessful rebellions in 1690 and 1738. In any case, by the end of Ottoman rule in Kosovo the population of the province had shifted from a clear Serb majority to an apparent Albanian majority.

Kosovo and Royal Yugoslavia

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was unable to keep the provinces in order; not only was banditry a widespread problem but also local warlords emerged, defying central authority. In such conditions political movements among the non-Turkish peoples in the Balkans (possibly inspired by the French Revolution's ideals of nationalism and enjoying a period of domestic national revival) were able to obtain increasing autonomy and then independence, beginning with Serbia in 1804. This gradual creation of national states was to transform local relations between ethnic groups into potential interstate conflicts, since the logic of nationalism demanded that all Serbs (or Greeks, or Bulgarians) be included in the new Serb state—even if a particular region included members of a different nationality. Such territorial questions were to loom large in the nine major conflicts—including the three most recent civil wars in the former Yugoslavia—fought in the region in the twentieth century.

Albanian interest in the creation of a national state came more slowly. Muslim Albanians were somewhat privileged under the Ottoman Empire and had less reason to resent it than did the various Christian groups. In addition, Albanians developed a sense of national identity more gradually, possibly because Albanian-inhabited regions had less contact with outside intellectual trends and influences, possibly because of relative poverty, and possibly because the strong identification with family and clan was still a viable alternative to a "national" identity. The turning point came in 1878, when the Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey awarded part of Albanian-populated Kosovo to Serbia. Although the Treaty of Berlin subsequently annulled this transfer the same year, Albanian leaders in Kosovo (united in the League of Prizren) protested the proposed transfer of Muslim inhabited lands to a Christian state.

Faced with an Ottoman government unable to protect it against the threat of Serbian annexation, the League increasingly pushed for an autonomous "Greater Albanian" province within the Ottoman Empire, which the Ottomans in Istanbul, Turkey, refused to grant—fearing this would lead to an independent Albania, as had happened with Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Over time, and outraged over the failure of the reformist Young Turk regime in Istanbul to grant significant autonomy despite initial promises, Albanian leaders turned to open revolt in early 1912. After several engagements, the Ottomans—simultaneously fighting an Italian invasion of Libya—agreed to compromise with the rebels and grant most demands.

This came to naught, however, since the First Balkan War of that same year resulted in the Serb annexation of Kosovo (and the occupation of several parts of Albania by Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek armies, in the hope to divide Albania between them). The Kingdom of Serbia, originally only a fraction of today's Serbia, had by the late nineteenth century established (or, as Serb leaders saw it, re-established) control over most of Serbia proper, and then began to push for the "liberation" of the Serb populations in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Hungarian Vojvodina, and Macedonia. The annexation of Kosovo (and part of Macedonia) in 1912-13 incorporated large, new lands where the local Serb population was outnumbered by ethnic groups hostile to Belgrade and which resisted the imposition of Serbian rule. An international commission created by the Carnegie Foundation found that Serb soldiers committed numerous acts of ethnic cleansing against both Albanians and Macedonians (crimes of which the Bulgarian and Greek armies were also found guilty).

Both Albanians and Macedonians sought to use World War I as a means by which to escape Serbian rule. Albanians hoped that a victorious Austria-Hungary, patron of the Albanian state newly established in 1913, would unite Kosovo with Albania. Though the Allies were ultimately victorious, Serbia was overrun by Austro-Hungarian, German, and Bulgarian armies in 1915 with much loss of life (possibly as much as one quarter of the Serb population died), while at the same time Serb troops fought guerrilla bands of Albanians in Kosovo. The open collaboration of Kosovars with the occupying powers—including Albanian military units who rose to support the Austro-Hungarians and anti-Serb persecution within Kosovo—was the justification for a new series of reprisals after the war.

