Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 1028 (1990)
WASHINGTON v. HARPER 494 U.S. 1028 (1990)
A Washington state prison policy authorized the treatment of a prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his or her will, provided that the prisoner be (1) mentally ill, and (2) either gravely disabled or likely to do serious harm to others. These two findings were to be made by a committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and an official of the institution in which mentally ill prisoners were held. The state supreme court held that this procedure, which lacked fully adversarial procedural guarantees such as those available in a court proceeding, denied a mentally ill prisoner procedural due process of law. The Supreme Court reversed, 6–3.
Justice anthony m. kennedy wrote for the Court. The prisoner had a "liberty interest" in being free from arbitrary administration of a psychotropic drug; however, the procedure provided by the state was sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. A court in a single proceeding cannot adequately evaluate the intentions or likely behavior of a medically ill person; such an evaluation requires ongoing observation of the kind available to the members of the committee given responsibility for the decisions here. The risks of an antipsychotic drug are mainly medical risks, which can best be evaluated by professionals. Although the state's policy does not allow representation by counsel, it does provide for a lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues; this assistance is sufficient to satisfy due process.
Justice john paul stevens wrote for the dissenters. In his view, the state policy violated both substantive due process and procedural due process. In support of the first objection, he argued that the policy authorized invasion of the prisoner's liberty not only for his own medical interests but also to maintain order in the institution. The second objection was that, considering the seriousness of the invasion of the prisoner's liberty interest, the committee was insufficiently independent of the institution's administration to satisfy the requirements of a fair hearing.
Kenneth L. Karst
(1992)