The new Royal Yugoslavia created after World War I thus had a large Albanian component—nearly 450,000 Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia combined, and possibly larger—that fought inclusion. The Kaçak Rebellion of 1921-24 saw tens of thousands of Albanians rebel against the new state, while similar rebellions raged in Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia against a Serb-dominated central government. Faced with a large Albanian population in Kosovo repeatedly shown to be untrustworthy, Belgrade began actively attempting to colonize Kosovo (and Macedonia, also considered to be suspect) with Serb settlers. Tens of thousands of Serbs were settled in Kosovo during 1918-40, on land confiscated from local Albanian and Turk estate owners. Many of these colonists soon left the province, aghast at the rural poverty of the region and alarmed by Albanian hostility.

The events of World War II followed the precedent of World War I. The German invasion of April 6, 1941, and the division of the country placed most of Kosovo under Italian administration. As the Italians had previously occupied Albania in 1939, Kosovo and Albania were united as a single Italian colonial possession. As in World War I, many Kosovars supported the Italians and Germans and in return received various forms of limited autonomy, including Albanian-language schools. Military auxiliary units were raised, including the infamous SS Skanderbeg division. And again, local Serbs were harassed and attacked, and tens of thousands fled to Serbia proper or were killed.

Considering the heavy Serbian losses during the war and the disproportionate number of Serbs who fought in the resistance to the Nazis, Albanian collaboration with the Nazis is still bitterly regarded by many Serbs. Albanian collaboration makes rather more sense, of course, if one accepts that they considered it to be resistance to occupation by Serbia. It should also be noted that there were Kosovar partisan detachments and resistance to the Axis, if the intensity was less than in Serbia proper (or in Albania, which was quite active in resisting the Italian occupation). In addition, there were also Serb collaborators with the Germans. It is clear that ethnic cleansing and atrocities by both sides significantly altered the balance of population in both wars and the interwar period. The Albanians continued to be a majority, but not an overwhelming one.

Tito's Kosovo

With the retreat of German troops from Yugoslavia in the fall of 1944, the Communist Partisans entered Kosovo and engaged in another episode of guerrilla fighting with Albanian forces. Some fighting even broke out between Albanian and Serb partisan detachments, which made Albanian loyalty to the new state particularly questionable. Although there were some initial possibilities that Albania and Yugoslavia (and perhaps also Bulgaria and Greece) would be united in a larger federation, the early 1946 and 1953 constitutions of Yugoslavia created under the direction of communist leader Josip Broz Tito did not grant a republic or "national" status to Albanians. As relations with Albania worsened in 1948 after Yugoslavia left the Soviet bloc, official government repression of the Albanian population increased. Agricultural land was collectivized, Muslim religious schools closed, and attempts were made to encourage Albanians to emigrate.

By the late 1960s, however, widespread Albanian discontent inspired Tito to change course. Alexander Rankovic, minister of the interior and creator of much of the architecture of repression in Kosovo, was purged and compromises were made with regard to Kosovar demands. Relations with Albania began to improve after 1961, when Albania left the Soviet bloc, and this resulted in some limited cultural and commercial exchange. In 1969 the University of Prishtina was established and classes were taught in both Albanian and Serbo-Croatian, with significant implications for Kosovo's later political history. Further, displays of Albanian nationalism were tolerated in an attempt to woo Albanians into becoming loyal supporters of federal Yugoslavia.

The most significant concession came with the 1974 constitution, which made Kosovo an autonomous federal province and provided it with equal representation within the federal government. Albanian cultural institutions were similarly encouraged and funded by the federal government. In addition, significant financial investment was directed towards Kosovo from the federal budget with the intention of creating a stronger economic base and providing employment opportunities for Albanians.

By Tito's death in May 1980, some of the effects of these policies of conciliation were becoming clear. Rioting broke out less than a year after his death, initially because of student demands for better food and housing (both of which were quite dismal). In fact, the university system well symbolizes some of the problems of Tito's later Kosovo policies. In 1980 over a quarter of the entire population of Kosovo were students in elementary, secondary, or post-secondary facilities and, with government funding, very large numbers of Albanians were attending Prishtina University. At the same time, the university was relatively underfunded and was clearly inferior to the more prestigious universities in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade. Nor could Kosovo possibly absorb the graduates of the university system: many new graduates found that their degrees (particularly in such fields as Albanian cultural studies) were of no use in finding them jobs. Nor had massive economic investment dramatically improved the situation in the province. Instead, the conciliatory policies had served to raise Kosovar expectations without providing the means by which they could obtain the standard of living they now expected. The result was a flurry of nationalist displays demanding an Albanian republic within Yugoslavia (or, in more extreme cases, union with Albania), demands seen as threatening by Serbs, Montenegrin, and Macedonians.

Chiefly because of the poverty of the region, Serbs had left Kosovo for the industrial cities of Serbia in large numbers during the 1960s and 1970s. But by the mid-1980s there was a widespread perception that Albanians were forcing Serbs to leave and that the Serb population was rapidly dwindling. Scattered vandalism, intimidation, and violence against Serbs occurred and was exaggerated by the apprehension. The increasing Albanian presence in local political and economic life was also a form of pressure, and many Serbs began to feel that the Albanians were actively seeking to drive them out to create an ethnically pure state. By 1986 local Serbs began protesting the degree of "Albanianization" of Kosovo; Serb intellectuals, including members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and several figures considered to be on the liberal left demanded that Kosovo be brought under the direct control of Belgrade to protect Serb interests there; and active debate was beginning about revoking Kosovo's autonomy among political figures.

Milosevic's Kosovo

By the late 1980s, the turmoil in Kosovo was not simply an Albanian-Serb conflict, but was seen by the other Yugoslav republics as a potential threat. Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in 1987 as president of the Republic of Serbia was fueled by the support of Serbs angry over the abandonment of Kosovo to the Albanians. Massive demonstrations in response to Serb moves by Kosovar Albanians in late 1988 and early 1989 in support of autonomy and independence were seen by local Serbs as further hostile pressure, and counter-demonstrations were held in Belgrade, the capital of the Republic of Serbia. In response, the government of the Republic of Serbia imposed a state of martial law in the province, further polarizing sentiments in the region. At the same time, Milosevic and his political allies moved to eliminate the autonomy of Kosovo, and in March 1989 enacted amendments to the constitution of the Republic of Serbia to eliminate autonomy in Kosovo and, subsequently, the Vojvodina. In 1990 the Albanian members of the former parliament declared independence within Yugoslavia for a Republic of Kosovo, and Belgrade responded by eliminating the remaining vestiges of local government. The immediate effect of this period was to ensure widespread support for Milosevic, now widely perceived as a defender of Serb rights, and to frustrate Albanians who saw the gains of 1974 being illegally reversed.

All this was viewed with misgivings by the other republics. Slovenia and Croatia, long dissatisfied with Yugoslav economic policies, were unhappy at footing the bill for Serbia to regain control over a non-Serb populated region, however historically significant. Worse, Milosevic used federal troops and employed legally questionable moves. This raised the possibility that such moves might be made on behalf of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. Further, by establishing control over Kosovo and the Vojvodina, Milosevic now controlled three of the seven votes within the ruling council of Yugoslavia, and controlling one more vote would give him control over federal policy. Although both Slovenia and Croatia had long pushed for reform and considered secession, the Kosovo crisis of the late 1980s helped push the two republics into the final steps that shattered Yugoslavia.

By 1992 Kosovo was divided into two spheres as Serbs dominated the government, police, education, and certain vital industries such as mining; and Albanians created their own shadow government, as well as dominating most economic life at the local levels. Ironically, as Albanians withdrew from FR Yugoslav institutions, they strengthened the position of hard-line Serbs in the government—it seems likely that Milosevic might have been defeated in the December 1992 elections if Albanians had not boycotted them and refused to vote. By the mid-1990s, large numbers of Albanians had left the province, chiefly because of the deteriorating economy and discrimination rather than as a result of violent ethnic cleansing.

Anxiety continued to grow among Serbs in Kosovo as events in Croatia and Bosnia played out over 1991-95; ultimately, Milosevic was unwilling to risk his own power base in order to intervene on the behalf of Serbs living outside Serbia, and the refugees from the Krajina that fled to Serbia were given only limited assistance (many, in fact, were pressured to settle in Kosovo as part of a new colonization program). Rather than inspire moderation on the local level, however, such fears led to active attempts to obtain weapons for protection against Albanians, since Belgrade was no longer to be completely trusted with defending them.

Albanian leaders for their part had gone on to proclaim an independent "Republic of Kosovo" in 1991 and conducted subsequent elections in 1992, appointing Ibrahim Rugova as the president. Despite certain provocative actions by his fellow Albanian political leaders, Rugova stressed non-violent and passive resistance to Serb policies. International mediation was seen as the key to obtaining a peaceful solution, particularly as the horrors of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia came to light. Even as those wars raged, violence in Kosovo was generally limited to occasional rioting and protests.

Although there were isolated terrorist attacks against Serbian police officers as early as 1993, the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came relatively late, over 1996-97. Its emergence can be traced to several factors. First, passive resistance for five years had gained the Kosovars little and had not served to lessen Serbian repression. Worse, international recognition (though not by the United States) of the FR Yugoslavia came in 1996 without any provision regarding Kosovar rights, despite Rugova's expectations for international mediation. Finally, the anarchy in Albania in March 1997 made weapons available for nascent terrorists—as did the money made available by alleged illegal activities by some members of the KLA, such as drug smuggling. With many Albanians, particularly students, unhappy with Rugova's policies and with ready access to weapons, the emergence of a violent alternative may have been inevitable.

More vicious clashes between the FR Yugoslav police and security forces and the KLA broke out in September and November 1997 as police vehicles and barracks were attacked. By February 1998 Serb forces had realized the potential threat of the KLA and began to clamp down on the province more severely, driving more Albanians to support of the KLA. By the middle of the year, the KLA may have held as much as 40 percent of Kosovo. Large-scale Serbian offensives in August 1998 increasingly pressured the KLA, but also began to include attacks against civilian targets. The continued, escalating violence between the KLA and Yugoslav security forces in late 1998 led to international demands for mediation, and the threat of a new series of Yugoslav campaigns to the insistence of the International Contact Group on the Rambouillet talks of March 1999. When the talks broke down, to the NATO air campaign against the FR Yugoslavia and subsequent intervention.

Recent History and the Future

It is clear that the NATO and United Nations peacekeeping missions in Kosovo have changed the balance of power in the province. Most of the Serb population appears to have fled; media accounts in early 2000 suggest that nearly 250,000 Serbs, Montenegrins, and Roma (Gypsies) have left the province, and that about sixty thousand remain. The pretext for international intervention was to preserve and strengthen a multi-ethnic society, and the current missions in Kosovo still legally recognize the province as being part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). But Belgrade's power in and over the region has been crippled, and many Serbs have fled fearing reprisals from Albanians. At the same time, the rise of the KLA has undermined the more moderate Albanian parties and it is possible that any agreements undertaken by Albanian representatives might not be respected by all KLA factions.

In the short term, the future of the province is uncertain. Peacekeeping forces have been relatively unable to control widespread crime and corruption in the province, much of which is controlled by former KLA members. Disagreements between the United Nations and various Kosovar political factions have limited reconstruction efforts. And while elements of both the Serb and Albanian population are willing to collaborate in easing tensions, extremists and widespread bitterness on both sides have limited progress in creating a political dialogue. It is also uncertain how successful disarmament may have been, since large numbers of weapons (especially Kalashnikov assault rifles) were obtained by Albanian civilians from Albania, and were distributed to Serb civilians by the government of the Republic of Serbia. It seems unlikely that either NATO or the U.N. will be able to "dis-engage" from Kosovo in the near future.

Over the next five to ten years, it seems increasingly likely that many Kosovars will be unwilling to accept autonomy for the province within Serbia, particularly if the Republic of Montenegro were to secede—seen as a possibility in late 1999 and early 2000 if relations with Belgrade were to worsen. As Belgrade's influence continues to weaken, the Serb population dwindles and Albanians become increasingly confident in their ability to resist or delay integration, it seems increasingly likely that the province will simply declare its independence from Serbia—likely leading to political conflicts with the peacekeepers and potentially another round of war with the FR Yugoslavia.

A second possibility is partition of the province between Serbia and local political leaders, although both NATO and the U.N. have repeatedly opposed any division of Kosovo. Before 1999 it would have been difficult to draw a clear ethnic boundary in the province, but Serb flight has left only two large pockets of Serb settlements. The first, smaller pocket is in the southeastern corner of the country, bordering both the republic of Serbia and Macedonia. The larger pocket comprises part of the city of Mitrovica and surrounding areas to the north. This area is both almost exclusive Serb and borders Serbia; in addition, after less than a year it has become almost completely economically and politically segregated from the rest of Kosovo. The FR Yugoslav dinar is used as the currency, for example. The chief obstacle to partition would probably be the fact that the region holds access to much of the Trepca mine complex, crucial to Kosovo's economy and which Kosovars would be loathe to relinquish (and in which, prior to 1989, many Albanians worked).

In either of the three cases—renewed autonomy in the Republic of Serbia or Federal Yugoslavia, independence for the province, or independence for Albanian majority areas—it seems likely that the outcome will increase tensions to the south, in the Republic of Macedonia.

Macedonia—The Next Kosovo?

Kosovo is not the only part of the former Yugoslavia with a substantial Albanian minority. There are small numbers of Albanians in Montenegro and Serbia, and a much more substantial population in the Republic of Macedonia. While census figures from the 1991 and 1994 censuses in Macedonia are still an issue of dispute (many Albanians boycotted the first election, and claim the second census under-represents them) there are roughly 440,000 Albanian citizens in Macedonia, or one-quarter of the population—not counting either illegal immigrants or refugees from Kosovo, both present in considerable numbers.

As in Kosovo, birthrates among ethnic Albanians in the rural areas are higher than for ethnic Macedonians. There is also a similar trend of Macedonians leaving the rural countryside in favor of the cities; one result of this is that the total area of Albanian settlements is apparently slowly increasing, as Albanians settle in abandoned villages. The possibility that historic Macedonian centers, such as Ohrid, might be surrounded by Albanians disturbs many Macedonians, and there have been calls for the government to "resettle" Macedonian villages with ethnic Macedonians.

Unlike Kosovo, since 1991 there has been no official, open persecution of Albanians and Albanian political parties have been part of coalition governments—including the recent coalition government formed in 1998 by the Macedonian nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE. Albanians enjoy a number of rights as a minority, including the recognition of Albanian as an official language in state use and Albanian-language schools. Many Albanians counter, with some justification, that there remains widespread unofficial discrimination against Albanians: Albanians have a lower standard of living, have their political influence minimized by gerrymandering (the manipulation of electoral districts), and are underrepresented in university admissions, the officer corps of the army, the police, and the middle levels of government. Allegations of police brutality against Albanians have been substantiated by the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, although there is less evidence that this is official government policy. Albanians have also protested certain articles of the Macedonian Constitution, which proclaims Macedonia as the state for the Macedonians, endorses the Macedonian Orthodox Church as the official religion and initially declared Macedonian to be the only official language.

Albanian efforts to make the Albanian language completely equal to Macedonian in public use or to obtain more government jobs and funding have been greeted with hostility. Particularly contentious was the opening of the Albanian-language University of Tetovo in 1994, which the government declared to be illegal and has violently suppressed on several occasions. Ethnic Macedonian students have protested against both recognition of an Albanian university and against conducting classes in Albanian at the national university. Although the government softened on the matter over 1997-99, if Kosovo slides toward independence many Macedonians may draw parallels between the University of Prishtina and the University of Tetovo, and fear that the university may embolden secessionist demands. At the same time, some Albanian extremists see the university as too close to the Macedonian government and self-proclaimed members of the KLA have publicly threatened to kill the president of the university as a collaborator.

From the perspective of many Macedonians, Albanian demands for autonomy directly threaten the state's existence. Geographically, Macedonia is not large, and the loss of its western regions is alarming. The country has also suffered continued economic problems since independence, chiefly because of the loss of its Yugoslav trading partners (the routes through and to Serbia having been closed several times by U.N. embargoes), but Greek hostility and domestic corruption have not helped. Many Macedonians who have seen their standard of living decline from the Yugoslav era resent the increasingly assertive Albanian political movement, and suspect it may further weaken their livelihoods.

Most worrisome is that many Macedonians perceive their country to be surrounded by hostile states. Greece has engaged in a number of sharp diplomatic conflicts with Macedonia, chiefly over what many Greeks regard as the "theft" of Greek heritage—such as the term "Macedonia," which Athens refuses to acknowledge (and thus leading to the confusing practice of many international organizations referring to "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," or FYROM). While recent Bulgarian policy has been extremely friendly, there is much dispute over the history of the Macedonians and lingering fears that the Bulgarians may actively seek to annex the country. And while many Macedonians have relatives in the FR Yugoslavia and have been somewhat sympathetic to the Serbs in the Croatian, Bosnian, and Kosovo conflicts, there are fears that Serbia could either seek to annex the Serb populated areas around Kumanovo in the northeast or (more likely) send troops into parts of Macedonia if the Kosovo conflict spills over into Macedonia if rebel Albanians attempted to escape to the south. In the face of external threats, possible Albanian secession has been interpreted as part of a potential repartition of the Republic of Macedonia.

All of this helps to explain why although government policy is much more tolerant than in much of the rest of the former Yugoslavia, domestic reaction can be so strong to events such as the Albanian mayor of Tetovo flying an Albanian (as well as a Turkish) flag in front of the city offices—an episode which ultimately involved fighting between Macedonian police sent in to confiscate the flags, at least one Albanian death, a seven-year jail sentence for the mayor (since amnestied), and widespread protests.

Bibliography

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Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer, eds. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. New York: New York University Press, 1997.

JamesFrusetta

Chronology

800s-1000s Kosovo is part of the Bulgarian Empire.

1100s-1300s Kosovo is part of the Serbian empire.

1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje (the "Field of the Blackbirds") is a major battle from which Serbs trace the downfall of greater Serbia.

1918-40 Serbs colonize Kosovo in an attempt to pacify the province.

1921-24 Albanians rebel against Royal Yugoslavia in the Kaçak Rebellion.

1944 The modern state of Yugoslavia is established under Josip Tito.

1974 The Yugoslav constitution is rewritten to declare Kosovo an autonomous province.

1980 Josip Tito dies.

1989 Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic strips Kosovo of autonomy. Protests begin.

1990 Troops are sent to Kosovo to impose control. Serbia dissolves Kosovo's government.

1991 Separatists declare Kosovo a republic.

1996-97 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerges.

1999 NATO air strikes begin to prevent ethnic bloodshed in Kosovo.

The Field of Blackbirds

The battle of Kosovo Polje, "Kosovo Field," in 1389 and its importance to contemporary Serbs has been widely noted in the media. Unfortunately, much of this attention has either been too uncritical of the current position or too critical, which makes it sometimes difficult to understand the issue.

In its "mythic" sense, the Field of the Blackbirds was the culminating event in which the Serb nation was shattered by an Islamic Ottoman Empire that proceeded to enslave and repress Serbs for four and a half centuries. Some see a religious or mystical meaning in this as well, with the enslaved and defeated Serbs to be redeemed after time; others see a national meaning of pride in resistance to a foreign conqueror. The assassination of Sultan Murad by the Serb noble Milosh Kobilich before the battle (who was himself killed by the Sultan's guard moments later) underscores this larger concept of resistance.

The historical "truth" is much muddier, at least in the eyes of American scholars. There were Serbs who fought on both sides of the battle (since, to preserve their positions, many local nobles in each region agreed to serve the Sultan as vassals), and the Serbian force included a number of non-Serbs (including Albanians). In addition, there is evidence that some peasants welcomed the Ottomans initially, since taxation was somewhat lower. And finally, Serbia itself was not directly annexed to the Empire until 1455—though an important battle, Kosovo Polje was one part of gradual Ottoman conquest of the Balkans.

Historical "truth" does not by any means invalidate the "myth," however, and the importance of 1389 should not be dismissed as Serb nationalism or mysticism. Americans have their own myths about the history of the United States, which are often historically false but important to Americans today. The American Revolution is cherished as being a shining example of a war for liberty, human rights, and democracy and is enshrined as such in political rhetoric, in many popular histories and in the American mindset. But many historians have raised questions about how such mundane—even repulsive—interests such as anti-Catholicism (the British government's toleration for Catholics in Quebec angered many colonists), desire to seize Indian-held land (the British government sought to limit settlement in the Ohio Valley, at least partially to protect local tribes), and even tax evasion (the hated "taxes" were in large part intended to pay for the troops and naval forces used to protect the colonies) played a role in the war. Others have pointed to the status of women and black Americans to question the commitment to "rights" and "democracy." This is not to say that the American Revolution was not about representation and rights—but that things were not simple and should not be accepted at face value. The same can be said about the significance attached to the battle of Kosovo Polje.

Kosovo or Kosova?

When events in Kosovo became headline news in 1999, there was some disagreement about which name to use for the region. The Serb form, Kosovo, generally prevails in English-language scholarship. In Albanian, however, the region is "Kosova" (or "Kosovî," in some grammatical situations). It is thus not uncommon to see journalists and scholars sympathetic to the Albanians use Kosova instead. "Kosovar" is increasingly being used to refer specifically to Albanians.

One added bit of confusion is that the Yugoslav government and many Serbs refer to the region as "Kosovo and Methoija" (or by the Communist-era acronym Kosmet) in the same fashion as "Bosnia" is more properly "Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Kosovo, Albania, and Greater Albania

If a "Greater Albania" is created to join Albania, Kosovo, and western Macedonia into a single state, it is quite possible that unification would be driven by Kosovars. Greater Albania might, in many ways, be a Greater Kosovo.

Albania under the communist regime was one of the poorest countries in Europe, and since 1991 the country has been plagued by widespread corruption, abuse of power by ruling political parties, and economic malaise. The country reverted to near anarchy in March 1997 when much of the population lost its savings in a series of "pyramid schemes" and rioted in protest of the government's refusal to compensate the victims (in addition, there was suspicion that some members of the government had profited from the scheme) and of government corruption and repression in general. During the temporary collapse of government the military armories were looted and hundreds of thousands of automatic and heavy weapons were distributed among the people in general (many of which would be subsequently acquired by the Kosovo Liberation Army). A new government led by members of the opposition succeeded in re-establishing order, but was in turn shaken by an attempted coup d'état in September 1998. The government is still only partially able to oppose private vendettas (the notorious Albanian "blood feud"), the rise of organized crime in the cities (much of which claimed to be run by Kosovars), and outright banditry in rural areas. Vicious fighting between the two major political parties has also prevented order.

There are as many Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia as in Albania, and most of the former enjoyed a standard of living and education much better than that available in Albania. The past decade has seen a rise of Kosovar influence among their co-nationals in both Tirana and in Macedonia, and the occupation of the province by peacekeepers may well increase this influence. If Kosovo does achieve independence, it may control the pace and path of future unification rather than Albania itself.

Interestingly, although relations between the KLA and the former government of Sali Berisha (which fell in 1997) were fairly close, the current government of Fatos Nano has distanced itself from both the KLA and pro-independence figures in Macedonia, likely in an effort to please both Greece and the FR Yugoslavia as well as the West—and attract badly needed investment and aid.

Any creation of a future "Greater Albania" would need to take into account the differing goals of the leaders of Albania, Kosovo, and the Albanian minority in Macedonia. What is good for Kosovars may well not be good for their co-nationals in Macedonia and Albania.